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FOREWORD
 
This$198,962.00 Space Industrialization Study was performed under
 
NASA Contract NAS8-32197 for Marshall Space Flight Center from September
 
1976 through April 1978. The study was intwo parts: Part 1 identified the
 
future opportunities for space industrialization, quantified the potential
 
benefits and developed and analyzed evolutionary program options required
 
to take advantage of these opportunities, Part 2 defined the framework
 
of international governmental, industrial, legal and economic constraints
 
within which space industrialization (SI) must evolve. Step-by-step guide­
lines to implementation of programs to capitalize on the SI opportunities
 
were formulated using information from Part I and Part 2. The study results
 
are documented infour volumes.
 
1. SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION - AN OVERVIEW
 
2. SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION - OPPORTUNITIES, MARKETS AND PROGRAMS
 
3. SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION - WORLD AND DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS
 
4. APPENDICES
 
Part 1 of the study was managed by Dr. Ralph Sklarew and Part 2
 
by Mr Gerald W. Driggers. Other key SAI participants were Mr. E. Battison,
 
Mr. D. Davis, Mr. Sam Gibson, Mr Mark Klan and Mr. Gordon Collyer. A large
 
portion of the work reported here was accomplished by consultants who
 
occupied roles as principal investigators. The key consultants were:
 
* Mr. Robert Salkeld - System Planning and Programmatics
 
* Mr G.Harry Stine - Industrial Planning and Marketing
 
* Mr. Paul Siegler - Market Assessment and Economic Analysis 
* Dr. J. Peter Vajk - World Dynamics and Futures Assessment 
A subcontract to Southern Research Institute (SoRI) in Birmingham, Alabama,
 
was managed by Mr. Driggers during Part 1 of the studyprior to his joining
 
SAI Key participants at SoRI were Mr. S J. Causey and Mr. R.Monroe.
 
Certain individuals within, and with no affiliation to SAI, provided
 
valuable informal data, comments and guidance during the stud . The followinc
 
are recognized for their special contributions.
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The interchange of ideas'and concepts provided by technical and
 
informal meetings with Mr. C. L. Gould and Mr. A. D. Kazanowski of Rockwell
 
International during Part 2 of the study isalso gratefully acknowledged.
 
The study was performed under the technical direction of Mr.
 
Rodney Bradford (Part 1) and Mr. Georg von Tiesenhausen (Part 2), Marshall
 
Space Flight Center. Mr. J. von Puttkamer was the program manager for NASA
 
Headquarters, Office of Space Transportation Systems.
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APPENDIX A
 
PART ONE FINAL BRIEFING 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION STUDY
 
PART 1 - FINAL BRIEFING
 
NASA HEADQUARTERS
 
November 9, 1977
 
CONTRACT NAS8-32197 
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PART 1 STUDY OBJECTIVES
 
Part 1 of the Space Industrialization Study at Science Applications, Inc., is
 
structured around answering the "What", "Why" and "How" of space industrialization
 
with a $100K, 1-1/2 person-year level of effort, 10 month study.
 
The answers for the time period 1980 through 2010 are developed against a back­
ground of alternate possible futures in terms of candidate opportunities for space
 
industries, potential markets for space products or services, assessment of space
 
production versus terrestrial alternatives, required major systems, and possible
 
programs and programmatics. Activities specifically of a scientific or military
 
nature are not considered.
 
The methods used to develop these answers stress
 
* 	Conceptualization to scope possible answers and to develop new ideas
 
* 	Compilation of previous works and data
 
* 	Categorization to structure the findings and to illuminate further
 
data requirements
 
* 	Evaluation to extract the implications of study results.
 
The major contributions of this study are in the structuring and logic imparted
 
to the numerous concepts presently being discussed.
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INTRODUCTIONSIN.APPLIAIONS N, 
PART 1 - STUDY OBJECTIVES 
* WHAT ISSPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION? 
/ CANDIDATE OPPORTUNITIES 
* WHY INDUSTRIALIZE SPACE? 
Q/ THE POTENTIAL MARKETS 
V/ COMPARISON TO TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES 
V IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 
* HOW COULD SPACE BE INDUSTRIALIZED? 
V/ THE MAJOR SYSTEMS 
V THE STEPWISE PROGRAMS 
V/ INVESTMENTS AND REVENUES 
V/ INITIATIVES 
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WHAT IS SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION?
 
Semantics, popular literature, the NASA Five Year Plan, technical meetings and
 
assorted initiatives by divers groups has led to substantial confusion concerning
 
space industrialization. 
SI is most importantly not a "program"; it cannot be
 
planned, orchestrated or directed. 
The definition shown here is based on our
 
observations of what currently is and what will evolve.
 
A point of the greatest significance. 
The level of activity and rate of
 
growth of SI 
can be most directly stimulated by government action and
 
investment in concert with industry.
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WHAT IS SI? 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION IS NOT... 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION IS NOT... 
A "PROGRAM".
 
A SPACE STATION.
 
SPACE COLONIZATION.
 
LARGE SPACE STRUCTURES.
 
* 	 NEW OR 15 YEARS AWAY. 
A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY. 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION IS... 
I* 	 INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT WORKING 
TOGETHER FOR PROFIT AND PRAGMATIC 
BENEFIT UTILIZING SPACE 
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PART 1 STUDY APPROACH
 
To answer "What", the study began with compiling and categorizing candidate
 
space industrial opportunities. To answer "Why", markets, future needs and
 
alternatives were investigated. Potential markets were scoped for the major
 
candidates. These tasks were conducted interactively with efforts to scope
 
alternate possible futures and determine future needs 
 A spectrum of candi­
dates for space utilization were assessed versus their terrestrial alternatives.
 
"How" was answered in terms of programs and their implications Programs were
 
developed around placing the space activities corresponding to the most
 
promising candidates in a logical time sequence for each alternate future. 
 The
 
programs were analyzed for major system requirements and timing as well as
 
investments and benefits.
 
INTR DUCIONSfIIN(LAA 
PART 1 -
COMPILE_______ ASSESSCANDIDATES TERRESTRIAL 
ALTERNATIVES 
I 

I 

SCOPE ALTERNATE FUTURES 
SPA(E INDU7RIA11IZATION 
PJL tA lYONS INC 
STUDY APPROACH 
SCOPEPOTENTIAL 
MARKETS 
I 
I 
DEVELOP 

COORDINATED 
PROGRAMS 
4l 
ANALYZE
 
PROGRAM 
IMPLICATIONS 
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PART'1 STUDY TEAM ORGANIZATION
 
The study team features a heavy emphasis on expert consultants, top level
 
corporate involvement, a blend of youth and experience in a new group
 
without inherent aerospace bias, and a large and growing list of highly
 
visible individuals with diverse backgrounds who have volunteered to review
 
and comment on study directions and findings These individuals serve the
 
multiple functions of peer review, wide dissemination of the study results
 
and stimulation of interest in space industrialization. The consultants are
 
integrated into the study as team members and represent almost half of the
 
study efforts.
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PART 1 - STUDY TEAM ORGANIZATION 
INDIVIDUALS SOLICITED TO: 
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* PROVIDE INFORMAL COMMENTS 
* NO COMMITMENT OR ENDORSEMENT IMPLIED 
SAI CORPORATE REVIEW 
i R BEYSTER W. E ZISCH 
SAI PRESIDENT SAI VICE-
CHAIRMAN OF CHAIRMAN OF 
TIlE BOARD THlE BOARD0I 
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SYSTEMS PLANNING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
S GIBSON R SALKEID J.VAJK 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS WORLD 

& SYSTEMS PLANNING DYNAMICS 
ANALYSIS & ANALYSIS 
ISAAC ASIMOV 
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STEWARD BRAND 
WILLIAM BROWN 
EDWARD CORNISH 
FREDERICK DURANT III 
WILLIAM ESCIIER 
PETER GLASER 

JERRY GREY 
0 A HAZELRIGG 
KERRY JOELS 
JOtiN PLATT 
GENE RODDENDERRY 
B A SCIIRIEVER 
THEODORE TAYLOR 
T F.WALKOWICZ 
G DRIGGERS
 
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 
P SIEGLER 0 STINE 
BUSINESS INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS ENGINEERING 
MARKETING 
IVAN BEKEY 
BEN BOVA 
HARRISON BROWN 
CARLETON COON 
HUGH DOWNS
 
SVEN ENGLUND 
EDWARD FINCH 
THEODORE GORDON
 
A. W GUILL 
BARBARA MARX HUBBARD 
ARTHUR KANTROWITZ 
WILLIAM PICKERING 
NEIL RUZIC 
W I.SIGFRIED 
JOHN TEEM 
DONALD WALTZ 
LUNAR PROGRAM TECINOLOGY MATERIALS MECHANICAL SPACE RESOURCE TECHNICAL
RES.OURCES COSTING FORECA-STING ENGINEERING ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT ECONOMI IARTWORK
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FUTURE SCENARIOS - METHODOLOGY
 
Since the future cannot be predicted with any confidence or certainty, we have generated
 
a series of scenarios for the future of the United States and the world as a whole over the
 
next three decades to bracket what the future might actually be. In this sense, our
 
scenarios do not attempt to predict the future but only to describe what might be considered
 
plausible courses of events which could develop from the present state of national and world
 
affairs. Each scenario is described in terms of the political, societal, economic, techno­
logical, environmental, and military aspects of the human system.
 
Based on simple extrapolations of present conditions and trends, a baseline scenario was first
 
developed which includes no "surprises" Major developments which could occur during the
 
next decades in each of the principal aspects of the human system were then selected as trig­
gers for alternate scenarios. (Military developments have explicitly been excluded from
 
consideration.) Each of the alternate scenarios includes most of the features of the baseline
 
scenario as well, unless specific factors in the alternate scenario would vitiate particular
 
features of the baseline Two possible developments in the next few decades were considered
 
briefly but proved to be too "bizarre", in that scenario development would depend too strongly
 
on details of these developments which are presently unknown or unknowable. These develop­
ments are artifical intelligence and contact with extraterrestrial intelligence. Both of
 
these could have profound impacts on future space programs and should be monitored in future
 
NASA planning.
 
As the scenarios were developed, it was possible to identify specific factors or drivers in
 
each scenario which would make specific space industries more attractive or less attractive
 
from political, economic, societal, environmental, or technological considerations. (Military
 
considerations, again, were deliberately omitted.) Thus it is possible to identify opportun­
ities for space enthusiasts to advocate specific space activities, these vary significantly
 
among various scenarios, but it appears that virtually any probable future contains sub­
stantive space industrialization goals
 
STU DY OVERVIEWSPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
STUD OVEVIEWSCWENCL APPLICATIONS INC 
FUTURE SCENARIOS - METHODOLOGY 
TRENDS 	 SCENARIOS DRIVERS 
BASELINE SCENARIOTRENDS 
IDENTIFICATION OF 
SPECIFIC FACTORS 
FAVORING/OPPOSING
SPACE INDUSTRIAL 
ACTIVITIES INEXAGGERATED 
TRENDS OR e FOREIGN CHALLENGE IN SPACE EACH SCENARIO 
POTENTIAL * COMMITMENT TO SPACE 
BREAKTHROUGHS o LONGEVITY BREAKTHROUGH 
" DISENCHANTMENT WITH SPACE 
" 	 POLITICAL * SPACE ENTREPRENEURS 
* CRITICAL MATERIAL SHORTAGES" 	ECONOMIC 
o ECONOMIC COLLAPSE* 	TECHNOLOGICAL 
• ENERGY BREAKTHROUGH* 	ENVIRONMENTAL
" MILITARY 	 * COOLING OF NORTHERN HEMISPHEREMECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHES 
BIZARRE CASES 
• 	ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
CONTACT WITH5­
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SCENARIO CONTENT
 
As explained on the previous chart extrapolation of trends form the basis
 
for the so-called "Baseline" scenario. This included predictions of events
 
and attitudes. Other scenarios contained exaggeration or elimination of
 
trends and attempted to couple these with events and attitudes that were
 
not necessarily predictive with a high probability. From the aggregate of
 
events, attitudes and trends came an interpretation of opportunities for
 
exploitation or advocacy involving space industrialization. It was assumed
 
that these opportunities would be capitalized on.
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SPACE lIDUS TRIALIZA TIONSCIEVCL APPLICATIONS INC 
1980 

BASIC TRENDS 
THROUGHOUT
 
THE PERIOD 
POLITICAL 
SOCIETAL 
ECONOMIC 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL
 
MILITARY
 
SCENARIO CONTENT 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
I I!__ I I 
EVENTS, ATTITUDES, TRENDS WHICH MAY HAVE DIRECT 
OR OBLIQUE EFFECTS ON THE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
SPACE INDUSTRY GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. 
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SCENARIO ROLES
 
The interpretations discussed with the previous chart set needs and the
 
existence of certain markets. 
Then a general program can be formulated
 
composed of the appropriate space activities which fulfill the perceived
 
needs and markets at the appropriate time. Another important scenario
 
function was in market sizing since that drove the magnitudes of various
 
systems within the programs and set timing for events such as introduction
 
of new capabilities
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SCIENCI A PPLICA TIONS INC 
SCENARIO ROLES
 
SCENARIOS SET - WEATHER MODF. 
--- ECONOMIC 
POTENTIAL 
---ETC 
EXISTENCE OF ! 
M A RKETS 
~SPACE INDUSTRY 
ACTIVITIES & 
PROGRAMS 
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COMPILING CANDIDATES 
- METHODOLOGY
 
Candidate space industrial opportunities were compiled by surveying the
 
extensive literature on theoretical space advantages, results of space
 
experiments, and projections of possible space products and services as well
 
as by discussions with numerous experts in the fields of space processing,
 
materials science, lunar and asteroidal resources, communications, remote
 
sensing, electric power supply, and transportation. The compiled data was
 
augmented by concepts evolved by the study team and consolidated into four
 
categories, activities in space with information, energy, materials and
 
people 
 Within an activity, each concept was categorized by the level of
 
detail into industries and specific uses for products and services.
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SPACE IND 051 RIALIZATION 
STUD OVEVIEW.5 CIENCE A PL ICA IONS INC 
COMPILING CANDIDATES - METHODOLOGY 
INTERPRETATION 
& CONSOLIDATIONLITERATURE SURVEY 
(OVER loo DOCUMENTS1 
CANDIDATE OPPORTUNITIES 
CATEGORIZATION 
REVIEW WITH CONSULTANTS 
& EXPERTS 
* ACTIVITIES 
" INDUSTRIES 
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• PRODUCTS/SERVICES 
RESULTS OF COMPILATION
 
The resulting compilation of candidates identifies, characterizes, and
 
categorizes over 250 uses for specific products and services. For example,
 
categorized within information activities is the communications industry which
 
has aggregated services for individual 2-way, group 2-way, up/down link only,
 
and remote control. Twenty-five uses have been identified and described for
 
these services among the sixty-seven specific uses for information activities.
 
An example of a specific use is personal communications using a portable 2-way
 
radio (wrist radio).
 
This compilation was based on the few data presently available and on theoretical
 
grounds The totals shown are mainly representative of the efforts expended
 
rather than absolute limits As new data becomes available, unforeseen opportu­
ities are expected to develop as well as some being shown to be infeasible.
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S~tDY VER 	 INCIEWSCAkNLL 	 APPLICATIONS 
RESULTS OF COMPILATION 
* 	 A LARGE LIST OF CANDIDATES AND MANY USES WERE IDENTIFIED, THE LIST IS NOT 
EXHAUSTIVE 
I ACTIVITY PEOPLE 
ACTIVITY MATERIALS USES 
5 
USES 6ACTIVITY ENERGY 3 
3 
19 6 
USES 62 -

ACTIVITY INFORMATION 23 28

4 24 
1 147USES 3INDUSTRIES 
COMMUNICATIONS 25 13
 
OBSERVATIONS 19
 
NAVIGATION 3
 
LOCATION 9
 
SENSOR POLLING 11
 
TOTAL 67
 
2 ­3 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES - METHODOLOGY
 
Thirty-one representative uses of space (candidate opportunities) were compared
 
to potential Earth based alternatives Comparisons were based on examining the
 
initial cost of installation on a first order basis and a cursory review of
 
qualitative factors such as ease of use, reliability, technology requirements, etc.
 
If costs and capability obtained appeared comparable between the alternatives, they
 
were retained for further study In certain instances the identified space uses
 
exhibited much lower cost for similar capability or the reverse. These were
 
identified as clearly viable candidates Where cost and/or capability were clearly
 
superior for the Earth alternative, the candidate was dropped from further
 
consideration.
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SPA CE INDUS TRIALIZTO AtSTUDY OVERVIEW 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES - METHODOLOGY
 
o CANDIDATES SCREENED TO REDUCE NUMBER BY CONSIDERING: 
--- DATA BASE FOR MARKET ANALYSIS
 
--- GENERAL APPEAL.
 
-- TEAM JUDGEMENT ON BEST CANDIDATES. 
FIRST ORDER jS110 QUANTITATIVE
 
134 - COMPARISON
 
167 17 1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
CANDIDATES 
* VIABLE 
* DROP 
* FURTHER 
STUDY 
QUALITATIVE 
COMPARISON 
IDENTIFIED 
ALTERNATIVES 
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TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES 
- QUALITATIVE COMPARISON EXAMPLE
 
Four candidates are shown with examples of the types of qualitative comparisons
 
made between space and Earth based alternatives. From the integral of qualita­
tive factors, judgments were made on 
the probable viability of each candidate.
 
In the personal communications concept the service offered by a space-based system
 
leads to the conclusion that it is probably viable
 
The space relay for education does not seem viable when compared to video tape/disc
 
systems for a non-interactive educational system. Fully interactive educational
 
systems were not assessed
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STUDY OVERVIEW
 
INDUSTRIALIZATIONSTUDY OERVIEWSPACE A 
SCIENCEAPPLICATIONS INC 4w 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES 
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON EXAMPLE 
ADVANTAGES 
 DISADVANTAGES 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION TERRESTRIAL FOR TERRESTRIAL FOR TERRESTRIALCANDIDATE ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
* PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS * HARDLINES-FIDER OPTICS/ * HIGH DATA RATE, LOW COST 0 PRODUCTION AND OPERATION UNPROVEN a CONTINUE TO(WRIST RADIO) GLASS WAVE GUIDES RAW MATERIAL UNLIMITED ANALYZE
* HARDLINES-COMBINER * IN PLACE SYSTEM, LOW * HIGH INSTALLATION COST SPACEMICROWAVE-METALLIC TECHNICAL RISK IGH MAINTENANCE OPPORTUNITIES,CONDUCTORS * EXISTING SYSTEM, LOW COST 4 I IMITED CAPARIt ITL.CHANNELS AND PROBABLY
* RF-CB(HiF VHF UHF) FLEXIBLE TO UPDATES RANG VIABLE
* EDUCATION * VIDEO TAPEIDISC * EXISTING SYSTEM & TECH 0 UPDATING ISEXPENSIVE
(SPACE RELAY) (PROGRAMMED NOLOGY, LOW COST, 
 DOES NOT APPEAR 
INSTRUCI IONS) FLEXIBLE TO BE A VIABLE4 GROUND BASED T V 0 EXISTING SYSTEM & TECH * TRANSMITTER SITES EXPENSIVE SPACE 
NOLOGY, LOW COST OPPORTUNITY 
RECEIVER INSTALl ATION 
& OPERATION 
" NIGHTLIGHT * TERRESTRIAL LIGHTING 6 EXISTINGSYSTE't FLEXIBLE * HIGH ENERGY CONSUMPTION NOT * CONTINUETO 
TO SCHEDULE FLEXIBLE TO GEOGRAPHIC ANALYZE 
LOCATION SPACESUPER CONDUCTORS * TERRESTRIAL PROCESSING * EMERGING TECHNOLOGY - OPPORTUNITIES* CURRENT PRODUCTION LIMITED TO * CONTINUE TO& FABRICATION LAMINATED RIBBON LABORATORY QUANTITIES ANALYZE SPACE
* NEEDED FOR CONSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES 
* NEEDED FOR GENERATION 
SAi 2808 
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RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON
 
INFORMATION
 
Most services need further assessment based on additional data before a clear
 
choice is possible A few within the information activity are unique or
 
almost so due to the view presented from space.
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STUDYVIEWSCOVERVIEOVE INDUSTRIALIZATIONINCUD IP NCE A PPLICA TIONS 
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON
 
PREFERRED APPROACH 
SPACE ? EARTH 
INFORMATION 
Wrist Radio (General Use) '/
Urban/Police Wrist Radio V 
3-D Holographic Teleconferencing V 
National Information Services V 
Electronic Mail V7 
Disaster Communications Set '7 
Advanced TV Broadcast V
 
Vehicle Inspection *
 
Global Search & Rescue V
 
Nuclear Fuel Locators V
 
Ocean Resources 
_V
 
Transportation Services (Equipment Sales) *
 
Coastal Anti-Collision Radar (Equipment Sales)
 
Rail Anti-Collision System *
 
Personal Navigation Seth (Equipment Sales) .7
 
Vehicle/Package Locator
 
Voting/Polling Wrist Set V/
 
Data not readily available on alternatives. 
- 29 ­
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON
 
ENERGY
 
If SPS results in low cost power, it may be the preferred approach. How­
ever, environmental, health, legal and technical considerations require more
 
data before any preference can be determined
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SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATIONai /ZSTU DY OVERVIEWSCIENCE APPLICATIONS INC 
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON 
PREFERRED APPROACH 
SPACE ? EARTH 
ENERGY
 
Solar Power Satellite (First SAT In 1996) 
49 5GW at 27 MILS/KWH V 
60 10GW at 115 MILS/KWH -*71 V 
MILS/KWH 
60 10GW at 27 MILS/l(WH V 
Urban Night Illuminator * 
Energy Monitor V 
Nuclear Waste Disposal 
Data Not Readily Available on Alternatives. 
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RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON
 
MATERIALS
 
Only one materials industry is really unique---making jewelry from immiscible
 
precious metals Most materials activity products could have terrestrial
 
alternatives in terms of alternate means of manufacture, substitute materials
 
or replacement of need
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SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
SCIENCE APPLICA 71ONS INC 
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVES COMPARISON
 
PREFERRED APPROACH 
SPACE ? EARTH 
MATERIALS 
Drugs and Phdrmaceuticals V 
Electronics
 
Semiconductors y/
 
Electrical 
Magnets V 
Superconductor (Generating Only) V/ 
Electron Tubes V 
Optical
 
Fiber Optics
 
Special Metals 
Perishable Cutting Tools V 
Bearings and Bushings 
Jewelry V 
Wire (High Strength, Low Resistance, etc) 
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TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES - RESULTS 
The results of the alternatives comparison are summarized under three of the
 
four activities identified. The People activities previously examined for
 
market potential are dependent on the uniqueness of space and thus have no
 
Earth alternative.
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SPACE IJVDUSJRIALIZA TIONSTUD OVEVIEWSC/A NCE APPLICATIONS INC 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES - COMPARISON RESULT
 
INFO ENERGY MATERIALS 
* VIABLE 
(CLEAR WINNER) 6 0 1 
" DROP 
(CLEAR LOSER) 2 1 2 
" FURTHERSTUDY 
(INDETERMINANT) 9 3 7 
RECOMMENDATION 
CONTINUE' STUDY OF: 15 INFO CANDIDATES 
3 ENERGY CANDIDATES 
8 MATERIALS CANDIDATES 
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MARKET SURVEYS - METHODOLOGY
 
The methodology for scoping potential markets was developed to provide broad
 
banded order of magnitude revenue projections The methodology is based on
 
historical performance of analogous products or services on forecasts of
 
markets and on expert opinion to assess the universe of potential users (as a
 
function of cost), penetration delays and saturation time for services, sales
 
and replacements, as appropriate. Best and worst case banding was used. The
 
revenues developed were then based on projected costs usage and the banded
 
number of users.
 
In Part 1 of the study the markets surveyed are divided as
 
U S. 
Information. 
Materials 
15 
8 
International 
Energy 
People 
3 
4 
4 
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MARKET SURVEYS - METHODOLOGY 
CANDIDATES. INDUSTRY 	 MARKET PROJECTION 
COMMUNICATIONS 	 USERS 
PERSONAL 	 BEST 
DESCRIPTION 
e SIZE 
e FUNCTION 	 o GROWTH 0 
N TECHNICAL REOTS 	 * SATURATION Z 
S COST 	
-...N • TIMINGN POTENTIAL USERS 	 LORSTCASE 
TIME 
REVENUES 
MARKET DATA 
BEST CASE 
*MARKET PENETRATION 0 SERVICES 4E 
* SALES VOLUME 	 * SALES uJ 
*REVENUE 	 ' REPLACEMENTS k' 
£9W WORST 
CASE-

EXPERT OPINION TIME 
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PERSONAL COMM MARKET SURVEY EXAMPLE
 
FUNCTION -- Provide private personal communications between any two individuals
 
having the device. It is implied that persons will have the device only
 
if they spend a large part of their time in a beam area. After national
 
expansion this will be, for all practical purposes, anywhere in the US.
 
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS -- Small low power pocket or wrist device interfacing
 
with a large space borne antenna with appropriate power and switching
 
capability Allocation of sufficient frequencies (old or new) to handle
 
the projected growth is assumed.
 
COST -- Analogous product costs for small hand held electronic devices were
 
examined. This included calculators, digital watches and portable CB
 
systems. Resulting average price spread selected was $300 (at entry)
 
down to $30 (near saturation). Market size and cost per call were traded
 
in a fashion to assure revenues greater than the initial investment by
 
year five, thus assuring an early ROI. The result was a cost/call range
 
of $3 00 to $1.31 in the first five years with a steady decrease to
 
$0 30/call at 15 years.
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MAR KET SURVEYS - EXAMPLE
 
SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS 
INDUSTRY -COMMUNICATIONS USE - PERSONAL 
DESCRIPTION 
* 	 FUNCTION - INDIVIDUAL PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS OVER LONG DISTANCE UNCONSTRAINED BY 
CONNECTION 
* 	 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS -
SMALL PORTABLE DEVICE 
LARGE SPACE BORNE SYSTEM
 
PROPER AND SUFFICIENT FREQUENCY ALLOCATION
 
* COST 	- DEVICE IS$300 AT ENTRY, DECREASING TO $30 AT SATURATION 
COST/CALL DECREASES $3 00 -+$1 31 IN FIRST 5 YEARS
 
COST/CALL IS$0 30 AT 15 YEARS
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TIMING -- Scenario guidelines get technology availability from 1984 to
 
1990. Analogous history in domestic communications satellites show
 
a delay o 8 years in obtaining a license. Delay attempts by such
 
companies as AT&T are to be expected. A relatively large investment
 
(about $500M to $1,000M) is anticipated implying some delay in itself.
 
Even under the best of circumstances it is difficult to imagine less
 
than six years from technology demonstration to system implementation.
 
Conceived competing product
Maximum period used was twelve years. 

resistance lead to a medium stretchout before growth of 5 years.
 
Analogies to color television saturation rates were used to imply a
 
moderate track (20 years) to ultimate saturation.
 
POTENTIAL USERS -- As with calculators and pagers, the initial market (2 to
 
5 years) is anticipated to be the professional and businessman.
 
With increased capacity, higher order market saturation and declining
 
users should become the entire population above
cost the universe of 

some age. A cutoff age of 16 was arbitrarily selected. There is
 
now over 1 telephone for every 2 people in the US. An ultimate
 
saturation of 1 for 4 was assumed at 20 years.
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STUD OVEVIEWSPACE 	 INDUSRIALIZATION 
SCIE NCE APPLICA TIOCAS INC 
MAR KET SURVEYS - EXAMPLE (CONTINUED) 
SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS 
* 	 TIMING - SPECIFICS ARE SCENARIO/PROGRAM DEPENDENT 
TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE ABOUT 1984 TO 1990 
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION TO SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD OF 6 TO 12 YEARS 
MEDIUM STRETCHOUT BEFORE GROWTH ABOUT 5 YEARS 
TRACK TO ULTIMATE SATURATION ABOUT 20 YEARS 
* 	 POTENTIAL USERS -
INITIAL 2 TO 5 YEARS PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESSMAN 
1 UNIT PER 4 PEOPLE ASSUMED AT 20 YEARS 
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MARKET POTENTIAL - WRIST RADIO
 
The market potential for wrist radio depends greatly upon fees from user calls.
 
More revenues are generated with lower fees due to the greater usage. Telephones
 
and CB's were used as analogous products to determine market penetration, delays,
 
etc. A decrease from an initial $3 per call to 30 per call was assumed, accomp­
anied by a corresponding drop in transceiver cost in year 10 Even the best case
 
is conservative, assuming only 1/4 of the population as users. The worst case
 
includes delays in cost reduction and reduction of users to those having multiple
 
phones. Anticipated legal/political resistance can delay entry 3 to 10 years.
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MARKET SURVEY - WRIST RADIO 
ACTIVITY: INFORMATION 
INDUSTRY. COMMUNICATIONS 
USE: PERSONAL 
* 	 BY EMPLOYING LARGE ORBITAL ANTENNAS, THE GROUND ANTENNA SIZECAN BE REDUCED, PERMITTING GENERAL USE MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS. 
NUMBER OF USERS REVENUE FROM SALES REVENUE FROM CALLS 
50-	 500- 25 
40 400" 20 
o 30 300 15, 
20i 	 200- ., ,.. ' I 10-
I II 	 O|10- 100 	
­ 5-.
 
10 20 
 10 20 
 10 20
 
YEARS AFTER INTRODUCTION 
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MARKET SURVEY - INFORMATION SERVICES
 
Information services are envisioned to provide ready access to the largest
 
libraries and data bases Initially the service may be for library to
 
library exchange to reduce the costs of small libraries while expanding their
 
services A few tens of thousands of libraries may use the service However,
 
as the service expands into the business market, there are millions of projected
 
users A final phase, individual home usage, was not projected but could be
 
expected to be even larger.
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MARKET SURVEY - INFORMATION SERVICES
 
T  VRIWSIENCE APPLICA TIONS INC 4W. 
ACTIVITY. INFORMATION 
INDUSTRY. COMMUNICATIONS 
USE. LARGE SCALE DATA TRANSFER 
BY EMPLOYING MULTI-BEAM ANTENNAS, PROVIDE ACCESS TO LARGE LIBRARIES 
FOR SMALLER LIBRARIES AND BUSINESSES. 
NUMBER OF USER LIBRARIES REVENUE FROM LIBRARIES NUMBER OF USER BUSINESSESS REVENUE FROM BUSINESSES 
100- 5­
20O 

-0 16 4
 
15- "- 0ta z12- 113­
0 - (A- 40- zoa8­
5- 20 / 04 1 
-
U) r/ 4 
- - - - - 5 ­
0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 2020 0 10 
YEARS AFTER INTRODUCTION 
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MARKET SURVEY - SOLAR POWER SATELLITE 
Solar power satellites could begin to provide significant power by 2010.
 
Initial satellites will be made of terrestrial materials but thereafter
 
non-terrestrial material from lunar or asteroidal sources appear promising.
 
The installed power is more a function of technical production times than
 
market size, saturation of the market is not envisioned by 2010. The revenues
 
generated depend upon the charges for power for which projections range from
 
7 to 27 mils/Kw-hr. These projections span the spectrum from Glaser to O'Neill
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MARKET SURVEY - SOLAR POWER SATELLITE
 
ACTIVITY. ENERGY 
INDUSTRY. SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM 
USE: 	 SOLAR POWER SATELLITE FOR ELECTRICAL PRODUCTION 
* 	 UTILIZE FULL SOLAR FLUX TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY IN ORBIT AND BEAM 
IT BY MICROWAVE FOR USE ON EARTH 
INSTALLED POWER 	 RVFNUE 
0 8 	 40 
cc 
4 06- L 3D­
=( 2 
Hi 04- 20­
0 	 o 
0 10 20 0 t0 20 
YEARS AFTER INTRODUCTION 
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MARKET SURVEYS - DRUG PRODUCTS
 
As an example of the drugs and pharmaceuticals markets, the potential market
 
for isoenzymes was developed. Though total usage continues to expand, reduced
 
transportation costs will reduce costs significantly, perhaps, resulting in
 
reduced revenues.
 
Overall, the potential markets for space produced drugs and pharmaceuticals
 
(based on more precise separation and higher purity due to reduced gravity)
 
could be 25% of the new drug market (after transportation costs have been
 
markedly reduced), approximately $600M/year
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STUDY OVERVIEW SPACE INDSTRALIATIONSC'IENCI APPLICAT/ONS INC 
MARKET SURVEYS --DRUG PRODUCTS 
ACTIVITY: MATERIALS 
INDUSTRY BIOLOGICAL 
USE PRODUCTION OF ISOENZYMES 
HIGH PURITY DRUGS CAN BE MADE BY ORBITAL SEPARATION UTILIZING "ZERO" 
GRAVITY. 
DOSES REVENUE
 
100­
15­
80­
49 ­?-
 10 >0 
C £ 
-J 
2-05
 
20-­
0 10 20 0 10 20 
YEARS AFTER INTRODUCTION 
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MARKET SURVEY - COMMERCIAL TRAVEL
 
With a low cost shuttle system, commercial travel into orbit or long distance
 
global travel is possible. Point to point times for global transportation by
 
shuttle would be within two hours 
 The number of passengers is a strong function
 
of the cost (as seen in present long distance travel) - with 104 passangers/year
 
projected at $25/lb. ­ (for revenues of $50M/year), 105 passengers/year at $10/lb.
 
(for $10OM/year) and 106 passengers/year at $5/lb. (for $lB/year).
 
This market projection assumes a drop from $25/lb. to $10/lb. in year 10
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MARKET SURVEY - COMMERCIAL TRAVEL 
ACTIVITY: PEOPLE 
INDUSTRY: TRAVEL 
USE. LONG DISTANCE TRANSPORTATION 
* UTILIZE LOW COST SHUTTLE SYSTEM FOR LONG DISTANCE COMMERCIAL TRAVEL. 
PASSENGERS 
50-
 50­
40- 40­
20-0­
0 
.- 10- 10- /f"" 
.~~-,-- -­'----..-.,,,,.J 
10 20 0 10 20 
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SUMMARY OF MARKET SURVEYS
 
The total of best case and worst case for each activity are summed directly and
 
presented in these comparative plots. All summations are done based on an
 
arbitrarily common year zero in order to show relative magnitudes. The year
 
of initial penetration, rate of growth, and final sturation level are all
 
scenario dependent for both products and services. Therefore, direct summation
 
of the various totals here is not appropriate.
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SUMMARY OF MARKET SURVEYS
 
INFORMATION 15 SERVICES ENERGY 3 SERVICES 
$B/YEAR $B/YEAR 
100 100­
10 t 10­
1-­
01l01 
0 o0 20 0 10 20 
MATERIALS 7 PRODUCTS PEOPLE 4 SERVICES 
;B/YEAR $B/YEAR 
100- 100­
10- 10 -
01 01-­
0 ~ ~~~ 20 010 
-0 - t- ---­
20 
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REVENUE COMPARISON - BASELINE SCENARIO
 
o Information services potentially have revenues similar to 
an extensive satellite
 
power system program.
 
o 
 Materials activities projections are sensitive to transportation costs, and
 
can exceed $20B/year by 2010. A conservative estimate of about $5B/year is
 
shown here.
 
o People activities are a distant fourth in 
revenue potential, but may be important
 
psychologically.
 
Acceleration of the timing for 
revenues is very possible in a more aggressive
 
scenario. The numbers illustrated here were derived in the light of the
 
Baseline Scenario extrapolative assumptions.
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REVENUE COMPARISON - BASELINE SCENARIO 
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- 55­
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT - METHODOLOGY
 
The eleven future scenarios were aggregated into six programs based on pro­
gramnatic similarities. The six programs span a spectrum from optimistic
 
upside to pessimistic downside. Variation due to the biggest single alternative,
 
satellite power system, is shown by the baseline versus the NO SPS alternative
 
program.
 
The activities corresponding to the major products and services are time sequenced
 
based on the drivers from the future scenarios to produce the programs. The sup­
porting systems required for the sdheduled activities are added to complete tile
 
program The programs are analyzed for implications for near term system require­
ments and timing as well as investments and revenues.
 
Investments are developed for each program from design, development test and evalu­
ation (DDT&E), and hardware production as well as space transportation costs. Public
 
funding is assumed for DDT&E and early transportation costs. Private funding is
 
assumed for production and launch of operational hardware. Benefits include direct
 
revenues generated by the space activities as well as projected jobs, taxes,
 
exports,'etc.
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PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
METHODOLOGY
 
CONSOLIDATION
 
11 SCENARIOS -t 6 PROGRAMS DRIVERS
 
Foreign Challenge ) 
Commitment to Space Upside 
Longevity Breakthrough .) 
MARKETS ACTIVITIES 
Cooling of N Hemisphere Climatic Crisis 
Space Entrepreneurs TCommercial 
Baseline PROGRAM 
Critical Materials Shortage Baseline 
Ecological Catastrophes ( 
REOTSEnergy Breakthrough No SPS S EOSYSTEMS 
SYSTEMS PORM&TMN
- - - - - - -- I - - - -
VESMENSSDisenchantment with Space Downside DATA 
INVESTMENTS & 
Collapse of Debt StructureBENEFITS 
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SCENARIO DRIVERS FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
 
Space drivers from the baseline scenario lead to the activities of the base­
line program. Global enconomic growth leads to increased long distance
 
communications Growing public interest in space is synergistic with VIP
 
trips on the shuttle The need for energy diversity provides motivation for
 
beginning a satellite power system with an early prepilot demohstration.
 
These drivers must precede the activity by sufficient lead time.
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SCENARIO DRIVERS FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES 
2005 2010
1995 2000
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SEMI PERMANENTL HABITATIONSELEMENTENTERTAINMENT 
COMM L PERMANENT 
DET TRAVEL HABITATIONLLO­
BASELINE PROGRAM
 
The program activities require supporting systems which must be started
 
with sufficient lead time. The public services (personal communications,
 
etc.) satellites require a means to deliver and maintain the systems in
 
high Earth orbit -- a chemical orbital transfer vehicle. Materials produc­
tion in low Earth orbit requires a facility herein called a space platform.
 
Producing power by satellite for ground use is a massive undertaking which
 
demands a low cost transportation system.
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SIENCL APPLICATIONS INC 
BASELINE PROGRAM 
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - METHODOLOGY
 
The Commercial, Climatic Crisis and Upside programs were very similar 
to the
 
Baseline except in timing of major space activities and magnitudes of certain
 
The largest single swinger between programs was the SPS. The impact
activities. 

of this was examined by detailed program analysis of the Baseline and NO SPS
 
programs. Some examination of the cost and economics was done on the Upside
 
Program to see what the impacts might be under the best of circumstances.
 
This will be discussed later.
 
The two detailed analyses consisted of breaking the industry activities down into
 
specific initiatives and using the scenarios and market data to size and time
 
This analysis then yielded program
phase representative hardware requirements. 

cost, both direct and support system requirements, and timing of technology
 
requirements.
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - METHODOLOGY 
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SERVICE A 
PROGRAM ELEMENTS
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DETAILED PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
MARKET DATA 
0 PROGRAM COST 
a SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - OBSERVATIONS
 
An overview of observations for each activity focuses on the major advantages
 
for space, the major technical hurdles and the possible timing. Information
 
activities have already begun with communications, observations and navigation
 
industries However, by the mid 1980's, significantly larger systems could
 
begin operation and expansion would then proceed rapidly. The information systems
 
utilize the view and access offered by orbiting the Earth The major technical
 
hurdles to their implementation are their size and power requirements as well as
 
the need for extensive data processing to be conducted in space.
 
Energy activities rely mainly on the solar flux. The major technical hurdles are
 
due to the size and mass of the systems, which leads to a requirement for lower
 
transportation costs. Additionally, environmental issues may present significant
 
barriers for their implementation. 'he timing for energy activities is viewed as
 
after the late 1990's.
 
Materials activities take advantage primarly of the reduced gravity and high vacuum
 
available in orbit In addition to demonstration of techniques, materials activities
 
will require significant power and low cost transportation. These are envisioned
 
to begin during the late 1980's in, perhaps, commercial batch quantities.
 
People activities in space use the uniqueness of space. The major technical hurdles
 
are transportation cost and, for large scale activities, habitation facilities.
 
These activities could be viable starting in the 1990's.
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
 
OBSERVATIONS
 
ACTIVITY IN FORMATION ENERGY 	 MATERIALS PEOPLE 
MAJOR SPACE 0 VIEW 	 0 SOLAR FLUX a LOW 'G' HIGH VAC 0 UNIQUENESS 
ADVANTAGE
 
a 	ACCESS o HIGH VAC 
MAJOR TECHNICAL * SIZE e SIZE/MASS OF a PROOF OF THEORY a TRANSPORT 
HURDLES 10-100 METER SYSTEM COST 
ANTENNA * PRODUCTION $25/LB OR LESS 
, 104 MW DEVELOPMENT 
* 	 POWER HUNDREDS OF 0 HABITATION 
21 KW - 10,000 KW - 105 TONS POUNDS PER DAY 
o 	 DATA PROC $1010 o POWER 
10 KW - 10,000 KW 
* 	TRANSPORT COST CONTINUOUS 
< $20/LB LEO 
• 	 TRANSPORT COST 
* 	 ENVIRONMENT <$100/LB LEO 
ISSUES 
TIMING FOR * PRESENT 0 1996+ * 1987+ * 1990+ 
SIGNIFICANT > $300 M/vR 
REVENUES
 
* 	 1985+ RAPID
 
EXPANSION
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - COST AND REVENUES
 
BASELINE PROGRAM
 
A comparison of annual revenues and expenditures and cumulative revenues and
 
expenditures was made where required funding included DDT&E for systems and
 
production and launch of the hardware. Revenue predictions came from the market
 
surveys conducted A full definition of all operations and ground segment costs
 
were not addressed. All DDT&E was assumed to be paid for public funding, whereas
 
profit making production hardware and launches were assumed to be commercial.
 
This allows certain implications and conclusions to be drawn on this program.
 
Particularly, it is noted that the SPS, which required substantial early funding,
 
will tend to push the total program break even into the 2010 time period with
 
return on investment (ROI) delayed until afterwards This is not unexpected since
 
the SPS would by necessity be a long payback investment The cross-hatched area
 
represents SPS revenues
 
The programs related to other scenarios all show the same basic trends with some
 
shifting and swelling of funding and revenue curves Peak yearly funding for
 
the Baseline Program would be on the order of $LOB.
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - COST AND REVENUES 
3ASELINE PROGRAM 400 
* 
* 
1977 DOLLARS 
SPACE SEGMENT COST ONLY SPaDRIVES 
ROlCINTO 2010+ 
TIME FRAME 
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44 
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a 
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - COST AND REVENUES
 
NO SPS PROGRAM
 
This is the major alternative to the Baseline containing an SPS. The direct
 
effect of the SPS including extraterrestrial material acquisition, etc. can be
 
seen by comparison with the Baseline. A comparison of annual revenues and
 
expenditures and cumulative revenues and expenditures was made where required
 
funding included DDT&E for systems and production and launch of the hardware.
 
Revenue predictions came from the market surveys conducted As with the baseline,
 
operations and ground segment costs were not included As indicated on the
 
charts, information systems look highly attractive for good ROI and early payback.
 
Peak funding would appear to be less than $2 billion.
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS - BENEFITS 
An analysis of the benefits of investments and revenues in terms of jobs, taxes,
 
GNP and a number of qualitative factors was conducted for the Baseline, Upside,
 
and NO SPS programs. Relatively conservative assumptions were made on labor
 
intensity and indirect mulipliers for determination of jobs and taxes generated.
 
The 1985 benefits are derived from the government funding projected for each
 
program during the developmental phases. The 2010 benefits are based purely on
 
commercial revenue projections with no government funding involved.
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
 
BENEFITS
 
NEW JOBS * TAXES GENERATED* 
NO SPS BASELINE UPSIDE NO SPS BASELINE UPSIDE 
1985 15,000 100,000 120,000 $ 100 M $ 800M $ 1,000 M 
2010 1,000,000 1,900,000 3,800,000 $ 10,000 M $ 20,000 M $ 40,000 M 
*DIRECT ONLY. TOTAL IMPACT MUCH GREATER.
 
EXPORTS 

COMM/INFO TECHNOLOGIES 
SPACE SYSTEMS 
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
LAUNCH SERVICES 
NEW MATERIALS 
ENERGY 

ENERGY SYSTEMS 
OTHER
 
GNP IMPACT IN 2010 = $200B - $800B 
QUALITY OF LIFE IMPROVED 
COUNTLESS LIVES SAVED 
NATIONAL PRIDE ENHANCED 
OPTIONS FOR UNFORESEEN FUTURES 
INCREASES IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
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AGENDA CONCLUSIONS
 
In this concluding section specific recommendations are made keyed mainly
 
to the near term hardware considerations.
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AGENDA 
INTRODUCTION 
* OBJECTIVES 
* APPROACH 
* TEAM 
STUDY OVERVIEW 
" FUTURE SCENARIOS 
* COMPILING CANDIDATES 
* TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES 
* MARKET SURVEYS 
* PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT/ 
ANALYSIS 
CONCLUSIONS 
* WHAT SHOULD NASA DO? 
* WHY HURRY? 
* WHAT NEXT? 
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WHAT SHOULD NASA DO?
 
This study has clearly shown that major activities with information, materials
 
and energy in space are attractive and should be pursued. The key technologies
 
shown must be developed to support the activities.
 
NASA should push the technologies leading to a low cost transportation system,
 
large structures and power generation on orbit and orbital materials processing.
 
The role of NASA should stress providing the required support facilities,
 
systems and demonstration programs to prove techniques and commercial viability
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WHAT SHOULD NASA DO? 
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SPUR TO U S. INDUSTRY AND U.S WORLD TECHNICAL LEADERSHIP WILL RESULT 
FROM NASA DEVELOPING THE FOLLOWING KEY TECHNOLOGIES 
" LARGE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
* STRUCTURES - LARGE ANTENNA OF 10M TO 200M DIAMETER 
* POWER -- 20 I(W TO 10,000 KW 
* DATA PROCESSING - 100 TO 1000 TIMES PRESENT RATE 
* TRANSPORTATION TO HIGH ORBIT - ROUTINE FOR MAINTENANCE, REPAIR 
" MATERIALS SPACE PROCESSING 
* LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION - GOAL ORIENTED SPAR, SPACELAB 
* PROTOTYPE PRODUCTION - 10 TO 100 POUNDS PER DAY ON SOME PRODUCTS
 
" ORBITAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS - POWER, STRUCTURE, STABILITY
 
* LOW COST TRANSPORTATION TO LOW ORBIT - < $100/POUND TO REALLY OPEN MARKET 
LARGE ENERGY SYSTEMS (USE IN SPACE, BROADCAST TO EARTH)" 
* STRUCTURES -05 KM TO 15 KM 
* POWER CONDITIONING - 100 KW TO 10GW 
LOW COST TRANSPORTATION TO HIGH ORBIT - MINIMUM FEASIBLE COST 
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WHY DEVELOP THE KEY TECHNOLOGIES?
 
The projected benefits depend upon commercial operations that can only
 
begin after the key technologies are available. The potential benefits
 
are significant covering a spectrum of national concerns from jobs and
 
balance of trade through standard of living and national pride.
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WHY DEVELOP THE KEY TECHNOLOGIES?
 
ANALYSIS OF FUTURE SCENARIOS, MARKETS AND RESULTANT PROGRAMS SHOW 
THAT THE RESULT WILL BE. 
* MILLIONS OF JOBS CREATED 
* SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
* ASSURANCE OF A LONG TERM FAVORABLE BALANCE OF TRADE 
* INCREASED NATIONAL AND WORLD-WIDE STANDARDS OF LIVING 
* AN ENRICHMENT OF NATIONAL PRIDE AND ASPIRATIONS 
* AN INVALUABLE OPTION BANK FOR RESPONDING TO UNFORESEEN FUTURE 
EVENTS
 
* 	 INCREASES IN KNOWLEDGE PROBABLY UNPARALLELED IN THE HISTORY OF 
CIVILIZATION 
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WHY HURRY?
 
"The future belongs to those who create itl"
 
With the shuttle, we have the basis for space industrialization. We 
can
 
lead by proper planning and timely implementation. The
 utilize our 

alternatives are clear---expanding the U.S. economy or growing international
 
competition.
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CONCLUSIONSSPC NUMLZTO 
WHY HURRY? 
* 	 THE REVENUE POTENTIALS EXIST TODAY -- WE ONLY LACK THE SYSTEMS 
* 	 ALL INDUSTRIES EXAMINED ARE EXPORTABLE -- THE SOONER THEY ARE AVAILABLE, 
THE SOONER WE REAP THE BENEFITS 
* 	 NEAR TERM EXPENDITURES WILL CREATE JOBS, SPUR THE ECONOMY, AND BE NON-
INFLATIONARY WHILE CREATING THE FUTURE 
* 	 THE TIMES ARE RIGHT -- IF WE WAIT THEY MAY NOT BE. 
* WE CAN NOT EXPLOIT THE SHUTTLE IF WE DON'T KNOW WHERE'WE ARE GOING. 
" SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IS RAPIDLY BUILDING 
-79­
WHAT NEXT?
 
We should begin actively supporting space industrialization by producing a
 
major space power system, initiating the development of systems to support
 
orbital manufacturing and developing large information systems. Substantial
 
space power is needed for almost any industrialization. Materials manufact­
uring in orbit will require considerable demonstration and supporting systems.
 
Large space information systems look the most commercially viable but the
 
orders-of-magnitude scale-up needed will require demonstration and legal
 
constraints (e g., frequency allocations) may pose the biggest hurdles.
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CONCLUSIONS SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATIONS IL:N(CL APPLICATIONS INC 
WHAT NEXT? 
* 	 PRODUCE'POWER ON ORBIT CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING AGGRESSIVE SPACEMANUFACTURING, INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND SOLAR POWER DEMONSTRATION 
PROGRAMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLEI 
* INITIATE RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TOALLOW INTRODUCTION OF LOW COST TRANSPORTATION AND FULL ORBITAL 
SUPPORT FOR MANUFACTURING IN 1987 
* INITIATE RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMSREQUIRED TO SUPPORT INTRODUCTION OF LARGE, HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 
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PART TWO FINAL PRESENTATION
 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION STUDY 
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MSFC 
".! SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION *" 
'°-- VVORLD AND DOMESTIIC IMPLICATIONS ,' 
"F 
I_.,... 
PRESENTED BY GERALDVW DRIGGERS ",-,f 
STUDY MANAGER 
MARCH 23, 1978 SIPAC/ /NDUSR/A/IZTION 
/ /' 
" 
N AS8 32197 ,%11/VNCI 4111 ICA TIO NR INC ,. 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION STUDY EVOLUTION
 
This is the summation of efforts and results from Part 2 of the Space
 
Industrialization Study conducted for NASA/MSFC by SAI under contract NAS8-32197.
 
Presentation of the results of Part 1 of the study were previously presented in a
 
similar format.
 
Whereas Part I of the study was concerned with defining and scoping SI,
 
Part 2 was directed toward issues related to concept implementation both on the
 
basis of the world and the United States. From the totality of considerations has
 
been drawn a set of basic recommendations for action and further study at various
 
levels of technology and programming.
 
INTODUTIN .rA IDSR ,AL, ,.7,,,U'lf  , 
INTRODUCTION SCI NCl AHlICA TIONS, INC 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION STUDY EVOLUTION 
PART 1
 
DEFINITION & OVERVIEW
 
S WORLD IMPLICATIONS 
* DOMESTIC IMPACTS & ISSUES 
* 
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS )INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
EXAMPLE ECONOMIC ( 
.S 
* RECOMMENDATIONS 
SAI-4230 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION - 20 YEARS LATER
 
From military and scientific beginnings some twenty years ago (October
 
1957 for Sputnik, January 1958 for Explorer) there has evolved a broad and complex
 
industrial base in space. The activities range from basic research in the space
 
processing of materials to the fully operational information transfer systems. The
 
worldwide gross annual revenue now exceeds one billion dollars in sales of services
 
alone. Current published projections indicate that revenues from services by 2000
 
may reach ten to twenty billion dollars given only minor extrapolations of present
 
technology. With technology advancements in power, structures, transportation,
 
materials processing, frequency use and data handling our study indicates that the
 
potential can be several times that revenue amount. Of the four general categories
 
of space industrialization (Information Services, Products, Energy, People in Space)
 
the area nearest maturity is Information Services as reflected on this chart. New
 
technologies will be necessary to open up new markets in these services also, however.
 
SAIENCE AI'CA TWNLI,INCWORLD ACTIVITIES SPCINDU IONNmALJZAIC 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION - 20 YEARS LATER 
* COMMUNICATION 
0NAVIGAT ION/ 
*EARTH RESOURCES 
*METEOROLOGY 
US USSR 
FSAI-4211 
OSPACE PROCESSING [T7] LAUNCH SERVICES 
s 
WORLDWIDE Sl CAPABILITY SUMMARY
 
The worldwide interest in SI is reflected by the number of countries and
 
agencies that are actively participating at present. This is characterized in this
 
chart by summarizing capabilities both previously demonstrated and currently being
 
developed that relate specifically to space industrialization. Although manned
 
capabilities are dominated by the USA and USSR the fruits of SI technologies are
 
being used broadly as demonstrated by the first two columns. Also significant is
 
the extensive involvement of nations and international organizations in unmanned
 
activities. This would indicate that the unique technologies most significant to
 
US future exploitation in SI would be those associated with manned space flight,
 
particularly shuttle related capabilities.
 
The bottom line (both figuratively and literally) of this chart carries
 
a significant message: space industrialization is a strong, viable international
 
and multinational endeavor­
WORLD ACTIVITIES SCJENCrAICA MONSINC 
WORLDWIDE SI CAPABILITY SUMMARY 
GENERAL UNMANNED MANNED UNMANNED MANNED 
0 O00 0 
4, A 4 
0 %4 0 q C 
UNITED STATES X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
 
USSR USRxxxXX xXXX®x x x ®® ® ®x®X xX xX ®®® x x 
CHINA(PR) X X X X X X X X 
FRANCE XX X X X ? X X X 
INDIA X XX X (X) X X 
JAPAN X X X X X X X 
ESA X X X X (X) (X) (X) X X (X) X 
OTHER X X X X X X X X X 
TOTAL
 
NUMBER
 
OFNATIONS 111 39 24 15 9 3+ 4 2 2 3 2 1 7 13 2 3 2 3 5 
SA 4207(X) Indicates to he demonstrated by 1981. ® Indicates currently unique capability 
X Indicates capability has been demonstrated. 
INDICATIVE SI GROWTH RATES
 
The last chart established the status of SI in the world by illustrating
 
current capability and utilization, all of which has evolved in the last twenty
 
years. A related question of some immediate interest is then whether this growth
 
continues or has it reached a plateau. This question has been addressed by
 
examining the growth rate and plans of several "mature" SI activities. Two of these
 
growth trends are illustrated on this chart; one is transportation capability to
 
LEO and the second is ownership of communication satellites by nations or organizations.
 
Launch capability continues to show a linear trend while communication satellite
 
ownership appears to be growing exponentially. Other service applications (remote
 
sensing, navigation, etc.) show similar trends. As an indication of how recognition
 
times may be shortening for new SI technologies it is interesting to observe that at
 
least five nations are now sponsoring materials space processing research with at
 
least three organizations or nations actively conducting launches.
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WORLD ACTIVITIES S PCLICA TONS. INC"N 
INDICATIVE SI GROWTH RATES 
~I INDIVIDUAL NATIONS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
ORBITAL LAUNCH CAPABILITY COMMUNICATION SATELLITES 
20 20 
>-F- z tu 
>< 15 - 15 
-cc-z 
;2: 10 - 10 ­
.. <.1 (F RG) . 
zi CA z22 TSC) 
SFRANCE) 0 E)
US 'IIRAN E) INTERSPUTNI K 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
 
YEAR YEAR SAI-4232 
EVOLUTION OF WORLD SI ACTIVITIES
 
Why is there such extensive involvement inorganizing for and implementing
 
space industrialization in the world? Inthe simplest terms, it appears that needs
 
and markets exist forming the basis for large scale international involvements. This
 
has prompted a wide spread interest and desire for independent capabilities to utilize
 
space and an awareness of the potential benefits from gaining and maintaining a com­
petitive position In the free world the US will be challenged through the eighties in
 
all technologies including those that are peculiar to manned space flight, The recent
 
capability demonstrations of the USSR aboard Salyut 6 and the strong reports of their
 
current development of a reusable shuttle leave no doubt that major technical achievements
 
can be anticipated by communist bloc countries in SI throughout the eighties.
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I IAT~NIC .5'A1ClFINDUS7RJLIZA TIONWO L--IIIE/ PIA IN SCIENCE A I'PiICA liONS, INC 
EVOLUTION OF WORLD SI ACTIVITIES 
-
4'GOALS 
'4~ ~~~ 44 INDEPENDENCE4 4 
PLN 
*, COPEITV 
4POSITIO 
4,' -NEW 
CAPBIIT 
4. 4LAUNCH 
ACTIVITIE 
H4 4 ' 4RE 
DEEOPET JUSTIFICA4 N 
'1 
440 NEEDS 
-~~~ 
MAR.KETS. 
ORGANIZATIONAL,4 
STRUCTURES 
44.4.44 44A14.253 
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION?
 
The key question posed here is: Will SI affect economic, social and other
 
factors in the world in proportion to its cost (percent of gross world product for
 
example) or can large changes be effected by relatively small SI initiatives? The
 
goal of this examination was to determine if national, international and worldwide
 
consequences from SI could be estimated and related back to the current and projected
 
activities represented on the previous two charts. An inexpensive cause and effect
 
analysis could prove very valuable in rapidly identifying those key technologies and
 
capability needs with the largest benefit multipliers.
 
The approach to determining such potential cause and effect relationships
 
involving SI on a national, international or worldwide basis was termed "impact
 
assessment".
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SPAC,,,NDUSiRA L1ZA U7ONWORLD IMPLICATIONS SCIFNC APl',LCA liONS, INC 
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Sl?
 
'o SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
* ATALYST OR "A DROP 
IN THE BUCKET"? 
* POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE 
EFFECTS?
 
HOW DO WE FIND OUT? 
ONE APPROACH: IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
SAI,4243 
/3
 
WHAT ISSI IMPACT ASSESSMENT?
 
As illustrated here, impact assessment involves examining the present
 
characteristics of a nation or group of nations in detail, predicting events and
 
activities (usually government plans and projections), superimposing SI activities
 
and postulating their impacts and interrelationships. A feedback loop is essential
 
to properly scope and tune the SI activities in light of their possible consequences
 
and interrelation to terrestrial events.
 
The key issues associated with the broad, straight forward application of
 
this approach were asked early in the assessment since the validity of any application
 
of the technique would be driven by the answers.
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WORLD IMPLICATIONS 
___I 
WHAT IS SI IMPACT ASSESSMENT? 
FEEDBACK , " .'l
 
81 ACTIVITIES 
2 EDUCATIONALI ~LEVEL jr 
TERRESTRIAL
 
EVENTS& PROJECTED (OR DESIRED)

DUCATIONA ACTIVITIES CHARACTERISTICS 
LEVEL OF A NATION 
PRESENT
 
CHARACTERISTICS
 
OF A NATION
 
* HOW DETAILED MUST THE ASSESSMENT BE? 
* CAN NATIONS BE GROUPED FOR ANALYSIS? 
SAI-4233 
/6­
LEVELS OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
 
The potential for conducting impact assessment on the basis of national
 
groupings by common characteristics (including the whole world) was examined after
 
single nations had been selected. Common characteristics in geography, economics,
 
social structures and politics were examined as key indicators leading to proper
 
grouping.
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WORLD IPLICATIONSSCINC APLICA ON, INC 
LEVELS OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
NATIONS GROUPED 
WORLD BY CHARACTERISTIC 
SINGLE NATION SAI-4234 
ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS
 
Six general characteristic areas were examined for each nation considered.
 
Enough detail was researched in each of these to gain insight into how SI initiatives
 
could be brought to bear on achievement of some national goal related to each area.
 
A qualitative assessment was made of the potential impact and the detaills
 
compared among the nations. An examination of these details indicates that tailoring
 
of SI involvement to any nation requires a highly detailed analysis and an iterative
 
systems design approach to developing implementation plans. No valid, productive
 
approach to impact assessment of nations by groups was postulated with the exception
 
of environmental considerations. Although the detailed assessment will ultimately
 
depend inmany cases on the exact details of a receiving or launch site, for example,
 
there are several generic factors which must be considered. Upper atmosphere and
 
magnetosphere interactions are excellent examples of research areas with broad impact
 
assessment applicability.
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WORLD IMPLICATIONS La 
ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
DETAILS BY 	CATEGORY 
MINIMAL BY NATION 
* GEOGRAPHY GEOGRAPHY
 
* POPULATION 
* ECONOMIC FACTORS 	 A. TERRAIN 
* SOCIETAL FACTORS 	 B. HYDRO. 
* POLITICAL FACTORS 	 C. ATMOS. 
* ENVIRONMENT 
..
 
RESULT: 	 GROUPED NATION ANALYSIS 
NOT VALID FOR ANY CONSIDERATIONS 
EXCEPT ENVIRONMENTAL 
SA14281 
it? 
EXAMPLES OF SI APPLICATIONS BY COUNTRY
 
The four countries examined to the greatest level of detail are shown
 
here. They were chosen because of their comonalities and differences. The
 
variations in applicability of SI are obvious.
 
One very interesting observation has resulted from this particular
 
examination. A combination of factors determines the optimum mix of SI applications.
 
In simplest terms, itwould appear that a national with strong economic viability but
 
in an early stage of technical and industrial development is the prime candidate as a
 
market place for space industrialization.
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S'ACFNI,,IAZVONMI)WORLD NPLICATIONS 	 SC€IENCEiA I'i'L)CA lIONS, INC 
EXAMPLES OF SI APPLICATIONS BY COUNTRY 
CRITERIA: 	 MUST HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON 
ANNOUNCED NATIONAL GOAL 
A, 	 Q 
NATION ' 	 e 
INDONESIA X X X X X IX 	 j$ 80 
NIGER X X ? X ? ? 100 
INDIA X X X 160 
BRAZI L X X X X X X X ? X 750 
NOTE: THE 	INDUSTRY LIST IS MEANT TO BE EXEMPLARY, NOT 
INCLUSIVE. 	 SAI-4235 
FINDINGS
 
The findings discussed on the past several charts are summarized here.
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SCFNI LIAWINWORLD IMPLICATIONS 
FINDINGS
 
EVERY NATION ON EARTH PROBABLY HAS A MARKET FOR* 
SOME FORM OF SPACE INDUSTRY SERVICE OR PRODUCT. 
AN OPTIMUM MIX OF MANY FACTORS, NOT ECONOMIC DEVEL­* 
OPMENT ALONE, DETERMINES THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF 
SI MARKET POTENTIALS. 
* 	 INTEGRATION OF AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS FOR SI MUST 
BE DONE NATION BY NATION IN A HIGHLY DETAILED 
FASHION TO YIELD VALID DATA. 
* 	 GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT CAN BE 
DONE TO SUPPORT U.S. WORLD MARKETING IN SI. 
SAI-4236 
UNITED STATES DETAILED ASSESSMENT
 
For very pragmatic reasons (our country, more plentiful data, etc.) the,
 
United States was examined in substantially greater detail than any other nation.
 
The four general categories of examination shown on the map will be used to outline
 
this portion of the briefing.
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,DS.MLIZ,
SCE, o.,
DOMESTIC IMPACTS!ISSUES SCIUNCi AlI'LICA lIONS. INVC 
UNITED STATES DETAILED ASSESSMENT 
A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF ONE 
NATION - THE UNITED STATES 
SSDOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES //

0INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
SAI-4237
 
IMPACTS/ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN PART I
 
Those areas which were identified in Part 1 as key impacts and issues
 
relative to the US and SI are shown here. As illustrated, Part 2 of the study
 
was partially devoted to refinement and quantification of these postulated impacts
 
and issues. Considerable additional work needs to be done in all areas but
 
particularly in those not examined in this study.
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DOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUESA ILICA ONS,INC 
IMPACTS/ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN PART 1 
IDENTIFIED IN PART 1 
IMPACTS
 
* ECONOMICS 
- REVENUES, TAXES, GNP 
* JOBS 
* BALANCE OF TRADE 
0 ENERGY 
0 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
0 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
0 OPTIONS FOR UNFORESEEN NREFINED 
FUTURES PAR 2
 
ISSUES 
* INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT 
* GOVERNMENT ROLES 
I SA14255
 
EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMY IMPACTS
 
Projections of impacts to new job creation, tax generation, GNP contribution
 
and balance of trade based on expenditure requirements and revenue projections were
 
made for two possible future SI scenarios ("plans"). Plan A included an all-up commercial
 
SPS program whereas Plan C included most other initiatives but no SPS. In both cases almost
 
all of the 1985 funding was by government whereas by 2010 the case flow was provided almost
 
100% by projections of revenue potentials and investments. All indications are that multiplying
 
be very large both nationally and internationally.
effects in the U. S. from SI investments will 

into the next century
The most obvious implication is that of continued economic growth well 

with its beginnings found in SI investments in the 1980's.
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7W/V]SPA.CEINDUS 1 ,14,ZAO 
/0 -0/DOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES SC,,IDM.',LIZA 77, 
-SCIINCE A1PI CA TIOHS, INC 
EMPLOYMENT & ECONOMY IMPACTS 
TAXES GENERATED*NEW JOBS* 
PLAN A (SPS) PLAN C(NO SPS) PLAN A (SPS) PLAN C(NO SPS) 
$100M1985 100,000 15,000 $800M 
$10,000M2010 1,900,000 1,000,000 $20,OOOM 
TOTAL IMPACT MUCH GREATER. U.S. MARKETS ONLY.DIRECT ONLY. 
OTHER IMPACTS 
= $200B TO $8008GNP CONTRIBUTION IN 2010 (1976 DOLLARS) 

BALANCE OF TRADE IMPACT (1976 DOLLARS) = +$10B TO $50B IN 2010SAI-42
 
EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES SI ACTIVITIES
 
As pointed out on the previous chart, SI holds the promise for economic
 
growth of both the private and public sector. As with the companies and nations
 
of the world referred to on an earlier chart, competitive position is necessary
 
to maximize potential income and growth in the international marketplace. The
 
needs and markets to be satisfied by SI initiatives exist and will grow. The
 
various industrial activities necessary to satisfy these needs and markets will
 
evolve or stagnate in the United States based on the quality and timeliness of
 
the steps shown here leading to the expanded use of space. Fundamental to the
 
realization of goals is the first step. arriving at a proper set of the industry
 
-and government roles and responsibilities.
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INlJLI7RIA LIZA 7HONMPACS/ISUESSIAChDOMETIC SCIl!NCI A II'ICA TIOVS, INC 
EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES SI ACTIVITIES 
AT,4.44.-. .' 
GOALS 
.4.4.44*GROWTH
 
42 ~ 4.COMPETITIVE. 
POSITIO 
4. .4USE 
44EXPANSION 
' 4.JUTIFCATOOPTN 
V 
4.N ED 
.4*.4.4~ 
MARKETS4. 4 
WHAT ROEARAGMNS 
REPOSIILTIS ETC 
+. RNETSA43 
3' . 
SAMPLES OF INDUSTRY POINT OF VIEW
 
Samples of points of view for three generic industries were gathered through
 
direct contact, literature survey, attendance at special technical meetings and through
 
surveys and studies conducted by others. The data synthesized from these sources were
 
screened specifically for perceptions of where space industrialization stands today;
 
what ideas were prevalent on industry/government roles and responsibilities; and what
 
particular recommendations were offered.
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SIACIND(NMUALIZA VONl SCIl!NCFi AIPLJICA rIOA', INCDOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES I nc i~,w 
SAMPLES OF INDUSTRY POINT-OF-VIEW 
PERSONAL 
* 	 COMMUNICATIONS EVALUATED FOR
 
- 2 CONTACTS PERCEPTION
 
o 	PRODUCTS o IDEAS ON ROLES& 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
- 9 CONTACTS 

(NON-AEROSPACE) 
 0 	 RECOMMENDATIONS 
* 	 ENERGY (AND INVESTORS) 
-	 4 CONTACTS
 
(NON-AEROSPACE)
 
INDIRECT 
* 	 LITERATURE 
* 	 TECHNICAL MEETINGS 
* 	 THIRD PARTY SAI-4202 
INDUSTRY PERCEPTIONS
 
The essence of industries perceptions on the status of SI today is
 
summarized in this simplistic qualitative chart. This can also be considered
 
something of a prediction on what will happen given risk reduction initiatives.
 
There is no general lack of faith in the future of space industrialization in any
 
area, only a perception that the economic risks of involvement are very high relative
 
to normal market risks except in the more mature communications industries. As the
 
risks come down with new knowledge, demonstration programs, government initiatives,
 
etc. (marked by the passage of a block of time) it is anticipated by all contacted
 
that the level of industry involvement will increase substantially.
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S
SCIENCIFAUTPICA 710NSoINCDOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES SCPhWCWMMI'A Z 701W 
INDUSTRY PERCEPTIONS 
ENERGY & PRODUCTS 
LEVEL OF RISK 
COMMUNICATIONS 
NORMAL MARKET RISK 
LEVEL OF INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT (ALSO TIME) 
SAI-4256 
INDUSTRY VIEWS ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
 
The specifics of appropriate roles and responsibilities which could be
 
adopted by industry and government vary broadly according to the industry and the
 
individual. It is	possible, however, at the rather gross segregation level presented
 
set of consensus opinions. As might be anticipated the communications
here to assemble a 

industry is sufficiently mature that the Product Development and Pilot Operations areas
 
require consideration of specific proposals to obtain a particular opinion. The large
 
geo platform concept was one initiative that generally fell in the joint venture category
 
for example. A new version of an existing satellite system was considered to be an
 
appropriate industry activity. Particular attention is drawn to the consensus or CEP
 
blocks.
 
stage setting providing
The information presented here is considered as a 

general guidelines for development of specific arrangements on a case by case basis.
 
Early general agreement to these guidelines by government would encourage enhanced in­
dustry involvement in space industrialization.
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SCITcMJcA7JONDOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES SCI, NCIF.AITLICA TION, , INC. 
INDUSTRY VIEWS ON ROLES & RESPONSIBILIITES
 
INDUSTRY IDEAS ON ROLES & RESPONSIBILITEIS 
C 
E 
P 
- COMMUNICATIONS4i' 
- ENERGY 
- PRODUCTS 
BASIC RESEARCH 
APPLIED RESEARCH 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
PILOT OPERATIONS 
PRODUCTION OPERATIONS 
TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT 
TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 
DEPENDS ON SPECIFICS 
C 
C 
E P 
E P 
E 
E 
E P 
C 
C* C* 
C* C* 
C E P 
C E P 
P 
P 
C E 
C F P 
SAI-4242 
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INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS
 
The recommendations reflected here were derived from discussions
 
with individuals working with companies presently in the satellite communications
 
business. They address the three basic issues of how to: promote the use of
 
space on an ever increasing scale; head off a potentially limiting factor in the
 
possible growth and competitiveness of U.S. industry, and enhance both competitiveness
 
and future balance of trade for the United States.
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RIZA ONSPAC'EINIXJ7DOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES SUIEWCINA IILA TIOMS, INC 
INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
COMMUNICATIONS 
" 	 SUPPORT SPACE BASED COMPETITION TO GROUND CAPA-
BILITIES 
" 	 PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING ON THE USE OF GEO-
SYNC BASED ON GOV/INDUSTRY INTEGRATED PLANNING 
STIMULATE LAGGING SUPPORT (SUBSYSTEM) TECHNOLOGIES* 
IN U.S. TO MAINTAIN COMPETITIVE POSITION. 
SAI 4245 
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INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS - PRODUCTS
 
These recommendations were derived from discussions with industry
 
people innon-aerospace product areas. Enhanced involvement through communica­
tions and meaningful dialog is considered desirable and worth considerable
 
effort on both the industry and government side. A better understanding of the
 
potential for space products, implementation of risk reduction arrangements and
 
product relevancy of government sponsored research are viewed as the strongest
 
pulls to increased industry involvement. The long term growth of the space
 
products industry to its apparent potential will depend on one development more
 
than any other, however. The cost of bulk raw material launch to LEO must come
 
down to a few dollars per pound (<$50/LB).
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0MDOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES StCE'"!Jf'IA7 NC ""t 
INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
PRODUCTS 
* 	 ESTABLISH BETTER BROAD COMMUNICATIONS WITH 
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY. 
* 	 INCORPORATE MEANS FOR RISK REDUCTION ARRANGEMENTS 
TO BE MADE. 
* 	 REDUCE TRANSPORTATION COSTS BY 10 TO 100 TIMES BELOW 
SHUTTLE PROJECTIONS 
* 	 MAKE RESEARCH RELEVANT TO POTENTIAL PRODUCTS. 
SA14247 
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INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS- ENERGY
 
Two research and development managers for power companies and two in­
vestors from life insurance firms (large investors in power) provided insight
 
into views and recommendations regarding SPS. Briefings and data on SPS and SI
 
in general had been previously provided.
 
Perhaps the two most significant comments are the first and last shown
 
here. The first is a direct admonition to sell the benefits, not the program.
 
The power companies never sold electricity by showing smokestacks, generators, dams
 
and power lines. SPS should be presented to power companies on the basis of generation
 
and distribution benefits to them and sold to the public as an investment in clean,
 
cheap electrical power.
 
The last point reflects the observation by these reviewers that the demands
 
for power in space in the eighties and nineties will provide a strong forcing function
 
for an SPS prototype size program. A technology and development program should thus be
 
possible which maximizes benefit to both SPS and future information systems.
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SPACNIMSRLIZA ,o1DOMESTIC IMPACTS/ISSUES SCIENCEAi'PLJCA TIOGAS, INrC 
INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
ENERGY
 
TREAT SPS LIKE A POWER PROGRAM, NOT A SPACE PROGRAM* 
RISK LEVELS
* 	 PLAN TOWARD DEMONSTRATION OF ACCEPTABLE 
FOR INVES.TORS. 
* 	 PUT STRONG EMPHASIS ON JOB IMPACTS AND OTHER USES FOR 
HYDROCARBON RESOURCES. 
* 	 FACE UPTO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES EARLY 
* 	 GO FOR STRONG INFORMATION SYSTEM SYNERGY. SAI4248 
THE MAZE OF SPACE LAW
 
As shown by the previous charts and discussions, both industry and
 
government are interested and motivated to attempt establishment of working
 
relationships to promote SI. The consideration of possible legal difficulties
 
then becomes of substantial interest, particularly if some initiative is cur­
rently blocked by international or national law. To explore this three experts
 
in various aspects of space law were polled on an informal basis for opinions.
 
A cursory review of the reams of literature on the subject was also conducted
 
to obtain the flavor of opinions and counter-opinions being expressed in
 
print.
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LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS PACEINDUSR,,IuzA 71ON S CIMr AIPiICA1HONS, INC 
THE MAZE OF SPACE LAW 
GOVERNMENT 
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATED 
> INDUSTRIAL. 
PLAN 
7 
HOW TORTUOUS THE PATH? ARE THERE BLOCKS? 
ASSESSED BY: 
]/ EXPERT REVIEW (INFORMAL TO SAI) 
* DELBERT D.SMITH 
* KATHERIN D. HALLGARTEN 
* ART DULA 
LITERATURE REVIEW SA1424 
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GENERAL CONSENSUS - INTERNATIONAL
 
The literature review supported the opinion that much discussion on
 
international law and space is in progress but that no seriously limiting universal
 
agreements have been made. However, a number of equatorial and/or developing nations
 
have expressed their determination to play a larger role in controlling space in­
dustrialization by international agreement. This is exemplified by the current
 
attempts to increase the number of such countries represented on the U. N. Committee
 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the point where they would have the majority
 
vote.
 
The last point presents that action needed to quiet an often expressed
 
fear that some potentially desirable long range goals (such as use of lunar material)
 
may be precluded or seriously hampered by improperly coordinated treaty agreements.
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.PC, N,,,MM LIZA ,NLEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 	 SCIICK AP1'LCA 71Ot/S INC 
GENERAL CONSENSUS - INTERNATIONAL 
* 	 MUCH INTERPRETATION, NEGOTIATION AND RHETORIC IN PROGRESS 
NO SERIOUSLY LIMITING TREATIES OR INTERNATIONAL LAW* 
IN EFFECT. 
PRESSURE IN U.N. TO ADOPT MOTIONS LIMITING SI* 
ACTIVITIES WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. 
* 	 INTEGRATED TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PLANNING 
NECESSARY TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS. 
SAIA264 
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GENERAL CONSENSUS - DOMESTIC
 
Policies and rules (often based on interpretation of law) seem to have
 
the highest potential for domestic impediment of space industry initiatives. Policies
 
related to control of systems and data (such as Landsat and shuttle/spacelab for
 
some trends as reflected by the
example) have received substantial attention and 

Some laws and rules, imposed due to other national con­quote here are apparent. 

siderations, may inhibit the bringing together of sufficient capital and capability
 
The impact of such prior enactments will
 to address the more aggressive SI programs. 

have to be addressed on a case by case basis as circumstances dictate unless general
 
Because of the special factors surrounding
guidelines are established ahead of time. 

potential SI investments,-it is considered extremely important by our reviewers that
 
industry viewpoints be factored into any proposed tailoring of laws and policy affecting
 
SI.
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LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 	 SPr,, AI,,,CA,,oN, INC,07
 
GENERAL CONSENSUS - DOMESTIC
 
* 	 "THESE.. .CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THAT PRIVATE SECTOR 
PARTICIPATION IN SPACE OPERATIONS IS DESIRABLE. 
NONETHELESS, A NUMBER OF TRENDS SUGGEST THAT 
NATIONAL ... POLICY MAY BE MOVING AWAY FROM PROMO-
TION OF FULL-SCALE COMMERCIAL INVOLVEMENT." 
-D.D. SMITH 
(With Amens) 
ANTI-TRUST LAW AND SEC RULES APPEAR TO LIMIT
 
"DISTRIBUTION OF RISK".
 
* 	 CONSIDERATION OF INDUSTRIES VIEWPOINT IS IMPERATIVE 
IN TAILORING LAW AND POLICY TO PROMOTE SI. 
SAI-4258 
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FIVE SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS
 
Illustrated here are the five most significant institutional implica­
tions given specific attention in this study out of the dozens which were
 
postulated. They are numbered here in reference to the next chart which discusses
 
the implications and required actions.
 
Space industry activities in existence today have already addressed the
 
five items to whatever degree was necessary to achieve implementation. Some
 
proposed industry activities are in transitional phases and some have been stagnated
 
awaiting institutional and policy changes. Inthe environment of applications
 
oriented space endeavors in the US and the world it would appear that space in­
dustrialization will represent an increasing fraction of total non-military space
 
expenditures, probably 80 to 90 percent in the early 1980s. Thus it would seem
 
imperative that the over-arching concepts of space industrialization must be
 
factored into the planning, implementation and exploitation of all new future
 
space capabilities.
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; oNsA"u,"R;L17A&,SCIFNCF'A ITILICATION,., 11VCINSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
FIVE SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS 
~EXPORT 
7~ I / PRIVATE$ I 0 
GOVt n. 
0:) 
TIME 
® TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
SAT 4259 
FIVE SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS
 
These five items are keyed to the previous chart and the accompanying
 
discussion. The government/industry/academic institutional arrangements necessary
 
to accomplish tasks 1 through 3 and optimize benefit from 4 and 5 must be designed
 
ina fashion responsive to the needs of individual Sl initiatives. The first steps
 
can be taken, however, by establishing a planning office responsible for the
 
integration of space industrialization elements into all national space activities
 
and plans. This office would supply the data for decisions on items 4 and 5
 
and formulate plans and focus for accomplishing items 2 and 3.
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1WT'ZOIINSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
FIVE SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS
 
(3 	 MUST BECOME AN INTEGRALSPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION 

PART OF NATIONAL SPACE POLICY PLANNING.
 
Q 	 INDUSTRIALIZING ORGANIZATIONS AND LEGAL STRUCTURES 
MUST 	EVOLVE AND BE ENCOURAGED. 
0 	 MECHANISMS FOR ADVANTAGEOUS TRANSFER OF 
RESPONSIBILITY NECESSARY. 
(' 	 THE APPLICABILITY OF SI TECHNOLOGIES TO MANY 
PROBLEMS, NEEDS AND MARKETS WILL GO UNNOTICED 
WITHOUT FOCUSED DIALOG. 
(W 	THE KNOTTY ISSUES OF TODAY IN TECHNOLOGY EXPORT 
WILL BE FURTHER DRIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL/ 
SAI4260MULTINATIONAL NATURE OF SI. 
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THE KEY QUESTION INSl
 
Simply stated, does it appear likely that private industry will significantly
 
increase its involvement in space industrialization even ifthe institutional require­
ments can be sorted out ina generally compatible fashion? The bottom line involves
 
the economics of the space operation, especially when compared to terrestrial alternatives.
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INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS s 7-C"Ac 	 f l
 
THE KEY QUESTIONS IN SI
 
VNEED FOR 
HAVE DISCUSSED 	 V PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN SI. 
V IMPLEMENTATION OF 
KEY QUESTION: 
WILL PRIVATE INDUSTRY FURTHER 
ITS PRESENT INVOLVEMENT 
SUBSTANTIALLY? 
SAI 4241 
PRIVATE INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
 
As represented here, the markets for industry both domestically and on
 
the international scene provide the motivation for providing a service or product.
 
A decision is then required on which option to pursue to provide that service
 
or product. Recognizing this, considerable effort was expended in both Part 1
 
and Part 2 of the study to compare SI initiatives to viable terrestrial alternatives.
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SPA CU, 1INISRI LIZA HION 
EXAMPLE ECONOMICS SC.WO',.A,.,L.C, INC 
PRIVATE INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
 
DOMESTIC MAR KETS 
SPACE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
* PRIVATE 
* GOVERNMENT 
INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS 
I___ 
TERRESTRIAL 
ALTERNATIVES 
MOTIVATORS OPTIONS 
SAI-4240 
S7
 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES ASSESSMENT
 
InPart 1 of the study very general qualitative and quantitative comparisons
 
few SI initiative deletions. More detailed and specific
were done, resulting in a 

alternatives were postulated and examined in Part 2. Itwas found, however, that SI
 
initiatives were not really sold or dismissed by straight-forward economic assessments
 
Postulates of what the companies characteristics and vested
of capability comparisons. 

interests are when such trades are made figure strongly into the selection. Ineach
 
case examined, circumstances leading both to turn down and implementation decisions
 
could be hypothesized
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SI'A Ch IIVIUS TI [A LIZA HION 
EXAMPLE ECONOMICS SCIEWC,'A,.,CA7oN, INC 
TERRESTRIAL ALTERNATIVES ASSESSMENT
 
PART 2PART 1 
MORE SPECIFICGENERAL 

0 COMMUNICATIONS MOBIL" INFORMATION 

AND POINT TO POINT
" ENERGY 
* PRODUCTS * REMOTE SENSING 0 EMERGENCY LIGHTING* PEOPLE 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
* ALTERNATIVES ALWAYS EXIST. 
* AN EXACT, OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC VIABILITY 
DETERMINATION IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON 
SPECIFICS 
ADVOCACY AND VESTED INTERESTS ARE KEY* 

DETERMINANTS IN SELECTION PROCESS
 SAl-4251 
TIHE GENERIC MARKETS
 
To be generally attractive, a capital intensive new market must hold 
substantial promise for revenue and net profit. From the analysis in Part 1 of 
this study (which quantified the elements of the market potentials summarized here) 
it was concluded that the projected revenues were sufficiently attractive as to 
spur industry interest in the coming years. 
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EXAMPLE ECONOMICS SCIECUAI)7 ICA TIONS,INC
 
THE GENERIC MARKETS 
ENERGY
INFORMATION 
SB/YEAR $B/YEAR 
100" 100
 
10 10 /
 
01-' 
I i II 
0i 20 0 10 20 
NOTE- BEST CASE LEAST CASE
 
PRODUCTS PEOPLE
 
$B/YEAR SB/YEAR 
100- 100 
10- 10­1 - - 1-- _ 
01 01 
0 10 20 0 10 20 
SAS 4264 
PART 1 REVENUE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT THE
 
GENERIC MARKETS WERE ATTRACTIVE QUANTITATIVELY.
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ECONOMICS CONSIDERED
 
From the market projection data of Part 1 of this study could be selected
 
those initiatives showing the largest individual potential revenues. Thus inPart 2
 
it was desirable to examine the details of these specific initiatives and determine
 
investment and cash flow requirements to further assess economic viability. As
 
illustrated here, however, the right combinations of detailed knowledge supporting
 
original contribution by the study Were available only in the Information Services
 
Five services were selected for analysis based on their major contribution
area. 

to the overall information market potential.
 
62
 
ECONOMIC VIABILITY ASSESSMENT
 
Comparisons to current communications industries were made to derive average
 
figures for net profit margin and non-hardware operational expenses. Rockwell
 
International, in the companion study to this one, derived hardware costs related to
 
Using market projections from Part 1
these five initiatives for the first platform. 

of the SAI study we derived a prediction of channels needed and sized the space systems
 
With

requirements and estimated production and deployment costs as a function of time. 

all the required cost data together a string of projected costs and revenues was cal­
culated.
 
The "Initial Capital" requirement reflects that amount of money required to
 
"Capital Before Breakeven" reflects
establish the service and initiate revenue income. 

the maximum debt incurred (cumulative cash flow) prior to the cash flow break even time
 
when outlay and income balance. "Rate of Project Return" is an investment judgment tool
 
which allows comparison of economic benefit gained relative to other potential investments.
 
A return of 10% would mean that the investor is breaking even relative to a 10% discounted
 
All figures quoted are computed against a positive future scenario assuming
investment. 

come to pass as specified
needed structures, power and transportation technologies will 

in a later chart.
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SPA Cr IDUSTR IA TIONEXAMPLE ECONOMICS
 S ClIFNCF Al'I'lICA liONS, INC 
ECONOMICS CONSIDERED 
PART 2 OBJECTIVE O-GENERIC TO SPECIFIC
 
HOWEVER:
 
* INFORMATION THEREFORE 
5 Services ;t 80% Revenues ASSESSED: 
* ENERGY V POCKET TELEPHONE 
SPS Examined Elsewhere V ADVANCED TV 
* PRODUCTS NAT'L INFO SERV 
Exact Details Imperative V TELECONF 
* PEOPLE 'I ELECTRONIC MAIL 
Viability Depends on Above Three 
SAI4260 
Al
 
SI'ACf.INDU)SIRIALlZA 77OAT 
SCIINCh AIILICAEXAMPLE ECONOMICS NR, INC 
ECONOMIC VIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
* 15% NET PROFIT MARGIN 
* HARDWARE COSTS FROM RI 
* DOE SHARES DEVELOPMENT COST (50%) 
* NUMBER OF CHANNELS AND SYSTEM SIZE LINEAR 
* INVESTMENT DISCOUNTED AT 10% 
* COMPANY INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS PRIOR TO INITIATION 
* ANSWERS ARE SCENARIO DEPENDENT 
CAPITAL BEFORE RATE OF 
SERVICE INITIAL CAPITAL BREAKEVEN PROJECT RETURN­
14%PERSONAL COMM $420M $420M 
17%ADVANCED TV $200M $200M 

NATIONAL INFO $420M $620 - $640M 17%
 
TELECONF $254M $2126M 11%
 
*ELECTRONIC MAIL $4,260M* 
*STRONG FUNCTION OF ASSUMPTIONS. BREAKEVEN NEVER ACHIEVED FOR POST OFFICE 
TO POST OFFICE SYSTEM ASSUMED HERE. 
SAI-4265 
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CUMULATIVE CASH FLOW REQUIREMENTS
 
The string of costs and revenues referred to in the previous chart are
 
presented graphically with the number of years to achieve breakeven specified. It
 
was not possible in this study to optimize the R & D, investment, debt, market
 
Also,
penetration rates, technical synergy and other factors affecting these curves. 

a more aggressive market scenario could easily lead to economies of scale not realized
 
Thus we feel the time to breakeven is generally conservative although not
here. 

revenue.
unattractive here considering the tens of billions of dollars potential annual 

The Electronic Mail initiative examined here was different from that delineated
 
in Part 1 of the study which assumed home to home delivery. The Post Office to Post
 
Office system postulated by RI appears to be economically infeasible at current first
 
class letter rates. A careful analysis of the effect of rates and house to house delivery
 
should be made before final judgment on the concept.
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,,,L..ZA
EXAM CONOLE ICSSl C,'llcS,,TIoN 7/
 
INC
EXAMPLE ECONOMICS SCIECI,ANISICA TIONS, 
CUMULATIVE CASH FLOW REQUIREMENTS
 
2- POCKETTELEPHONE 
NATIONAL 
INFORMATION 2 
ADVANCED 
TV 
$1 1 / SB 
0 ­ 15 YR 0 / 
11 YR 9YR 
1 11 YR 191YR 
2 ELECONFERENCING 2 ELECTRONIC MAIL 
$80 -I _ $80--""/ 
FUNCTION OF 
1 19 YR 1 ASSUMPTIONS 
2 /POST OFFICE TO POST OFFICE 
2 2 
3 
SAO 4257 
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VIABILITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS
 
Although Electronic Mail inthe form assumed here appears unattractive, the
 
remaining four SI opportunities appear very attractive. An examination of recent
 
literature related to satellite communications systems indicates that rudimentary
 
forms of these initiatives are already in the planning stages. But how large will
 
these industries grow and what markets will they command? The answer lies inwhat
 
R&D commitments are made in the next five to ten years that provide the technological
 
basis for aggressive industry programs in the eighties and nineties
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CE Al?'!SChIft! A TI ONEXAMPLE ECONOMICS 	 SI'AC/s IlIAA TION 
VIABILITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
* 	 FOUR (4) OF FIVE (5) OPPORTUNITIES EXAMINED IN DETAIL 
APPEAR VERY ATTRACTIVE (WITHIN ASSUMPTIONS) 
* 	 COMPLEXITY INVERSION, LARGE SPACE SYSTEMS AND 
TRANSPORTATION ARE KEY TECHNOLOGIES. 
* 	 REALIZATION OF THE,10 TO 40 BILLION DOLLAR MARKET 
POTENTIAL OF THESE OPPORTUNITIES WILL REQUIRE VERY 
LARGE GEO PLATFORMS IN THE 90s WITH ECONOMICAL 
OPERATIONS. 
SAI 4263 
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PART 2 RESULTS OVERVIEW
 
This chart summarizes the How and Why of Space Industrialization as
 
The roles and related activities of government
examined in Part 2 of this study. 

and industry feed the integrated SI activities that represents the summation of
 
future private and public SI programs. The motivators for such input and sponsor­all 

ship are shown as a feedback loop. Three encompassing benefits to the public at large
 
the integrated "value generation" of space industrialization. Net value
 are shown as 

generation is possible because a new and virtually inexhaustable resource, loosely
 
called "space", is being utilized.
 
7-0-.
 
SCINC , 1,,IC,4,,o, INCCONCLUSIONS 
PART 2- RESULTS OVERVIEW 
ECNMCGOT / P ROFITS 
INDUSTRYGOVERNMENT 
RESEARCH & 
1
DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATED IMPLEMENTATION
 
SPACE OPERATIONS
[ TRANSPORTATION 
LARGE SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION MAINTENANCE 
STRUCTURES J ACTIVITIES EXPANSION
 
POWER IN SPACE
 
GENERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT 
INCREASED STANDARD OF LIVING 
JOB CREATION 
SAI4238 
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GENERAL RECOMMENDATION
 
Space Industrialization is,as Ehricke termed it,the overarching concept
 
capable of encompassing and coordinating future applications of space in the most
 
beneficial manner. The individual initiatives in the industrial activities identified
 
in this study should not be pursued as autonomous projects unto themselves. This
 
study has shown that the concepts of space industrialization are viable; that synergistic
 
relationships are possible and desirable; and that industry/government cooperative
 
planning and implementation are desirable and feasible. For various reasons industry
 
will be loath to establish long term goals that carry near term investment commitments,
 
thus government must lead in planning The assumption of authority and responsibility
 
by industry at an appropriate point in the life cycle of an initiative will require
 
operating characteristics that should be established as part of the design and develop­
ment process. In this area industry must lead.
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3 /iSPA Ch' INDUSMRA LIZA lIO0CONCLUSIONS 	 SClAl'fJCATIONS INC 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
* 	 ESTABLISH GOALS FOR SI IN CONCERT WITH VARIOUS 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY. MOST 
WILL BE IN THE EIGHTIES BUT SOME MUST BE IDENTIFIED 
FOR THE NINTIES AND BEYOND TO OBTAIN OVERALL 
GUIDANCE. 
* 	 PLAN FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF, AND TRANSITION TO, 
PRIVATE INDUSTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF ALL 
SI INITIATIVES WITH PUBLIC SERVICES BECOMING A 
CUSTOMER. CONSENSUS OPINION IS THAT THIS WILL MAXI-
MIZE PUBLIC BENEFIT. 
SAI-4244 
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SPECIFIC 	RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The reconmendations most strongly expressed by our industry contacts were
 
presented earlier. Although the level of specificity varies, they are all expressions
 
of a positive nature intended to enhance the near and long term growth of space in­
dustrialization.
 
One recurring message has appeared throughout this study when the origins
 
and reasons for success of various projects was examined. It is that three elements
 
were recurrent. They were.
 
1. The concept was technically sound.
 
2. Its evolution was well coordinated and the concepts and developments
 
involved widely displayed.
 
3. Strong advocacy was provided by a small group of well informed, hard
 
working people.
 
In recent years a fourth element has often been required: application to a
 
need, 	although there are notable exceptions in recent years in the scientific community of
 
It is these general observations that prompt our recommendation that a special
course. 

Office for Space Industrialization Planning, Integration and Implementation be established
 
to focus SI efforts.
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SPA CE INDUSTRIA LIZA TION 
SCM A,,,,C, TIONS INCCONCLUSIONS 
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
* 	 INCORPORATE IN PLANNING AND ACT ON ALL PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
RECOMMENDATIONS DISCUSSED EARLIER. 
ESTABLISH AN OFFICE FOR SI PLANNING, INTEGRATION* 
AND IMPLEMENTATION REPORTING TO THE NASA
 
ADMINISTRATOR.
 
CONDUCT THE SERIES OF STUDIES RECOMMENDED IN THE SAI* 
FINAL REPORT. THE SUBJECTS AND SEQUENCES ARE DESIGNED
 
TO CONVERGE ON ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS DELINEATED HERE.
 
SAI1424O 
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SI STRUCTURES, POWER AND TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS
 
This study has shown that commercially viable industries in Information
 
Services, Energy and Products can be realized given the tools illustrated here for
 
private enterprise to work with. Our analysis has also shown that public investment
 
in these capabilities in the eighties will be paid back manyfold in the nineties and
 
beyond. All indications are that Space Industrialization is the catalyst required to
 
swing the United States and the world upward toward the next plateau of human
 
achievement. This will be achievement in toto, not just inspace or on the Earth
 
but throughout the sphere of human endeavor. We believe that implementation of our
 
recommendations and aggressive pursuit of the overarching concept of Space Industrialization
 
will be concrete steps toward realization of these achievements.
 
1 26PM 'FINI)US7IALIZA TRWSCIENCEFA,I',,A,,ONS,INC riCONCLUSIONS 
S STRUCTURES, POWER &TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS 
1990-1995
1980-1985 1985-1990 

25 75KW 
JUSTIFIED BY SPACE 200 -- 500 KW 
1,000 10,000 KW 
JUSTIFIED BY NEEDS 
OF LARGE SCALE 
PROCESSING, SHUTTLE NEEDS, 
COMM. TECHNOLOGY 
JUSTIFIED BY 
GEO PLATFORM, SPS 
COMM. INITIATIVES, SPS 
SHUTTLE I SSTO 
$250 $350/L HLLV -1 
$100 $150/ LB LEO 
JUSTIFIED BY PRODUCTS, 
INFORMATION AND ENERGY 
LOW COST SYSTEMS $20 -$50/LB LEO 
JUSTIFIED BY PRODUCTS, 
INFO. AND ENERGY 
SA-42, 
77
 
APPENDIX C
 
SPACE INDUSTRY OPPORTUNITIES
 
INFORMATION
 
riron 
Cornunications 
Individual 
E-0935R3 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS WRIST RAD IO(CC-9) 
o 	PURPOSETo allow citizens to communicate through exchanges 200 ft DIA ANTENNA 
2 BEAMS SYNC Hby voice, from anywhere. 7 kW POWE SBEANM EtT Aof1000 CHANINELS/BEAM ORBI 
100USERS/CHANNEL 
* 	 RATIONALE
 
Mobile telephones are desirable, but should be wrist
 
worn Uses include emergency, recreation, business,
 
rescue etc
 
* 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Multichannel switching satellite and wrist transmitter-
.- , 
receivers connect people anwhere to each other directly
 
or to telephone networks Analog or vocoded voice used SO.,,,
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
* WEIGHT 	 16,000 1b 
* SIZE 200 ft dia antenna 	 \ G. 
* RAN' POWER 21 kW 	 ) C,o 5
* OR2IT Synch. Equat. 	 CD 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE I
 
: RIS:( CATEGORY I(Low)

* TIME FRAME 	 1990
* IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 300M
 
0 PERFORMANCE 
 WER 2 mW 
IC 25,000 simultaneous voice channels, each shared by 	 BATTERY urE 
up to 100 users: 2.5 million people communicate by 	 CO.TnUO S 
normal voice. 	 vocs/corRECOGNITION FOR 
TELEPHONADDRES0BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* 	 TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large/tandem tug or SEPS
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit
* SUESYSTEMS 	 Attitude control; antenna; processor; repeater
* 	 TECHNOLOGY large multibeam antenna, multi-channel repeater, LSI processor, multiple-access
* OTHER Wrist transceiver, LSI technology 	 t pcheaques 
32
 
Informatix
 
Communications
 
individual 
E-0930R2 
URBANIPOLICE WRIST RADIO (CC-2) 
o PURPOSE 
To give real-time, secure, anti-jam, high coverage,

wide area personal communications to each policeman.
 
SYNCH 	 EQUAT 
SRATIONALEI ORBIT 
. 200 f DIA ANTENNA
 
Portable /personal sets needed to increase police .: 2 FIXED BEAMS
25 kW TRANSMITTER 
mobility/ 	safety. Jamming/eavesdropping will 10 CHANNELSIBEAML BAND 
become routine 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Wrist 2-way transceiver and channelized Comsat giveinstant 2-way communications to patrolmen. Multibeam 
antenna, anti-jam processing, and pseudo-random coding

make jamming difficult.
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 18, 000 lb
 
" SIZE 200-ft dia antenna
 
o RAW 	POWER 75 kW 
* ORBIT 	 Synch Equat.
"CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 	 M (AE 
o 	 RISK CATEGORY I (Low) C VFR D
 
FRAME STIME
1990OVERAGARA
 
" IO0 COST (Space only) 390 M CENTER
 
o 	 PERFORMANCE 
10 Channels/city area, 250 areas s;multaneously. WRIST TNE,Resists 1 kW uplink jammer and 40 kW downlink jammer/ 
. T POWER•ANTI 	 JAM VOCODEDJ  
VOICEtwo miles distant, 	 2o. WEIGHT 
24 LIFE 
* 	BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS ' .1. 1. 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug or SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; antenna; processor I 
o TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder; LSI processor; multi-access
* OTHER Wrist transceiver, LSI technology 	 techniques 
Information
 
Communications
 
Group
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Education
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Transmission and/or Rebroadcast
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Use space as a repeater or broadcast station for educational
 
TV to increase possible audience coverage and lower cost. Using
 
bigger antennas, smaller receivers are possible and thus much lower
 
user cost. Should piggyback on public communications platform.
 
Advantage of space is wide audience and numerous parallel channels
 
available.
 
1) U. S. Secondary 
2) Third World 
3) Adult U. S. 
4) Adult Third World 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: Large Antenna lOC: Near Mid-Term
 
SITE: Gso DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MI'ASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH: Moderate
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLI SHIflNT: 
OPEPATIONS: 
PRODUCT:
 
E-7218R4 
Information
 
3-D HOLOGRAPHIC TELECONFERENCING (CC-i1) Communications 
" PURPOSE 	 Group
 
To greatly reduce the need to travel for most government
 
or private industry business conferences without
 
significant loss in ability to transact business.
 
o RATIONALE 	 1SATELLITE -IN GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 66 ft ANTENNA LENS 
Travel for conferences is costly, time consuming, and 190 BEAMS nTOW EACH 
250 TrVCHANNELS7kW RF POWERinefficient. 
C BAND 
o 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTION SW MHz SPECTRUM USED 
loentical conference rooms are fitted with aTV. camera, 
T.V projector and laser illuminator and stereo sound 
system. Resulting holograms produce three-dimensional 
images that can walk, talk, and present data 
" CHARACTERISTICS 	 IDENTICAL 
CONFERENCE

* WEIGHT 	 15,000 lb 56-ft antennaROM
" SIZE 
" RAW POWER 220 kW 	 Io USER AREAS 
" ORBIT 	 Geostationary WiIl DIAMETER V MERA 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1
 
" RISK CATEGORY II (Medium)
 
I TIME FRAME 1990 ONiFIXED ANTENNA
 
, IOC 	COST (Space only) 500 M 3ow TRANSMITTER 
* 	 PERFORMANCE TV 
1,250 identical conference rooms in 100 urban areas TRANSMITTER 3 COLOR LASER interconnected simultaneously with 3-D colorV PROJECTOR 
CONTROLholographic images and stereo sound. 
3 * BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle, largeltandem tug or SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual assembly and servicing
* SUBSYSTEMS Large multibeam antennas, processors, high power transmitter 
I TECHNOLOGY High power transmitters - LSI processors, prime power source 
e OTHER User equipment, holographic quality, image motion compensation 
k- 34
 
IxTmaTln 
Communi.cations
 
Group 
E-0936R2 
DIPLOMATICIU.N. HOTLINES (CC-10) 
* PURPOSE 
To provide rapid, reliable, secure communications 
between heads of state (or embassies). SYNCH EQUAT ORBIT 
* 	 RATIONALE NN 
Good, 	 rapid communications needed to reduce dangers 5ft2ANTENNA 
."
200 ANTENLNof escalation in international situations. 	 CHANNEL TRANSPONDER
* AUTOMATIC SWITCHING SUBSTATION 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Multibeam antenna Comsat crosslinks any or all
 
terminals, one per country Satellite processing Is
 
autonomous and not subject to capture. 

NATIONAL TERMINAL 
ft ANTENNA* 	 CHARACTERISTICS .2 21DUPLEX VOICE 
" WEIGHT 3000lb CHANNEL lANTI SECUREJAMMING 
1W TRANSMITTER 
o SIZE 	 5 x 20 ft 
* 	RAW POWER I kW
 
ORBIT Synch. Equat. FOOTPRINT PER
 3 	 BEAM" CONSTELLATION SIZE 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 00 
* TIME FRAME 1985 
IIIO.1C COST (Space only) 330 M a 
0 6 PERFORMANCE 
One full duplex voice channel per country, secure, 
vi 200 countries accommodaed. Automatic switching
In 	satellite; or multiple access user-controlled. 
0 	BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and IUS /tug 
o ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Attitude control; antenna; processor and switch 
* TECHNOLOGY Multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder: LSI processor and automatic switch; 
* OTIER None 	 multiple-access techniques 
33 
Information
 
Communications
 
Group
 
E-O934P2 
NATIONAL INFORMATION SERVICES (CC-8) 
" PURPOSE
 
To provide a National or Intelsat adjunct network LASER LINKS TO
with capability to serve small-antenna users. SATELLITES 
* RATIONALE 
" AINLCurrent satellites require very large antennas and SYNCH EQUAT200 ItCIA ANTENNA .N ORBITtherefore have few entry points 1000 BEAMS- not suited for 100 CHANNELS/BEAM
"disadvantaged" users. 1W TOAL 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Large multibeam antenna satellites link facsimile, voice,
data, and teletype terminals with low power and small

antennas. Satellite is amulti-channel processingrepeaterCHARACTERISTICS 
oAwTE NA 
" WEIGHT 20.000 lb 
SIZE SIZ200-ft dla antenna 3 ft ANTENNA5W POWER
" RAW POWER 15 kW
" ORBIT Synch. Equat* CONSTELLATION SIZE 4 S RER/
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 10 M11/11-OR 
o TIME FRAME 1990 10o 
'-
USER AREAS, SMALLER 
o C COST (Space only) 1.1 B / SUBSLRERUER 
o PERFORMANCE IMbh/s.. OR C D400,000 channels of 1Mbit/sec or 1MHz capability mhz CAPABILTY
serviced in 4000 areas worldwide, with 0.05-W trans­
mitters and 3-ft antennas at user terminals.
 
o BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS I 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuftle and large tug or SEPS
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit
" SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; antenna! processor
" TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder; LSI processor multiple-access
" OTHER techniques 
dmorlpiOXl 
Communcauions
 
Groups
 
E-0931 R3 
ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMI SSION (CC-4) 
* PURPOSE 
To speed up delivery and lower costs of most mail.
 
To service thinly populated areas. SYNCH EQUAT
 
CORBITORBIT 
* RATIONALE 
* ~200 ,..ft DIA ANTENNADelivery of physical letters is slow and needless in most 1O00BEAMS 
y0 CHANNELS/BEAM
 
cases when locally reproduced facsimile could do. 5kW RF POWER 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Page readers and facsimile printers at each post office
 
read, transmit, receive, and reproduce mail. Satellite
 
acts as multi-channel repeater.
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
o WEIGHT 20,000 lb
 
" SIZE 200-ft dia antenna
 
* RAW POWER 15 kW C­
* ORBIT Synch. Equat.
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 C
 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low) WiTH IoPOST OFFICES
PER AREA
 
* TIME FRAME 1990 3 M POST OFCES TOAI
 
" IOC COST (Space only) 430 M "A
 PERFl MAN 3ANTENNA SW POWER PER
 
atFAC POWER PER MAJOR URBAN OFFICE
10 pas (nOW 
RURAL OFFICEiransmi s racsimlie aR10 pages (8112 x 11") per second per post office Up to 100,000 post offices serviced in up to50% of area of U.S.A. Total service -100 billion
 
pagesiday.
 
•wBUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug or SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; antenna; processor 
o TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder; LSI processor; multiple-access 
o OTHER None techniques 
-S
 
E-0929R2 
Information
 
DISASTER COMMUNICATIONS SET (CC-3) 	 Communications 
Groups
* PURPOSE 
To provide communications, command, and control
 
to disaster area emergency personqel. M FIXED BEAMS ­
i *• 	10 SCANNED BEAMS 
25 kW TRANSMITTERSSYC 
* RATIONALE 	 EUT ORBIT 
Lack of communications hampers quick and effective 0j
 
handling of emergencies. ,
 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Wrist 2-way transceivers connected to each other and 
to control centers through multi-channel Comsat. 
Anti-jam. 	 -, -.-. 
* 	CHARACTERISTICS l> 
" WEIGHT 18 0 
o SIZE 200-ft dia antenna 	 7 
o RAW POWER 75 kW 	 10 
o ORBIT Synch. Equat. 	 OBEAMS FOR 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE 1' 	 DISASTER 
RISK CATEGORY I I(Low) AREASI
* TIME FRAME 	 1990 
o IO0 COST 390M 	 250 FIXED BEAMS
* PERFORMANCE 	 FOR URBAN C+C 
Provides 10 disaster areas and 250 urban centers with
 
10 channels of voice communications each. Secure,

anti-jam coded. 	 ,i 
o BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
o TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug or SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; antenna; processor ,
*TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder; LSI processor: multi-access 
aOTHER None techniques 
26 
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Communications
 
Down-Link Only
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Communication 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Down-Link Broadcast (Audio/Video)
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Powerful satellite in GEO stationary orbit makes
 
reception possible in all U.S. areas with small antennas
 
Usuage:
 
Make TV available to all locations in U.S.
 
1) Weather Broadcasts (Remote Areas)
 
2) Disaster Warning
 
3) Entertainment
 
4) Education
 
5)
 
ORIGINAL PAGE JS
 
O POOR QUALTJ1 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHNiENT: 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
47
 
Information 
Communicatlons 
Down-Link Only 
E-7217112 
ADVANCED TV.BROADCAST (CC-6) 
o PURPOSE 
To make T.V. available to all locations In U. S., with 
small receiver antennas. 
* ATONAL
*RATIONALE 
Mountainous, rural, and remote areas currently have poor or no service due to line-of-sight transmissions. 
C BAND , 
. BEAMS 
TRANSMITTERS EACH 00W 
33 CHANNELSIBEAM MAX 
60, kW TRANSMiMTEO POWER . 
OEOSTAIONARY 
ORBIT 
fDOIA LENS 
ANTENNA 
,,, 
o CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Powerful satellite in geostationary orbit makes reception 
possible in all U.S. areas with very small antennas. 
TRANSMITTERI CHANNEL 10 ft 011H, 
low POWER 
10MCHANNELS10 ft DISH, I kW 
pz 
o CHARACTERISTICS 
%WEIGHT 14,000 lb 
* SIZE 56-ft antenna 
* RAW POWER 150 kW 
o ORBIT Geosynchronous 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 
0 TIME FRAME 1990 
* sOC CosT (Space only) 460 M 
"Z0 PERFORMANCE 
512 color T.V. channels broadcast to U S. land area, 
covered in 250 beams, each with 90-mi footprint. 
Local stations can distribute program anywhere. 
25 COVERAGE AREAS 
ANTENNAPVE'RHOME 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug or SEPS ' 
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manned servicing 
" SUBSYSTEMS 100 Woutput tube, 60-ft rmultibeam antenna 
* TECHNOLOGY Processor/filters 
* OTHER None 
29 
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Communications
 
Up-Link Only
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Vehicle Inspection/Communications
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: National Motor Vehicle Inspection System
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
1) Install a microprocessor (similar to VW system perhaps) in each 
automobile manufactured which will sample conditions on key safety 
items in or on vehicle. Examples are tires, steering 3oints, lights, 
brakes, glass(for breaking), etc. A small broadcast system (ala 
Bekey) would allow periodic sampling by satellite and identification 
of unsafe vehicles nationwide. A condition uncorrected after some 
period of time would bring action by authorities. Savings in total 
state manhours unknown but substantial. 
2) Distress Signal for Remote Use
 
(Exploration, etc.)
 
3) Isolated Equipment Malfunction Warning
 
4) 
CHARACTERISTI CS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
intormation it
 
Communications
 
Up-Link Only
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Navigation
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Location/Tracking of Icebergs in North Atlantic
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
At present, icebergs carried south from Greenland by the
 
Labrador Current into the North Atlantic shipping lanes are tracked
 
by air patrols which must re-locate each known iceberg every few
 
days to provide reliable information to ships at sea. Projected
 
positions can only be done with fair confidence for one or two days
 
ahead, necessitating this cumbersome method.
 
Aerial drops of inexpensive transponders interrogated by
 
satellites should significantly reduce the costs of the present
 
program, with increased reliabli.ty and accuracy in iceberg position
 
reports.
 
The present system is operated by the International Ice Patrol
 
(a branch of the U.S. Coast Guard), with expenses shared by 19
 
maritime nations. The U.S. share is 12% of total annual costs of
 
$1.3 million. Even with the present system, one ship is lost by
 
iceberg collision about every 3 years; probable losses in each
 
incident of the order of $10 million. I have no information on
 
numbers of planes and personnel lost in the flights, which are
 
often done in marginal weather conditions.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: (Essentially, this would be part of a VLA satel-

TECHNOLOGY: lOte system IOC: Late 1980's
 
SITE: either GSO, or multiple DIMENSION: 100 meters or 
TRANSPO t btes in LEO largerantenna on satellite 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
E-7219R2 
Information
 
ENERGY MONITOR (CS-9) Communcation 
Up-Link Only

" PURPOSE 

To measure energy flow at avery large number of points 
on dr1 SATELLITE AT 
on ulstrlbuiofl fltwork GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
1M0 ft DIAMETER 
RATIONALE- ioe CHANNELS/BEAM 
* RATI AL~M N: TOTAL S-ECTRUM 
Power programming and fine-tuning requires knowledge
 
of energy status on network.
 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Small L-band transmitters send instantaneous current,
 
voltage, or power readings on network when queried
 
sequentially by multi-channel/processing communications ­
repeater 
o CHARACTERISTICS -' 
o "TIGHT 10, 000 lb 
* SIZE 150-ft dia .....-. -"­
o RAW POWER 23 kW
 
" ORDIT Geostationary CONTROL
 
CENTER 
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low)
 
" TIME FRAME 1990
 
* IOC COST (Space only) 300 M ONE-TURN 
* PERFORMANCE SECONDAR 
Up to one billion points on energy generation and
 
distribution network measured every hour. TRANSMS NON
 
2.5W PEAK( 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS OoIw AVG 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and IUS/tug 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing, assembly 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control, antenna, processor 
* TECHNOLOGY Multi-channel transponder, LSI processor 
* OTHER 
t4
fitD 44 
GLOBAL SEARCH + RESCUE LOCATOR (CC-i) 
* 	 PURPOSE 
To locate emergency transmitters worldwide; to allowsmall, lightweight transmitters. I 
* RATIONALE 	 3 ft DIA ANTENNA-
CHANNEL 
Search for rescue is expensive and not always
successful 
POSITION FIXING 
WITHIN WO0flo 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONIN3DMSOS
 
Coded, small transmitter in emergency package carried 

by traveling boats, aircraft. Signals received and 

transponded by satellites, and location computed by 

TDOA techniques .1 1
 
* 	 CHARACTERISTICS
 
" WEIGHT 1500 lb 

" SIZE 5 x 20 ft
 
o RAW POWER I kW
 
" ORBIT Near-Synch., or Med. Alt.
 
I CONSTELLATION SIZE 20 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 
o TIME FRAME 1985 
* IOC COST (Space only) 350 M 
* 	 PERFORMANCE ,/ 
Location of up to 100 simultaneous emergency transmitters 1W PEAK 
to 500 ft in three coordinates, anywhere, worldwide 10 mW AVERAGELIFE -	 I MONTH 
UNIQUE CODE 
SELF CONTAINED 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Expendable or shuttle and tug
 
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated servicing unit
 
* SUBSYSTEMS No unusual requirements 
* TECHNOLOGY No unusual requirements
 
" OTHER None
 
9A 
Informatior
 
Communica Lions 
E-0928R2 Up-Link Only 
CONSTELLATTON OF I 
4TRANSPONDERS 
/ 
ONI, 
EMERGNCY 
TRANEM ER 
g 
E-0940R3 
NUCLEAR FUEL LOCATOR (CO-7) Information 
Communcations 
Up-Link Only

* PURPOSE 
To detect and locate all nuclear reactor fuel elements 
4 TRANSPONDER SATELLITEScontinuously wherever they are. INCUINED ORBITS 
* 	RATIONALE 4 ft DA
 
ANTENNA
 
Real-time monitoring of location of nuclear material 116BEAMS
 
0 MRzneeded to prevent proliferation of weapons and nuclear 
blackmail. 	 III­
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONEach 	assembly or container istagged with amicrowave 
generator in atamper-indicating case. The uniquely coded
signals are transponded by four satellites and the position
computed by time-difference-of-arrival on the ground. 10 MWz
 
* 	CHARACTERISTICS ,
 
" WEIGHT 3000 lb T

* SIZE 42 ft antenna 	 C 
* RAW POWER 300W 	 ANTENNA 
* ORBIT Synch. Elrpt.IIncl. 	 CUUM TUB 
CONSTELLATION SIZE 4 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 
THEROP IL _ * TIME FRAME 	 1985 
* IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 270M 	 TAMPER ­
* PERFORMANCE 	 DETECTOR -- 6 
Each 	fuel assembly identified and located to ±500 ft REACTOR T
continuously, whether in a reactor building, in transit,
 
or in storage, 10,000 assemblies tracked simultaneously. 1-IV
 
* 	BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS
 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and Tug

* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual service unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Antenna, transponder
TECHNOLOGY 	 Multibearp antenna - multi-channel transponder 
,OTHER 	 LSI ground multi-channel cross-correlator receivers; high temperature
and high radiation resistant vacuum tube transmitter and code generator;
thermopile electrical generator; tamper alarm. Roof transponders. 
16 
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Remote Control
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Rbbotic 	Functions
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: 	 Use of Comm. and/or Data System On-Orbit to
 
Interface with Robotic Operators on Ground
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
(1) Maintenance of private & commerical facilities - a mobile robotx
 
system with cleaning and pattern discrimination capability
 
(microprocessor?) would be used to vacuum, clean wallswash floors
 
and maintain toilet areas. Single large data system linked by

satellite can service many (hundreds) of these via communication link.
 
(2) Remote operation of Texas Tower type rigs for oil or mining
 
operations.
 
(3) Remote massive farming of the oceans via satellite communication
 
link.
 
(4) Remote control of ground explorations for minerals, etc. in
 
different regions.
 
(5) Remote mining 	operations.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHNENT 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
/4 
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Remote Control
 
E-0951R3 
VEHICULAR SPEED LIMIT CONTROL (CS-10 
* PURPOSE 	 /.-- ­
2o ft ANTENNA CROSSED 
WITH 100kEAMS ANTENNA 
To establish positive vehicle speed control zones in 
cities by radio control of vehicle engine governors AC kWNAVIGATION 
10bCHANNELS/BEAM 	 SATELLITE 
CARS/CHANNEL 	 I...CS 7) 
o 	RATIONALE
 
Excessive speed is amajor contributor to traffic accidents
 
and injuries With positive control, speeding is im-

DOsible 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION - Each vehicle has a small
 
transceiver and a command receiver connected to acorn­
mandable speed governor Each vehicle determines its
 
location using crossed antenna NAVSAT Speed commands
 
are generated by computer on the ground
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 22,000 lb
 
" SIZE 200-ft dia antenna
 
* RAW POWER 430 kW
 
*ORBIT Synch EquaL. NAIATO
 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE I 
o RISK CATEGORY II (Medium)	 100, CIA 
* TIME FRAME 1990 	 EACH 
* tOO COST (Space only) 470M 	 S NAVIGATION 
* PERFORMANCE 
Vehicle speed controlled to ± 1 mph. Provision for one
 
million cars in each of 100 cities (100 million total PEED LIMIT COM.ANDS SET SPEED ZONE
 
Speed zones changed by program change. T HY AR NAVSAT SPEED LIMITSvehicles) 
8tAM 	 HE5POO ON QUERY GENERATE SPEED 
* 	 BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS I TANSM'f-ER COMMANDS
 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug or SEPS
 
o ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assemble in orbit 
o SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control, antenna, RF power DC power, channelized transponder 
* TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna, power tubes, channelization techniques, large-scale multiple access 
* OTHER 
-4 	 45 
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Monitoring
 
E-0909R4
 
SYNCHRONOUS METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE (CO-12) 
* PURPOSE 
To collect worldwide atmospheric data for global
weather prediction. 
* RATIONALEHigh resolution and frequent coverage of globe are 	 3fBL.A OPIESneedd f  foecass 	 Nus " 1VISIBLE LIGHT TELESCOPE 
needed for forecasts 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONOptical sensor with 1meter mirror collects visible light SYNCHRONOUSdata on gross meteorological features Same instrument TORAL
 
makes spectrum measurements for detailed information
 
on atmosphere.
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
o WEIGHT 3,000 lb 	 COMMUNICATIONS 
5x 30 ft 	 NK" SIZE 
o RAW POWER 	 IkW 
o ORBIT 	 Synch. Equat.
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 3
 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low)
 
o TIME FRAME 1985

" IOC COST (Space only) 190 M 3 ft RESOLUTION
 
" 	PERFORMANCE 
Ground resolution 300-ft dia. Scan rate. earth coverage ,0 / SWATH 
In20 sec for clouds, etc. Detailed measurements of 
spectrum every 200 sec. 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tug
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Laser for communications 
* TECHNOLOGY Laser communications link. LSI computer
* OTHER 	 Weather prediction algorithm 
E-0944R3 
(CO-11) Information ATMOSPHERIC TEMPERATIJRE PROFILE SOUNDER 
* PURPOSE 

To measure actual profiles of temperature in the 
,Ihlatmosphere. 
* RATIONALE 
Weather prediction requires knowledge of temperature 
profiles, as well as other phenomenaIt 
DESCRIPTION
* CONCEPT 
Pulsed laser vibrationally excites 
C02 or H20 molecules. 
Subsequent rotational transitions in the millimeter wave 
spectrum show temperature dependeride which is 
measured by ratio of energy in several lines. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
SWEIGHT 
* SIZE 
* RAW POWER 
* ORBIT 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 
" RISK CATEGORY 
" TIME FRAME 
o IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 
* PERFORMANCE 
I 
4000 lb 
30-ft dia antenna 
5kW 
600-nmi polar
4 
III (Medium) 
1990 
250 M" 
Entire atmosphere measured, with resolution of 300 ft 
horizontally and 100 ft vertically, every four hours. 
Emission lines and signal strength imprecisely defined 
at present. I, 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
Observtions
 
Environmental
 
Monitorlng
 
"Imm WAVE 30 ft DIA ANTENNA US 
-
PULSED C LASER ", 
M 
ATMOSPHERE 
co2 H20 VIBRATIONALLY EXCITED 
MILLIMETER WAVES RADIATED 1 It 
BY ROTATIONAL TRANSITIONS 
fA///t,/t/,'/// h i k / ',/ 
SURFACE 
It.. 
( 
* TRANSPORTATION 
, ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS 
o SUBSYSTEMS 
" TECHNOLOGY
" OTHER 
IShuttle and tugIIUS
Automated service unitlShuttle-attached manipulator 
Antenna, laser, attitude control r 
- Laser, power dissipation, antenna, pointing, sensitive heterodyne receiver 
20 
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Monitoring
E-7221R3 
WATER LEVEL AND FAULT MOVEMENT IND ICATOR (CO-3) 
.maE
eprecisionmeasurements in manyplaces in
 
rapid succession for aid in earthquake prediction,
 
water resources establishment, disaster use, etc
 LASER RADAR SATELLITE IN GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT / 
O5M OPTICSRATIONALE 	 PICOSECOND PULSESR 2 MICRORADIAN POINTING 
PULSOWER
Prediction of earthquakes, floods, droughts, and . 1.4w APER 

accurate water resources would be of great social
 
and economic benefit
 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Picosecond (10-1 sec) pulsed laser radar in orbit obtains 
precision differential range measurements from corner 
reflectors implaced on both sides of faults, river banks 
and floats, etc. 
* 	 CHARACTERISTICS
 
" WEIGHT 800 lb
 
* SIZE 	 0.5m optics
* RAW POWER 250W

" ORBIT Geostationary

* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1
 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 1cCN
 
REFLECTORS TOJ* TIME FRAME 1985 	 10 CMCORNER
* IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 50 M 	 DEACT REIVE 
* PERFORMANCE 
" PEFORMNCECORNER 
 REFLECTORS Relative range obtained to ± 0.3 millimeters at any ON POSTS AND 
ni.mber of points separated by 100 meters or more. R RLATI TE EVE 
10' instrumented points can be measured every hour. 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle IUSITug
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manned servicing

" SUBSYSTEMS Picosecond receiver, transmitter, 2Pr pointin

* TECHNOLOGY 	 Streak camera converter, mode locked laser and switch 
" OTHER
 
Rz) 
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Observations
 
F-0118R2 Resources
 
Monitoring
 
OCEAN RESOURCES AND DYNAMICS SYSTEM (CO-4) 
o PURPOSE 
To locate schools of fish and to map ocean ­dynamic signatures.ASYNCHRONOUS 	 EQUATORIALtinalcsinaurs.DATA 	 RELAYSAELT 
* RATIONALE 
Fish protein resource yield needs to be maximized due
 
to world protein shortage. Mapping instruments needed.
 
* 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTJON-E 
Temperaturnd emsivt ifferences in surface water LW SEOSORcaused by schools of fish, currents and plankton 1 1M DOTECS COOLED
 
concentrations are detected by the differences in their CRYOGENIC REFRIGERATOR
 
self-emission in the long-wave infrared. 
* CHARACTERISTICS 	 DAT 
* WEIGHT 15,000 lb
 
" SIZE 10 x 60 ft
 
" RAVI POWER 25kW
 
* ORBIT 	 300 nmi polar
* CONSTELLATION SIZE I
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 
* TIME FRAME 	 1985 
* IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 300 M 	 ' NEsovo2 
* 	 PERFORMANCE x,:"1, 
100-ft resolution attained over all ocean surfaces PLANKTON O SCHOOLevery 12 hours. Sensitivity equivalent to 0.002 deg C 	 WCEK FEEN,"AREAS 	 ,,evr ± 	 R- , OFSHFiSHr­
achieved. 
 "RE"
 
* 	 BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shuttle attached manipulator
* SUBSYSTEMS Thermal dissipation, sensor, cry6genic cooler
 
" TECHNOLOGY Large LWIR sensor: cryogenic refrigerator. LSI data processor

* OTHER 	 None 
11,3
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E-0938R2 
FIRE DETECTION (CO-2) 
* PURPOSE 
To detect fires in remote regions, maintain surveillance IRCCD MOSAIC 
of hot spots, fire perimeters. DETECTORS I oPTICS 
* RATIONALE 	 . .- ----- '- .. .-----
Fire damage can be minimized by early detection, and
 
firefightirg with knowledge of extent and progress
 
" CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Satellite with short and long wave infrared sensors
 
detects fires at an early stage - transmits data to
 
control center
 
o CHARACTERISTICS 
o WEIGHT 	 25,000 lb 
o SIZE 15 x 60 ft 	 CENTER 
" RAW POWER 2 kW
 
" ORBIT Synch. Equat.

* CONSTELLATION SIZE I IUSASCNE 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 	 EVERY2Smin 
* TIME FRAME 1985 	 105RESOLUTION ELEMENTS 
o IOC COST (Space only) 230M 	 N20 20m, USCAN NED OVRUA 
3 I RESOLUTION* 	PERFORMANCE 
Detects fires as small as 10 x 10 ft Location accuracy 
<300 ft Resolution - 300 ft - U.S. coverage every 
2 112 minutes 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; sensor 
o TECHNOLOGY Large optical mirror; LSI data processor; CCD focal plane 
* OTHER 	 None 
-I 
HIGH RESOLUTION EARTH MAPPING RADAR (C0-13) 

" PURPOSE 
To provide maps of the surface with high resolution 
through cloud cover. 
o RATIONALE 
Resources, pollution, crop, water, and other observations 
may be aided by high resolution and frequent coverage 
regardless of weather I 

SCONCEPT DESCRIPTION 

Synthetic array radar of very high power provides high 
resolution On-board image processing allows micro­
wave data link for all weather capability 
o 	CHARACTERISTICSI 
" WEIGHT 
" SIZE 
" RAW POWER 
" ORBIT 
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 
• RISK CATEGORY 
* TIME FRAME 
* IOC COST (Space only) 
o PERFORMANCE 
110,000 lb 
16 x 	00 

2 5 MW 
200 nmi polarREDU
1 
II (Medium) 
1990
 
500 M
 
200 nmi ground swath mapped to less than a few feet 
resolution once aday. U. S. covered every six days.Snm1 

* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
, .M..ORBIT 

-- -, L 
ANTENNAS
E:ACH 1 X III It 
WITH DIFFERENT
 
SQUINT ANGLE
 
"ft
 
/o 
EACH ANTENNA 
COVERS 2.x 
E-5832112 
Information
 
Observations
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Monitoring
 
2. MW REACTOR 
RADIATOR 
TAERMOELEDC.IC 
GENERATOR
 
RADAR
 
RAA 16MW DA 
PO-E	 AV GN, 
W N, 
DATA UNK 
STAT10N
 
MO0 nrnlSWATH MAPPED> 
* TRANSPORTATION 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS 
" SUBSYSTEMS 
* TECHNOLOGY 
* OTHER 
Shuttle 
Shuttle manipulator; servicing 
Thermal, nuclear, power generator, radar 
High power transmitter; automated image processor, reactor, shielding
None 
4 
22 
E-0937R2 
Information
 
ADVANCED RESOURCES/POLLUTION OBSERVATORY (CO-I) Observations 
Resources/Environmental 
" PURPOSE Monitoring 
To provide high quality, multispectral earth resources SIDE LOOKING RADAR
 
and pollution data.
 
ORIT
" RATIONALE 

Integrated ERTS-like system, real-time data distribution / 'l
 
tto worldwide users, active sensors needed. 
" CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONActive and passive sensors, large aperture, high, medium,
 
and low resolution imaging obtained in multispectral
 
region and radar Data disseminated by laser link
 
th roug h relay satellite \ 10 SW T
 
" CHARACTERISTICS
 
* WEIGHT 30,000 lb \
 
" SIZE 10 x 60 ft 100 n", SWATH
 
0 RAW POWER 12 kWMULTISPECTRAL
 
ORBIT 500 nm sun synch. RISOLUTON 
CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 2 ,SWATH 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) MULTISPECTRALRESOLUTION 
TIME FRAME 1985 <win
 
0 IOC COST (Space only) 350 M
 
* PERFORMANCE 
RADAR -RESOLUTIONMultispectral resolutions varying from< 10 to <100 ft - S0 H
obtained worldwide.\ 
COVERAGE EVERY S HOURS 
" BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS __\ 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tug 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shuttle attached manipulator, servicing stages 
* SUBSYSTEMS Guidance and navigation: attitude control: transmitter 
* TECHNOLOGY Large radar antenna; high power tubes and modulator; LSI data processor 
* OTHER None 
RESOURCES MONITORING
USES; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 

- MINERALS

- WATER POLLUTION 

- HYROLOGICAL
 
- AIR POLLUTION 

- FORESTS
10 - LAND USE 

- CROPS

- CITY PLANNING 

- MINING
 
-=a=DUAQNG 
in rma "r 
Observations
 
E-0939R2 Surveillance 
U.N. 	 TRUCE OBSERVATION SATELLITE (CO-6) 
* PURPOSE
 
Aid U N. teams to monitor truce agreements, particularly
 
border zones, and weapon system dispositions such as 4= IbSAT
 
missile launchers. ICL ORDIT

I RUIc /R'
* 	RATIONALE 
U N will have responsibility for truce montorng, but 7 ftOPTCS 
will be denied on-site capability in some cases Space 
systems are free from local control or interference 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
One low altitude satellite with visible light optics for COMMAND 
daytime monitoring and infrared optics for night- AND READOUT 
time operation. 
o CHARACTERISTICS 
o WEIGHT 	 4,000 lb 
* SIZE 	 15 x 60 ft 
* RAW POWER 	 3kW 
* ORBIT 	 225 nmi near-polar . 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE I 	 UN 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 	 POST 
* TIME FRAME 	 1985 
* IOC COST (Space only) 90 M 
* 	PERFORMANCE 
Ground resolution, <6 ft. (Visible) 120-ft I. R. 
Location accuracy, 300 ft Truce area covered 
twice aday -RUCE LINE 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shuttle attached manipulator 
* SUBSYSTEMS Focal plane 
* TECHNOLOGY Similar to weather satellites and ERTS; CCD focal plane

" OTHER
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E-0941R4 
Information
 
Observations
 
BORDER SURVEILLANCE (CO-8) 	 Surveillance 
o 	PURPOSE 
To detect overt or covert attempts at crossing 
aborder 
* 	 RATIONALEFlow of illegal aliens and drug traffickers isamajor 1CHANNELS SYNCH EQUAT
 
problem. Detection is difficult along long, unpatrolled IKHt EACH ORBIT
62dB GAIN
 
borde rs. L GANI
 
o 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Very many, very small seismic sensors are read out 
by a satellite with very large antenna Penetration causes 	 CONTROL UNIT 
vibrations which are picked up and correlated at a 	 ONE MILLION SENSORS
 
ONE THOUSAND CHANNELS
central site. 
SENSORS SHARE A CHANNEL 
;VERY 2.ml* 	 CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 8000 lb 	 o0 00 

" SIZE 9000ftx9ft 0 a
 
" RAW POWER 20 kW o o)
 
" ORBIT SW Synch Equat. SENSORS W
 
oI* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 OE 0m 

" RISK CATEGORY II (Medium) LIFE 36

•M ESSAG E M q=
 
o 	 TIME FRAME 1990 bit. WHEN
 
IOC COST (Space only) 170 M EXCEEDED 5 FENCES'
 
* 	PERFORMANCE 
Virtually all moving objects detected False alarms sorted 
by correlation between sensors and fences. Sensor life 
3 5 years at one penetration attempt per sensor per

month.
 
* 	BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* 	TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tug 
o 	 ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual assembly and servicing unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Structure; attitude control; antenna 	 I 
* 	TECHNOLOGY Large passive microwave antenna - stationkeeping subsatellites; laser master measuring 
o 	 OTHER Small, light, long-lived sensor units which are very and control unit 
cheap in mass production. 
17 
Pmorm" rpw 
Navigation
 
E-7649R2 Aerial 
MULTINATIONAL AIR-TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR (CO-5) 
* PURPOSE 
To extend radar coverage beyond the li'ne-of-sight for O
 
Air Traffic Surveillance, and avail ther countries 
 2 X250 It 
,,1 ALUMINIZEDMESHSIUICA GRIDof the same satellites. 	 In 
* RATIONALE CLOTH 
Radars are costly and many are required today due 3W nmI ALTITUDE 
to line-of-sight limits. 
o CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONOrbital diffracting passive arrays allow large coverage

from a few central radars. Scanning accomplished

by orbital motion and frequency shift.
 
* 	CHARACTERISTICS
 
" WEIGHT 3,700 lb
 
" SIZE 250 x 250 1t
 
o RAW POWER I kW
 
" ORBIT 300.nmi, 35-500
 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE 150' 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low)
 
"TIME FRAME 1985 
 ILLUMINATOR 
" OC COST (Space only) 330 M 	 00D 
o PERFORMANCE ,F T
 
All aircraft equipped with 10 Wbeacons detected F
 
reliably for enroute control every 4mm. U S A. B
 
covered with three radars. Smaller countries need
 
only 1- 2 radars ;
" BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle M 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shutle manipulator, automated or manual assembly/ servicing
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control, structure
 
" TECHNOLOGY Ion thruster, structural rigidity

* OTHER 	 None,, 
14 
E-0932R2 
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES SATELLITES (CC-5) information 
Navigations 
* PURPOSE Aerial 
Simultaneously satisfy traffic control, air surveillance, 
navigation, position fixing, command/control for
multiplicity of uses. 
*RATIONALE 
20 SATEUTES AT LEAST FOUR IN VIEW OFANY USER 
ON BOARD NAVIGATION (10 hi 
- SURVEILLANCE BEACON (10l hiDIGIAL COMM 100 Kb * 
Similar and overlapping requirements by many agencies 
for precision navigation enable one comprehensive
sstei Tmeet allaneeds frall users. 
*CNCEPT DES CR1PTION 11 
Comsat transponders are used, with four in view of user 
at different angles I ranges, to provide TDOA position 
fixing and 2-way communications.I' 
I\ 
-VOICE COMM 10 DUPLEX 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 
SIZE 
1400 lb 
6x8ft 
" RAW POWER 600 W 
o ORBIT 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE 
" RISK CATEGORY 
* TIME FRAME 
8000 nmi polar20 ' 
I (Low) 
1985 
" IOC COST (Space only) 350 M 
* PERFORMANCE 
100,000 users serviced, position to 30 ft, surveillance 
of beacon to 100 ft,digital communications of 
100 kb/sec. 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS ,, 
" TRANSPORTATION 
o ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS 
* SUBSYSTEMS 
* TECHNOLOGY 
* OTHER 
Expendable or shuttle and tug
Automated servicing unit 
No unusual requirements 
No unusual requirements 
None 
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In f Oriat i -
NaVigatiun 
Nautical
 
E-0942R4 
COASTAL ANTI-COLLISION PASSIVE RADAR (CO-9) 
o PURPOSE 	 2SATELLITES, APART IN SYNCHRONOUS EQUATORIAL ORBIT 
Inexpensive and lightweight radar for all surface 
vessels - navigation; collision avoidance 
* RATIONALE 	 10 PHASED AR'AYS 
POWER
 Conventional radar too expensive and interference 	 WA 1%" 
prone 	 Pleasure craft usually denied radar benefits. X AN M 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPfTIQ I" 
Iluminate seacoasts wit scanning microwave beams 
from space Scanning receiving antennas on boats 
obtain range and angle data on hazards. 
I
* CHARACTERISTICS 

I WEIGHT 2,000,000 lb
 
* SIZE 	 1,000 x 10,000 ft 
* RAW POWER 	 ,MW
* ORBIT 	 Synch Equat. 
CONSTELLATIONEED, 	 EACH 200 x 200 nml 
* RISK CATEGORY II (Medium)
* TIME FRAME 	 1995 
* IOC 	COST 10 B 
* 	 PERFORMANCE 2 ' " FiACH AREA SCANNED IN
Relative location of all objects >1 m within ILLUMINATOR BEAM
 
12 nmi range 100 x 300 ft accuracy in 500 sector
 
3 x 0 5 ft antenna in vessel Unlimited number of
 
usersI
 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION , LLV and large tug or large SEPS
 
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly In orbit
 
o SUBSYSTEMS 	 Structures; attitude control; antenna: power 
* TECHNOLOGY 	 Large adaptive microwave antenna: high power transmitters: prime power source. 
* 'OTHER 
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Location
 
Individual
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Navigation
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Personal navigation wrist sets
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Large space antenna permits small low power
 
wrist sets
 
Usuage:
 
To provide accurate relative position location
 
with very inexpensive user equipment
 
1) Hiking
 
2) Exploration
 
3) Military
 
4) Automobiles
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: 	 IOC:
 
SITE: GEO DIMENSION: 	200 ft
 
antenna
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: 18,000 lb POWER: 75 KW
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHNIENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT:
 
F-2748 
inrormatlon
 
Location
 
Individual
 
NEAR-TERM NAV IGATI ON CONCEPT (CS -16) 
o 	 PURPOSE 
To provide reasonably accurate relative position location CROSS ANTENNA AT X BAND 
in the near term with very inexpensive user equipment. ARM #1 - FREQUENCY 1. 10 W POWER
 
ARM #2 - FREQtJENC #2 100 W POWER
 
o 	RATIONALE '. 
Navigation system costs are dominated by user 
­
equipment costs. Wide popular need. 
o 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTION SYNCH EQUAT ORBIT 
Narrow beams are swept over the U.S. by phased arrays 
in space. Very simple receivers measure time elapsed
between pulses received and display distances (N-S, E-W) FIXED BEACONS 
to fixed points. TRACKED FOR 
" 	 CHARACTERIS TICS CALIBRATION 
*VEIGHT 1,600 lb 
* SIZE 160 ft cross
 
" RAW POWER 1 kW
 
* 	ORBIIT Sync. Equat.
"CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 SWEEP 
" RISK CATEGORY I (Low) SMW 'Nay
"Q"--2.4FRETUENCY 10 nmiSIMPLE RECEIVER 
" IOC COST 90 M WITH OMNIA 
*CLOCK R N ACCPiOATEfl 
-User position located to 1/2 nmi every 10 sec anywhere in O 1-
TIM E FRAME 1980 
ciUSA and 200 nmi beyond coastlines. 

-User receiver can cost less than $10 in mass \ -­production. 
o BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* 	TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and IUS 
* 	ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Manned or automated assembly and servicing units 
* 	SUBSYSTEMS Antenna, attitude control 
* 	TECHNOLOGY --­
* 	OTHER LS I receivers 
o 
* 
* 
* 

E-1105R5 
Information
 
PERSONAL NAV IGATION WRIST SET (CS-7) Location 
Individual
 
PURPOSE 
To provide accurate relative position location with CROSS ANTENNA AT XBAND 
very inexpensive user equipment. ARM #1 - FREQUENCY #14 W POWER loft 
ARM #2 - FREQUENCY #2 4 W POWER / 
2 nml
 
RATIONALE 
Navigation system costs are dominated by user 
equipment costs. 
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION SYNCH EQUAT ORBITNarrow beams are swept over the U. S. by large phased 2
 
arravs in space. Very simple receivers measure time

elapsed between pulses received anddisplay distances
 (N-S. E-W) to fixed pointFIEBACN
 
e WEIGHT 3000 lb 
9 SIZE 2 nmi cross 
o RAW POWER 2 kW 
* ORBIT Sync, Equat
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1
 
a RISK CATEGORY 1I (Medium) SWEEP-,..

* TIME FRAME 1990 2F C*'IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 100 ME 
J WITH OtNNI 
SPERFORMANCECLOCK ACCURATE 
- User position located to 300 ft every 10 sec relative 
to a fixed location <100 nmi away.
 
- User receiver can cost less than $10 in mass
 
production.
BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and Tug 
_ 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Manned or automated assembly and servicing units 
* SUBSYSTEMS Antenna with independently stationkept subunits.
" TECHNOLOGY Ion thruster, adaptive RF phase control, laser master measuring unit
* OTHER LSI receivers 
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Package/Vehicle
 
Monitoring
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Communication/Navigation
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Package Monitoring
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Large space antenna permits small low power
 
wrist sets
 
Usuage:
 
Vehicle/Package Locator
 
1) Nuclear Products/Fuels
 
2) Package Tracing 
3) Shipping Containers 
4) Documents 
5) Prisoners 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 1990 
SITE: EO DIMENSION: 2 mi antenna 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: 20,000 lb (total) POWER: 23 KW 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISIIMENT: 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Infortation
 
Location
 
Packages/Vehicles
 
E-7220R4 
VEHICLE/ PACKAGE LOCATOR (CC-12) 
* PURPOSE 
To locate vehicles or articles In shipment continuously 
anywhere in U.S.A. 
o 	 RATIONALE 
To aid in prevention of theft or hijacking, increase 
efficiency, and minimize error in shipments 
* 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
A small transceiver is attached to (or enclosed in) each 
unit to be tracked The unit determines its location usin? 
crossed antenna NAVSAT, and relays the data to acontro 
center via a special Comsat when queried 
0 CHARACTERISTICS 
e WEIGHT 
SIZE 
*RAW POWER 
o ORBIT 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 
a RISK CATEGORY 
* TIME FRAME 
e IOC COST (Space only)
PERFRMANE
* ACUNITSRO 
Up to one billion vehicles or containers can be located 
± 300 ft every hour anywhere in U.S.A. Location 
package could cost less than $10, weigh 3ounces. 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
20,000 lb (Total) 
2-mi antenna 
23 kW 
Geostationary
2 
I I (Medium) 
1990 
400 M 
ANTENNA 	 ANTENNA116 BEAMS X BAND 
. GEOSTATIONARYBAND 
NAVIATION/ 
c 
~COVERAGE	 CONTIGUOUS 
co 	 AREAS 
NAVIGATIO 
BEAMS 
CONR 
FIXED 	 RANSCEIVERCALIBRATIONFOR 
VEHICLE CR CONTAINER 
TRANSMIflERECEIVER 
3W PLAK 10 mW AVERAGE POWER 
SELF CONTAINED ANTENNA
 
EACH UNIT RESPONDS TO UNIQUE QUERY CODE
 
" TRANSPORTATION 
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS 
* SUBSYSTEMS 
* TECHNOLOGY 
" OTHER 
Shuttle and largeltandem tug or SEPS 
Automated or manned assembly and servicing
Antenna attitude control, laser radar, channehzer/processor, stationkept antenna 
Phase control, LSI processor, multiple access technique, stationkept sub-units 
Cheap - LSI - container - transponder 
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E-0952RI 
Information
 
SPACE DEBRIS SWEEPER (CS-II) Location 
Vehicles
 
* PURPOSE
 
To remove expended satellites and debris from 	 SPENT SATELLITE 
synchronous equatorial corridor where they pose 
a long-term collision threat - - .Tuc3R-FoFaE 
" RATIONALE N 
TU NSERTCONSynch ronous equatorial corridor is becoming very 	 \/
crowded and could be dangerous in future. 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 	 /
Use tug to impart AV to debris to drop its perigee to / 
<100 	nmi Dcbris will reenter within weeks One I 
orbit 	later, tug re-injects itself into SE orbit. Tug 
resupplied by shuttle 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
* WEIGHT 	 500,000-lb propellant 
* SIZE 	 Tug 
* RAW POWER 	 -­
o ORBIT 	 Up to Synch. Equat.
* CONSTELLATION SIZE I 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 
* TIME FRAMIE 	 1985 
* IcC COST (Space only) 0.5M 	 \ 
* 	PERFORMANCE 
500,000 lb of propellant will deorbit 100 satellites 
REENTRYof 5,000 lb each. 	 AND 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tug 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS No unusual requirements 
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 No unusual requirements 
* TECHNOLOGY No unusual requirements
 
" OTHER None
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Information
 
Sensor Polling
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Communications 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Voting & polling 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE): 
Large space antenna permits small low power
 
wrist sets
 
Usage:
 
Voting & polling - very rapidly with
 
large sample size
 
1) Individual Polling Units 
2) Family Polling Units - Individual 
Finance 3) Business Surveys -Group
4 
Entertainment 4) Local & National Elections - Individual
 
Sales
 
Maintenance 5) Seismic Sensing
 
6) Intrusion Sensing Automated
 
7) Safety Monitoring
 
8) In-Situ Enfironmental Monitoring
 
CHARACTERI STI CS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 1990
 
SITE: GEO DIMENSION: 150 ft
 
antenna
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: 13,000 # POWER: 9o Kw
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
E-0933R4 
information
 
Sensor PollingVOTING/POLLING WRIST SET (CC-7) 
Individual 
* PURPOSE 
To provide direct access to entire population for SYNCH EQUAT
voting or polling purposes. OrS 
o RATIONALE 15D ft ANTENNA 
110 BEAMS 
Voting and polling are time-consuming processes, IWOCHANNELSIBEAM 
30 kW AF POWERsubject to many errors due to small sample size. 
11
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Multi-channel satellite queries wrist radios, and relays 
responses to Washington from individual voters. Unique 
voter pseudo-random codes. 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
* WAEIGHT 13,000 lb I / 
* SIZE 150-f4dia antenna 
* RAW POWER 90 kW' 
* ORI3lT Synch. EquaL. IDAPOPULATION 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 3"G PEOPLE PERCENTER
 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 106 OTHER AREAS AT
 
FRAME STIME
1990PEPLEAREA
 
* IOC COST(Space only) 300 M 
o PERFORMANCE
P RMRADIO MSGE
 
10-bit message relayed automatically upon query UNIQUE 0 bit CODE QURIEDSAG
 
100, 000,000 people polledlvote in one hour. Any WRST sc 
0013 ToRANSMISSION QUERIEDel 
by satellite 2 z wELIHT 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS Pi 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tandem tug 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; antenna; processor 
o TECHNOLOGY Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel transponder; LSI processor; multiple-access 
* OTHER LSI wrist transceiver techniques 
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E-0947R5 
ENERGY GENERATION - SOLARIMICROWAVE (CS-I) Energy 
SPS 
* PURPOSE 
To provide abundant electrical power with little 
pollution. SYNCH EQUAT 
73 nm 	 ORBIT 
" RATIONALE 
,More 	and clean energy needed. 
SOLAR ARRAYS
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
XBANDSolar energy is collected, converted to microwave energy, 	 Ikm ANTENNA DISTRIBUTED TRANSMITTERSand transmitted to earth, where it is rectified to DC by a 

rectenna.
 
o 	CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 40,000,000 lb 
* SIZE 	 7.3 x2 6 nmi 
* RAW POWER 10, ow MW 
* ORBIT Synch Equat. 	 I k W VREO 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE I 
* RISK CATEGORY IV lHigh) 
* TIME FRAME 2000 
* IOC COST (Space only) 61 B '1 
0 	 PERFORMANCE 
5,000 megawatts supplied to 10 km collector, with less 
than 500 MW lost as heat to the environment, at a 
cost of $1,500 per kW 
• 	 BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
e TRANSPORTATION LLV and large tug and larg SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Mann6d servicing unit; assemble in orbit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; structures, power antenna . 
* TECHNOLOGY Large economical solar arrays; large active microwave antenna; high power tubes; 
a OTHER Recterina on ground 	 feeding and cross-connects 
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ENERGY
 
1 Energy 

Reflector Insolation
 
Light
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Reflectors/Illumination
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Illumination
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Large reflectors would be placed in LEO or GEO to reflect
 
sunlight to areas requiring increased total insolation. Intensity
 
could vary from a few lunar equivalents to full sunlight. Illuminata
 
area would vary according-to reflector altitude.
 
Applications: 	 Increased agricultural yield, search and rescue,
 
increased fishing yield, urban lighting
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Energy
 
Redirected Insolation
 
Nightlight
 
E-2019R4 
NIGHT ILLUMINATOR (CS-6) 
* PURPOSE 
To provide night lighting without earth-based energy, SYNCH EQUAT OREr 
pollution, street lights, cables, trenches, etc. 
* 	RATIONALE
 
Alternative energy sources are needed.
 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
 
Large area reflectors in space reflect the image of the Q ORIENTED MIRRORS.
 
sun onto the earth. Multiple satellites used to ECH 1000 fA
 
minimize construction difficulties. 	 OORUAU'ILY 7001 	 0 x DIFFRACTION LIMIT 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 100,000 lb . l CI SPOT 16 WICr. jGX 
0SIZE 2 mirrors each 1,L000-ft dia ULLMOON LEVEL ILLUMINA1'IONTERABLE 
* RAW POWER 1 2 kW 

" ORBIT Synch. Equat
 
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 
* RISK CATEGORY II (Medium) 
* TIME FRAME 	 1990 
* IOC COST (Space only) 160 M 	 NHAY 
00 	 e PERFORMANCE 
Ten times full-moon level illumination at night provided 
v to area 180 nmi dia (no clouds). Full moon level provided 
through moderate clouds. 
* 	 BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS _ _
 
a TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and large tug andlor SEPS
 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Attitude control; mirrors, structure 
* TECHNOLOGY 	 Large reflector; pointing: stationkeeping master control 
* OTHER 	 None 
41 
---
*rgflw 
Nuclear Waste Disposal
 
E-0948RI 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL (CS-4) 
o 	PURPOSE 
To permanently dispose of nuclear wastes
 
without environmental damage.
 
TOTAL WEIGHT - 64= lb 
PAYLOAD PACKAGE - 30M lb TO EARTH ESCAPE VELOCITY 0* 	 RATIONALE 
Wholesale use of nuclear generating plants for electric V 
power 	will result in large amounts of highly toxic and
 
ong lived radioactive wastes ,
 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION UPPER STAGE 
Wastes are packaged in containers with shielding and
 
cooling, and put into earth escape trajectories by 2S0 lb NUCLEAR WASTE
 
shuttle and velocity stages. O L
 
* 	 CHARACTERISTICS 
o 	WEIGHT 64,000 b -- SHUTTLE 
o 	SIZE 15 x 60 ft 
* 	RAW POWER 
* 	ORBIT Escape
 
* 	CONSTELLATION SIZE --­
* 	RISK CATEGORY II (Medium) 
* 	TIME FRAME 1990- 2000 
* 	IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 430 M 
* 	 PERFORMANCE 
2500 lb of waste per flight at $15 million per flight 
($6XXJ/lb). Cost increase to electrical consumer - 2%. 
* 	 BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
" TRANSPORTATION Automated shuttle and large tug
* 	ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Safety/abort - backup systems
 
SUBSYSTEMS Shielding/encapsulation; abort systems

" 	TECHNOLOGY Thermal control; structural package integrity recovery techniques
* 	OTHER 
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E-0945R2 
Energy(CS-3)ENERGY GENERATION - NUCLEAR/MICROWAVE Nuclear Power
 
Electrical
* PURPOSE 
To generate and deliver electrical energy without 
pollution or hazard. MHO GENERATOR RADIATOR " .1 
* 	 RATIONALE SYNCH EIUA., - -
Power is needed which requires no radioactive material - O-sarr 
on earth, produces no atmospheric heating, and no MICROWAVE 
resource consum oion. 	 A 06'am 
DI.RIBTE* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 	 A- XBAND
Abreeder reactor, MHD power generator, microwave 	 TRANSMITTERS 
transmitter, and microwave antenna are used to beam 
energy to aground receiver Fuel breeding supplies fuel 
* 	CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT TBD 
* SIZE 	 3,600-ft dta 
* RAW POWER 10,000 MW
 
• ORBIT Synch. Equat.
 
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 ow MW
 
* RISK CATEGORY IV (High) 
•TIME FRAME 2000 am[
 
IOC COST (Space only) TBD x AT
 
* PERFORMANCE 
5,000 Megawatts delivered power continuously - with 
sufficient fuel breeding for a life of at least 1000 years 
" BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
9 TRANSPORTATION LLV and large tug and larg4 SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Manned service unit, automated servicing unit; assemble In orbit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Structure; attitude control; antenna; reactor; power unit 
Large active microwave antenna; large reactor; heat radiator; MHD power generator;oTECHNOLOGY pointing and tracking sensor
* OTHER 	 Rectenna on ground, safety 
IJ
 
* 

* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
4Wrgfl 
Power Relay
 
Power Distribution
 
E-7648R3
 
MULTINATIONAL ENERGY DISTRIBUTION (CS-8) 
PURPOSE
 
To distribute energy to small-city users without . OITAO 
transmission lines, and serve many nations MULTIPLE 
INCLINATIONS20 PHASE CONTROLLEDsimultaneously. 
RATIONALEEACH 750 ft x 7W to 
Transmission lines are fixed, have an environmental im­
pact, and limited capacity to feed growing communities or 
developing nations without large networks or large losses 
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
Phase-controlled array reflectors in low orbit sequen­
tially relay remote source power to 100 user antennas 
SOURCE
per satellite Power is rectified at substation receiving 
arrays and filtered. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 34,000 lb 
* SIZE 750 x750 ft C-
USER ANTENNAS 
* ORBIT 300 nmi several incl. POWER 
SIZE SOURCE

RISK CATEGORY IV (High) ANTENNA
 
* CONSTELLATION 200 1600 X 1500f 
• TIME FRAME 2000 
* IOC COST (Space only) 5.8 B 
PERFORMANCE 
1000 user areas in U S A owered with 100 MW each in 
rapid (1/120 sec) sequence from 10 power station source 
antennas Scanning loss <1%overall efficiency >55% 
3000-ft swuare receiver with I 7 nmi square guard
fe nce su ifcesor user 
BUILDINC BLOCK RECUIREMENTS 0 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle 
o ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shuttle attached manipulator; manual or automated servicing unit 
* SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control, stationkeeping units, phase control, figure control
 
" TECHNOLOGY Ion thrusters, phase control, measurement and control lidar, LSI processor
 
" OTHER
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F-1713R1 
Energy 
POWER RELAY SATELLITE (C5-15) Power Relay 
Power Distribution
 
" PURPOSE
 
To provide for transmission of electrical power from 
remote regions, minimizing environmental impact 10 REFLECTR$, EACH I kM DIA 
CEO 
SYNCH
* RATIONALE 	 ORIT I-
Power should be generated in remote regions I
 
Sunny side of Earth can supply power to night side
 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
 
Source power is converted to a microwave beam,
 
bounced off an orbiting reflector, and reconverted
 
to DC at receiving antenna on ground.
 
* CHARACTERISTICS ( 10 kM RECTENNA 
" WEIGHT 600,000 Ib &MMW POWER 
* SIZE 0.5-nmi dia USER 
" RAW POWER --­
o ORBIT 	 Synch. Equat 
o CONSTELLATION SIZE 100
 
"RISK CATEGORY IV (High) 10kM ­
* TIME FRAME 1995 XMIER
 
" IOC COST (Space only) 36 B 10ooo MW POWER
 
* 	 PERFORMANCE SOURCE
 
5,000 megawatts delivered to each of 100 user areas
 
53 percent overall DC-DC efficiency attained. Total
 
energy is about 10 percent of U.S. consumption
 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION LLV and large tug or large SEPS 
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Mannedlautomated servicing, assemble in orbit 
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Attitude control; structures, phase front control 
* TECHNOLOGY High efficiency, large, passive steerable phase front antenna; Ion thrusters 
" OTHER Ground-based elements 
50 
Power, Relay
 
Aircraft
 
E-0949R3 
AIRCRAF LASER BEAM POWERING (CS-5) 
o PURPOSE
 
To provide an alternative to oil as a source of energy
 
for powering commercial transports
 
* RATIONALE 	 - 1 SEA -
MIRRORS EACHOil isalimited resource, becoming more expensive 
INDEPENDENTLY STEERABLErapidly 	 POINTED TO lOpr 
* 	 CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
 
Jet turbines are operated by heating air with laser beams
 30ft DIACOLLECTORprojected to each aircraft by multi-mirror satellites 

Laser on ground powered by nuclear reactors provides
 
energy
 
aCHARACTERISTICS /
 
* WEIGHT 	 2,000,000 lb 
NUCLEAR PLANTS 3 x101 W TOTAL* SIZE 	 169 mirrors, each 15-ft dia 
* RAW POWER 
" ORBIT 300 nmr, 450 incl
 
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 200 TR D
 
* RISK CATEGORY IV (High) 	 ER0 
* TIME FRAME 	 2000+ 
• IOC COST (Space only) 87 B 	 LASER PROJEC'R 
* 	 PERFORMANCE 
2000 large jet aircraft powered continuously (30% duty .L 10w TOTAL !10	 PH SE -.* MULTIPLE 
cycle) at 10-50 MW/al rcraft Break-even with oil CONTROLLEDADJUSTED LASER CCOMBUSTION FLOOLCPSCLOSED LOOP 	 COMPRESSOR 
operations at 5N/gal. 	 BY SATELLITE SENSOR CHAMBER 
-F SCINTILLATION 
CANCELLATION 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 	 6LASERS FOR USA DUAL BURNER JET ENGINE 
* TRANSPORTATION LLV and large SEPS
 
" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Manned or automated servicing unit; orbital assembly
 
" SUBSYSTEMS Attitude control; mirrors; processors; crosslink; thermal control
 
* TECHNOLOGY Large high temp mirrors; radiators; pointing and tracking sensors; LSI processor 
* OTHER 	 Ground high energy laser; atmospheric scintillation correction. Safety 
40 
Biologicals
 
Separation/Purlficaton
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Electrophoresis
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Pure Biologicals (urokinase, blood cells,

etc.)Usperkn,
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE .)
 
Use eletric field separation in static or continuous flow
 
devices to produce cell based biologicals with very low impurity
 
Micro-g makes cell surface charge dominate-force.
content. 

Possible applications in production of urokinase separation of
 
blood cell, and sperm and cancer research
 
1) Urokinase
 
2) Pancreatic Cells
 
3) Pituitary Cells
 
4) Lymphocytes
 
5) Granulocytes
 
6) Macrophages
 
7) Bone Marrow
 
8) Sperm Cells
 
CHARACTERISTICS: Variable according to activity level
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
MATERIALS
 
Materiats 34
 
Electronics
 
Semiconductors
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Electronics
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Electronic devices
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
TRW has identified some immicible alloys as possible semiconduc­
tors. These immicibles can be more precisely controlled and manu­
factured in space.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Better and more diversified products in
 
calculators, watches, microelectronic
 
circuits, that use less power or require
 
less waste.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
/7 
Materials
 
Electronics
 
Semiconductors
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Single Crystal
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Large Single Crystals, Electronic
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Single Crystals grown in space have several advantages over
 
ground base samples. They are free of container contamination and
 
other consequences of gravity allowing them to be larger, cleaner,
 
and a good deal more perfect. Single crystals can be made by vapor
 
deposition, zone refining or other well known crystal growing
 
techniques.
 
Poszible Applications: 	 Improved semiconductor devices specifically,
 
better amplifiers, more precise calculators,
 
smaller circuits, better diodes, LED's,
 
smaller computers with larger capacities,
 
better timers; maybe at a substantial power
 
requirement reduction
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
3 Materials 

Ele6tronics
 
Rectifiers
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Crystals
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Large Crystal Rectifiers
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Large crystals of high homogeneity grown in micro-g capable
 
of being applied to large scale power rectification.
 
Possible Application: 	Efficient AC-DC rectification for power
 
transmission near corona limit
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: 	 IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: 	 POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Electronics
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Vibration isolation
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Imprinting of microcircuitry, small motor testing
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
High frequency components possible due to isolation from earth
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Electronics
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metal Bubble
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Magnetic Memory Device
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE): 
The elimination of large gravity effects allows manufacture
 
of precise metal bubbles. These could be of very specific chemistry
 
and controlled very tightly.
 
Possible Appliction: 	Use as data storage for faster data
 
acquisition in computer memory devices
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: 	 POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLI SHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Electrical
 
Magnets
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Permanent Magnets
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Same As Above
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Process
 
Directional solidification, crucibleless environment
 
Uses:
 
(1) Seals for colostomy and ileostomy patients
 
(2) Elimination of scar tissue
 
(3) Motor size reduction (factor or 3-5 for consumer products)
 
(4) Weight of microwave power generators reduced by 60%
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of Art OC: 1985 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION.: - 2x2x3 M 
TRANSPORTATI'ON: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: Capacity: 40xlO 3Kg/yr POWER: 25 KW 
Hardware: lOxlO 3Xg GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: -1o Hrs/Wk 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
6 Materials 

Electrical
 
Magnets
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Magnets
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Production of High Coercive Strength Magnets
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Controlled directional alignment in magnetic materials to
 
increase field strength and lifetime in permanent magnets.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Permanent magnet generators; more efficient
 
electric motors, and microwave generators;
 
magnetic bonding; improve solenoids;
 
magnetic levitation
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Electrical
 
Wiring
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Superconductor
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Liquid Hz Temperature Superconductor
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Complex intermetallic compounds and heterogeneous materials
 
with precisely controlled internal structures have been
 
theoretically identified to have superconducting properties at
 
LH2 temperatures is much more available than LHe and future
 
supplies could be practically unlimited.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Low loss power transmission; highly
 
efficient electric motors; high field
 
magnets (fusion); plasma propulsion
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
13 Materials 

Electrical
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Liquid Immiscible Alloy
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Cold Cathodes
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Eutectic mixture of tungsten and nickel is etched to leave
 
tungsten pro3ection which are cold emmiters of electrons.
 
For TV sets there is no production cost advantage; however,
 
there is power savings in operation and features such as instant-on
 
could also be utilized in lasers.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Electrical
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: AlSb Solar Cell
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Aluminum Antimonide (AlSB) Solar Cell
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE): 
Obtaining stoachiornetric homegeneity in the A1Sb compound
 
will theoretically allow manufacture of a solar cell some 30-50%
 
more efficient than silicon.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Energy production on Earth, SSPS,
 
satellites and spacecraft
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
2 Materials 

Electrical
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: vacuum
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Magnetron
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Present process requires large facility to evacuate before
 
sealing these magnetrons.
 
Space processing would allow use of "cheap" high vacuum
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO (behind shield) DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Casting
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metals
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Cermets
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Due to segregation and temperature limitations, production
 
of cermets is confined to sintering. The use of space allow
 
melting and dispersion allowing much more freedom in choice
 
and treatment of cermet. Cermet could also then be cast or drawn
 
to final form.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Heating element, electrical contacts,
 
cutting tools, abrasive tools, resistive
 
metal, bushing, bearing, valves, rings
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
-MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Structural
 
Casting
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Cast Structures
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: High Reliability Castings
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Zero gravity and its associated reduction in convective
 
effects minimize the voids and allow a wide measure of control
 
over structure.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Cast titanium structural parts, fine grained
 
beryllium castings both in near completed
 
shapes
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMIENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
5'7 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Energy
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Breeder Reactor Fuel
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
35 + immicible alloys containing Pu or U for use as breeder
 
reactor fuel
 
Power production
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: 1985 for development IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
60 
14 Materials 

Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Lubricant
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Bearings, Self Lubricating
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
10 possible solid state binary alloy system showing liquid
 
immicibility gap
 
Ref: 	 TRW - Study on processing immicible materials in zero 
gravity 
C. N. NAS 8-28267
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 1980 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
CI 
1 Materials 

Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: ceramics
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Refractories
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Gravity effects quality and structure of ceramic materials.
 
Lack of gravity combined with reduced contamination might allow a
 
higher temperature inert refractory to be produced.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Production of cermets, dispersion
 
strengthened alloys, refractory alloys:
 
high temperature engines, valves, molds
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: 	 POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
21 Materials 

Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metal
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Electrical Steels
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
We can use space to make steels in thinner sheets at higher
 
silicon contents in purer iron and therefore reduce the core
 
losses in electromagnetic devices.
 
Possible Applicatlons: Transformers, motors, generators,
 
(possibly for lunar mining application)
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
S9
 
25 Material 

Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metals
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Dispersion Strengthened Alloys
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Space low gravity allows more variety, more and better
 
dispersions, with materials normally considered incompatible.-

These alloys exhibit high temperature, high strength, wear
 
resistance and creep resistance.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Turbine blades, electrical contacts, tools,
 
cutting, impellers, springs, bearings,
 
valves, fasteners, fittings, armour plate,
 
gages, weld rods, thermoelectric and
 
thermoionic devices (lead telluride)
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: JOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Structural
 
Immiscible Alloys
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Jewelry
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Same As Above
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Four immiscible alloys identified which have the necessary value
 
and could be processed more precisely in space. Also use of contain­
erless shaping could give better finishes.
 
Possible Application: Jewelry, rings
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Float Zone
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metal
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Superplastic Materials
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Processing in space is conducive to production of metals
 
with small equiaxial grains known as super plastic Materials
 
Possible Applications: 	 Intricate punched parts and fittings use in
 
racing applications, use with materials not
 
normally drawn, such as, stainless steel,
 
dispersion hardened steels, to make large
 
numbers of small intricate fittings.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLI SHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Mareriais
 
Structural
 
Float Zone
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metals
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Refractory Metals
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Use of space would allow higher temperatures used without
 
container contamination such that metals known as refractory metals
 
could be alloyed and manipulated in greater freedom than ever
 
before.
 
Possible Application: 	 Tungsten x-ray targets, tungsten turbine
 
blades, refractory cermets, valves, high
 
temperature engines, cold ertmiters
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Float Zone
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Chemical Production
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Corrosion Resistant Electrode
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Super cooling metal ozide melts in abscence of nucleation sites
 
and exposing to ionizing radiation an amorphous crystalline
 
structure is produced. This done in space would lead to superior
 
conducting glass at high temperature.
 
Possible Applications: Use in metal refining, chemical processes
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
YdLer±ai
 
Structural
 
Directional
 
Solidification
 
POTENTIAL-CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: High Purity
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Zirconium Cladding of Nuclear Fuels
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
High vacuum and containerless melting
 
Claddinq of nuclear fuel elements (increased strength and
 
reliability)
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
4 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Composites
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Materials
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Composites
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Space has the unique ability to maintain liquid non-wetting
 
stable composites due to high vacuum and negligible gravity. These
 
composites could be cast drawn or otherwise processed by means
 
impossible on earth.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Light strong aerospace structural material,
 
stiffness sensitive (golf clubs, fly rods,
 
tennis racquets), exotic whisker metal,
 
super high strength materials
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
. .. . . ... .	 ... 70 
Structural
 
Composites
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Zero-G
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Radiation Shielding
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Elimination of sedimentation
 
High Density particle in plastic matrix
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art TOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Structural
 
Composites
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Contamination Free
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Carbon Filaments
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Increase size and uniformity due to zero-g and vacuum
 
Use to reinforce plastic
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
iqateria-L,
 
Structural
 
Joining
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Processing
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Brazing and Welding
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
On Skylab a brazing and a welding experiment was conducted.
 
The results of these experiments demonstrated some advantages of
 
space operation. The properties of high vacuum and reduced gravity
 
allow larger molten zones, better alloy diffusion, less segregation
 
and improved homogeneity.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Welding of stainless steels, dispersion

hardened steels, composites into turbines
 
and other critical applications
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
7­
Materials
 
Process
 
Catalysts
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Chemical Industry
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Catalyst
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Many immicible systems that can be processed in space could
 
have possible activity as catalyst. The use of foams would
 
significantly increase surface area. Small galvanic couples might
 
increase activity and resist passivity in catalysts. New combinatao
 
might lengthen life, highten performance and increase abrasion
 
resistance.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Coal conversion, petroleum refineries
 
practically any area of chemical production
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
32 Materials 

Process
 
Membranes
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Chemical Industry
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Metal 	Membrane
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Space allows the formation of metal membranes that are not
 
possible in gravity.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Chemical separations, isotope separation,
 
solid state reactions, surface effect studies
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
75­
24 Materials 

Process
Powders
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Spheres
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Precision Powders
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
The use of space to produce spheres has been well demonstrated.
 
It could be used to produce fine powders of well controlled size.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Powder metallurgy, shot peening standards,
 
used to clean ultra clean equipment such
 
as for oxygen service, or medical use, used
 
as extremely fine bearings
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Process
 
Purification
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Manufacture
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Solid Extraction
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
We can make use of triple point in metals or sublimation to
 
separate high purity fractions.
 
Possible Application: Distillation of isotopes, separation of ores
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
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,Materials
 
Process
 
Purification
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Radioisotopes
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Separation of Isotopes
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Zero-G would significantly reduce seperation cost, purity,
 
elimination of hazards of processing
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: 1985 IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
28 Structural 

Process
 
Purification
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Metals
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Rare Earth Metals
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
High vacuum and containerless melting allows a much greater

purity and ease of handling of rare earths. These reactive metals
 
have unique properties desirable in many fields limited by their
 
purity and availability.
 
Possible Applications: Used in metal alloys for corrosion resistance
 
heat resistance and in glasses, refractories,
 
ferromagnets, semicoaductors, fungicides,
 
as catalysts and others
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
'PRODUCT:
 
'7Q
 
Materials
 
Process
 
Devices
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Process Control
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Sodium-Potassium Filled Thermostat
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Sodium-Potassium thermostats require vacuum of high pumping
 
capacity in order to be processed.
 
Possible Applications: High temperature process control
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Optics
 
Fibejzs
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Fiber Optics
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: IR Fiber Optics
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Continuous fibers of lithium fluoride (LiF) grown in a matrix
 
of sodium chloride (NaCI) (ref. Skylab and ASTP); improved wide
 
range transmittance with better image quality.
 
Potential use in law enforcement, security, process control, internal
 
medicine, data transmission, etc.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
Optic

FiberM
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Zero-G
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Fiber Optic
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Chalcogenide glasses used in fiber optics improved by
 
containerless melting and drawing
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art 
SITE: LEO 
TRANSPORTATION: 
MASS: 
IOC: 
DIMENSION: 
SUPPLIES: 
POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Iaterials
 
Optical
 
Lenses
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Containerless Forming
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: High Quality Lenses
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Elimination of surface polish roughness by use of containerless
 
shaping; proper cooling to obtain homogeneity.
 
1) High Resolution Cameras 
2) Specialized Microscopy 
3) 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: state of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
Materials
 
Optical
 
Filters
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD- Vibration
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: optical Filters
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Higher precision due to absence of earth vibration and
 
gravity effects
 
1) Narrow Pass (wavelength (single)
 
2) Selected Pass (multiple wavelength)
 
3)
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: state of the Art IOC:
 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Materials
 
Opticals
 
Special
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Zero-G and Contamination Free
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Coating of Optical Reflectors
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Aluminized optical reflectors improved quality in
 
Zero-G and vacuum of space
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
27 Materials 

Optical
 
Special
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Glass
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Electrically Conductive Glass
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Transparent glass properly mixed~with conductive materials
 
may have good electrical conductivity.
 
Possible Applications: 	 Solar cell cover if wavelength and intensity
 
transmittance right; simple security system
 
in buildings; self defrosting car windows
 
without internal wires
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
Maerial 
Optical 
Special 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Contamination Free
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Glasses
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Removal of Boron Oxide
 
Ability to cool with nucleation will allow glasses to be made
 
that are not now possible. They would have different 
Transmittance 
Damage Thresholds 
Strength 
Indexes 
uses envelopes for lamps 
optical quality glass 
lasers 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: Developed IOC:
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH:
 
MANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
1 
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POTENTIAL PRODUCTS FROM
 
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
Self-lubricating high-temperature sleeve bearing. There are many
 
self-lubricating bearings available today.Acommon one is made
 
of stainless steel fiber metal impregnated ':ith lead. When the
 
bearing gets hot enough to melt the lead, the molten lead in
 
the fiber metal matrix acts as a lubricant. However, the tensile
 
strength of fiber metals decrease as a function of their
 
density. By impregnating a tungsten whisker matrix with
 
a lower melting point metal or alloy, or with analloy~wherein
 
only one component undergoes phase change to liquid state at
 
bearing operating temperatures, we could create a high-strength
 
high-temperature sleeve bearing for such applications as gas
 
turbines, steam turbines, power plant turbines, etc. Would also
 
make a damned fine railway journal bearing because of its ability
 
to sustain high transverse loads.
 
Low-light-level TV camera or micromilature TV camera. If a
 
perfect semiconductor crystal could be manufactured in zero-g,
 
the density of microelectronic devices that could be put on a
 
single chip could be increased by a factor of 100. Thus, about
 
750,000 microelectronic components could be incorporated on a
 
1-inch-diameter disc. If these are photocathodes, the disc would
 
be the heart of a low-light-level or very small TV camera. Smaller
 
TV cameras will always find a market in both industry and
 
entertainment. If cost can be reduced because of a reduction in
 
chip rejects caused by crystali imperfections, price of TV
 
cameras could also come down, leading to a broader market, even
 
in domestic home use.
 
Hnigh-quality gallium arsenide crystals. Gallium.arsenide is a
 
commonly-used material in LED's, Gunn Effect diodes for microwave
 
use, etc. Reject rate is high because of the inability to grow
 
perfect GaAs crystals in one-g. In zero-g, GaAs crystals could
 
be grown to large, perfect crystals from the metallic solution,
 
which is a cheaper, more reliable way to do it with lower reject
 
rate. This can lead to cost reductions in any device presently
 
using LED's, including digital counters an--lresentations of all
 
sorts.
 
Improved germanium telluride and germanium selenide crystals.
 
Both GeTe and GaSe are widely used semiconductor materials, 
but are hard to grow without high reject rates in one-g because
 
convection causes fluctuation in temperature of the crystals
 
during growth by vapor phase deposition. Increase in £,erfection
 
of crystals of these substances should lead to lower reject rates
 
of semicons made with them and thus reduce the price of semicons
 
and IC devices. 
 7 
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New semiconductor material from Gold+Germanium. Gold add
 
Germanium are immiscible metals. But a homogenous mix can
 
be achieved by melting, mixing, and solidifying Au and Ge
 
in zero-g. Skylab experiments have shown some interesting
 
semiconductor properties of this mix. A whole new area of
 
high-current semicons could result, leading to improved

products in the high-current diode area, leading in turn
 
to practicality of DC power transmission systems using
 
existing transmission lines.
 
High-temperature superconductor. Skylab experiments with the
 
ixmiscible metals lead, indium, and tin produced an immiscible
 
alloy with a transition temperature of 9.2K. Further work
 
in this area may lead to a superconductor at liquid hydrogen
 
temperatures. Some data indicates the transition temperature
 
is increased in a magnetic field. This would lead to high­
efficiency transformers and other energy-saving electric
 
power transmistion equipment.
 
Improved germanium semicons for microelectronics. Size, number
 
of elements, and reject rate of microelectronic chips, PROMS,
 
and other IC devices is lkmited by imperfections in germanium
 
crystals and microstructures formed in one-g. Both the price,
 
size, comp&exity, an acceptance rate of microelectronic
 
devices could be inproved'by zero-g processing.
 
Improved whisker-reinforced composite materials. Dispersions 
of whiskers of silicon carbide in metals can be improved by 
zero-g processing, leading to super-light, high-strength, and 
high-temperature composites of reduced price and higher 
production. These would have uses in aircraft, automobiles, 
trains and other transportation devices where strength-to­
weight ratio is important for performance and efficiency. 
A number of large, heavy, unwieldy industrial devices could 
also be lightened and strengthened. For example, prnn rolls 
in a paper machine could be lightened and strengthened, thus 
making it quicker and easier to cantilever them to change the 
Fourdrienier wire, press felt, or drier felts. The high temperature 
characteristics of possible compotsites also would permit their 
use as rolls in steel sheet and bar mills. They would also permit 
the redesign of many Industrial components where weight and 
strength are important and where a reduction in weight with no 
reduction in strength could lead to savings in material costs 
in the machine itself. 
Uniform semicon materials. Any improvement in the production
 
of semicon materials such as germanium, gallium arsenide,
 
indium antimonide, and gallium antimonide by zero-g processing
 
to eliminate crystal flaws and/or homogeneity would lead to
 
improved performance and lowered reject rate of electronic
 
components using these materials.
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Improved capacitors and supercaps. Lamillar eutectics can
 
be grown or formed in zero-g without the dislocations in
 
the plate-like structures caused by forming in one-g.
 
Development of lamillar eutectics consisting of a conductor
 
and a semiconductor or ilsulator in zero-g could lead to
 
improved capacitors for microelectronics or supercapaitors
 
(capacitors of very small physical size and very high
 
capacitance) for use in microelectronics chips, discrete
 
electronics equipment, energy storage, and power generation
 
and transmission.
 
Directional magnetic materials. Certain lamillar eutectics
 
can be formed in zero-g that will incorporate aligned
 
magnetic materials in the lamillar structure. This will
 
create magnets of more uniform field orientation, greater
 
field strength, and more uniform flux. They would be useful
 
in making smaller and more efficient electtic motors for
 
home appliances, for electric autos, and for industrial uses.
 
They would also be useful in improved loudspeakers of lighter
 
weight. They would find application in ag amp equipment for
 
industrial controls of lighter weight and improved long-term
 
performance as well as in electric control equipment such
 
as relays and circuit breakers.
 
Eutectic wave guides. The lamillar structue of some eutectics
 
leads to the speculative possibility of being able to form
 
such eutectics of such materials that would form very high
 
frequency wave guides, perhaps by using a semicon inside an
 
insulator martix or by etching the lamillar material out of
 
the eutectic to create lenticular voids in the material that
 
would act as waveguides. This would permit further development
 
of electronic equipment in the gigahertz frequency spectrum
 
for industrial instrumentation and control, as one example.
 
Improved fiber optics using eutectics. Both halide eutectics
 
and lamillar eutectics show promise of being developed into
 
improved fiber optics equipment. Fiber optics made from such
 
eutectics would be characterized by more compact size for a
 
given number of optic fibers. Initially, length of such fiber
 
optics would be two to three centimeters, which would permit
 
their use in imaging equipment, lenses, etc. Primary characteristic
 
would be reduced price and easier manufacture.
 
Standardized micropore filters. Micropore filters made from
 
posdered metals or fiber metals are characterized by the
 
gaussian distribution of their pore sizes. By melting metallic
 
grids in aero-g, micropore filters of more standardized pore
 
opening size would be created. These would have application in
 
biological and chemical work. To some extent, they would also
 
be useful as libficant-impregnated bearing materials.
 
9o
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Production of pure metals by outgassing. Outgassing has often
 
been presented as a problem area of space processing. However,
 
by turning it around and making it a process itself, it leads
 
to the possibility of producing super-pure materials by permitting
 
them to deliberately out-gas in the vaccum environment of space.
 
The combination of containerless melting and vacuum outgassing
 
permits such super-pure metals as beryllium which is brittle
 
amd hard in its unpure sttte but dx± ductile and machinable in
 
its pure state. Beryllium is an excellent neutron reflector,
 
and the application of super-pure beryllium in the nuclear
 
industry alone should be looked into. The combination of its
 
nuclear properties plus its physical properties may make it
 
more useful in areas where it currently cannot be used because
 
of poor physical properties.
 
New catalysts. Current catalysis theory indicates that catalysis
 
probably occurs only at the surface of the cataylist material.
 
Improved cataylists can be made by increasing the surfacearea
 
through controlled crystallization, permitting the long-growth
 
of dendrites in zero-g. This could lead to new catalysts as
 
well as a possible improvement of some existing catalysts that
 
are grown or growable in the crystalline state.
 
Tungsten-cupper composite. The uniform mixture of tungsten and
 
copper attainable in zero-g leads to the possibility of producing
 
this material for wear-resistant high-temperature applications
 
in electric equipment such as high-power circuit breakers,
 
high-current relay points, and other electrical switching devices.
 
This means longer life, which means shorter down-time for
 
replacement, lower inventory levels for on-hand replacement
 
devices, and therefore lower cost and investment with less
 
money tied up in investment in equipment.
 
improved infra-red optics. Uniform and homogenous chalcogenide 
glasses produced in large qualities and size in zero-g melts 
would permit improved and cheaper infra-red optics. This in turn 
may lead to such products as domestically-available night vision 
g± equipment for sercurity, travel, transportation devices such 
as autos; industrial instrumentation such as vapor quantity 
measurement in processes; police equipment; fire detection 
equipment for cities, buildings, etc. 
"Space wood." High-temperature, high-strength, light-weight
 
structural material made of foamed metal reincorced with aligned
 
metallic whiskers. Architectural uses. Utility in any transport­
ation device where light weight and tensor structural strength
 
would be important. "Metallic balsawood" in concept.
 
uKIGINAL PAGE ' 0" 
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Structural insulation. A combination of an organic foamed plastic
 
such as polyeurethane or polystyrene with oriented whisker
 
reinforcement to produce a thermal insulator with tensor
 
structural characteristics. This would have application in
 
hydrogen-powered aircraft and automobiles, space craft, large
 
refrigeration equipment, railroad reefer cars, railroad tank
 
cars for LNG, ocean-going LNG ships. Most thermal insultation
 
equipment today is non-structural and must be made into a
 
sandwich with a structural material in order to bear loads
 
in compression or tension.
 
Tensor electrical conductor. By combining copper with oriented
 
whiskr reinforcement material in a wire, electrical transmission
 
lines could be made larger without the need for additional supporting
 
towers, thus permitting up-grading of existing transmission lines
 
to higher load-carrying capabilities without adding towers. Or
 
new transmission lines coule be built using fewer supporting
 
towers. Such tensor wire would also be useful in making stronger
 
cables of smaller size for guys, supports, hoists, lifts, cranes,
 
etc. (In large cranes and long elevator lifts, the weight of the
 
cable itself becomes a major tma load factor.)
 
Ultimate tensile microwire. Continuous whisker material grown in
 
space with tensile strength approaching or exceeding ultimate
 
strengths and in lengths of a meter or more. Replaces all saws
 
and sawing devices, cutting devices, and slicing devices for
 
materials of lesser hardness than the wire. Makes possible
 
extremely strong, lightweight whisker-wrapped pressure vessels.
 
"Heat wires." Thermally tensor wires or rods made from whisker
 
materials and coated with thermal insulator material of much
 
lower tensile strength. Conducts heat along the whisker material
 
with little radiation off the wire or rod. Has higher strength
 
than simple wire.
 
Ultra-hard materials. Production of high-temperature carbides
 
and nitrides by containerless melting in vacuum conditions,
 
causing vacuum purification, and controlled cooling to produce

uniform crystalline structure. Has potential of possibly being
 
nearly as hard (or perhaps as hard) as diamond because of the
 
regular crystal matrim. Would khx have superior electrical
 
conduction properties and may even act as a superconductor with
 
high transition point. Using acouttlc suspension and shaping
 
by standing waves while cooling, could be formed into wire
 
dies andnf other shapes.
 
Amorphous semiconductors. Ovshinskils Dream come truel Production
 
of amorphous semiconductor materials could be possible in zero-g 
because of the uniformity and lack of segrgation possible. This 
would lead to amorphous semiconductors which in turn might lead 
to picture-wall TV screens, for example. 
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Space-made glass products: Because of the fact that glass produced
 
in zero-g is more homoganeous than that produced in one-g, and
 
because of new types of glass that can be produced in orbit,
 
the following products would be affected, and the following
 
products could be produced with performance characteristics
 
better than one-g glass. (No implication is made as to whether
 
or not they would be economically competetive with one-g glass.)
 
Host materials for lasers; raw materials for lens coatings;
 
multi-element lenses for high numerical aperture systems such
 
as microscope objectives, low light level lenses, and long
 
focal-length lenses; multi-element lenses with high n for
 
anastigmat photo objectives, aplanats, and lower curvature
 
lenses for zoom, spectrometers, monochromators, polarizing
 
microscopes, and high speed large lenses; high numerical
 
aperture systems including oil-immersion microscope objectives
 
and fiber optics bundles.
 
Improved high-strength castings: One-g castings of metal
 
show a definite change in grain size between the wall of the
 
mold and the center of the casting, the harder metal being
 
on the outside of the casting because of smaller grain m
 
size. Uniform cooling of castings in zero-g in the absence of
 
convection cells within the casting would result in castings
 
of more homogeneous internal structure, thereby permitting
 
castings made in zero-g to be smaller and lighter than their
 
terrestrial analogs of equal strength. Although such space
 
castings will probably first be used in space-made spacecraft
 
and in large space structures from lunar and planetoidal materials,
 
their use would eventually trickle down to earth. Thus, castings
 
made in space could probably compete with forgings made on
 
earth because space castings could have complex shapes and
 
surfaces.
 
Immiscible alloys, general: It appears that immiscible alloys
 
that cannot be made on earth because of density segregation
 
during cooling and that can be made in space in the absence
 
of g-forces to cause density separation and convetive cooling
 
interally would have applications to the following general
 
product areas and systems: Fine particle superconductors;
 
breeder reactor fuels; nuclear reactor structural materials;
 
nuclear reactor control rods; bearing alloys; jewelry,
 
solid lubricants; superplastic materials; and magnetic detectors
 
of enhanced sensitivity. The list of possible products, markets,
 
etc. that are touched by this one area alone would require a
 
complete one-year+ study.
 
Aluminum antimodide solar cells. Possibility of alloying
 
aluminum antimodide in zero-g demonstpated in ASTP indicates
 
possible new type of solar cell with her higher conversion efficiency.

C/1 
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Urokinase produced by electrophoresis. A better way to produce
 
urokinase. The only way to produce pure urokinase with a
 
higher yield from human kidney cells and urine. Used to
 
treat cancer, leukemia, cardiovascular diseases.
 
High-oohesive strength permanent magnets. On earth, permanent
 
magnets are usually formed by sintering which destroys and/or
 
degrades their properties by oxidation. There are also many steps
 
involved. They could be made in a single step in zero-g with
 
higher density and better magnetic properties because of the
 
absence of segregation. Possible uses include levitators for
 
high-speed ground transportation systems and devices, gyros,
 
and bearings for energy storage flywheels.
 
Monolayer crystals. The first of these has just been formed
 
by labs with alternate one-atom-thick layers of GaAs and
 
AlAs. When pumped, it emits polarized laser light. It may be
 
the first of a family of layered crystals. These can probbbly
 
be made in space using free-atom chemistry techniques.
 
Metallo-organic polymers. Utilizing the vacuum and-zero-g
 
properties of space, it will be possible to make in great
 
quantities such exotic polymers as platinum-propylene. The
 
so-called Vnoble metals' can be made to combine with introverted
 
organic molecules to produce new plastic-like materials with
 
presently k unknown properties. Among these properties may be
 
extreme chemical corrosion resistance, even better than that of
 
teflon; high-te~mpurature characteristics in molded thermoplastic
 
and thermosetting plastic materials; unsuspected catalysis effects.
 
This is far-out stuff. It might even be possible to mkke an
 
internal combustion engine block by injection-molded metallo­
organic polymers. A new technology.
 
Improved dental materials. Dental fillings are normally made 
of an aia--amof silver and mercury. This material 
has a higher heat transmission factor than tooth enamel or pulp, 
as well as a different coefficient of thermal expansion, leading 
to a useful lifetime in a tooth of from 10 to 15 years. A hard, 
non-tqxic, non-corrosive, high-strength composite is required 
to replace the amalgam. A thermo-setting fiber-re-inforced 
noble metal polymer might be an answer. Such a material could 
be made only in space. The market is small (150,000 USA dentists) 
but everyone has teeth that need plugging. Material would cost 
more than amalgam, but would offer longer life with fewer visits 
to the dentist. The suggested material may not be the most 
practical one, but further research needs to be devoted in this 
area.
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Tourism
 
Short Term
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Tourism
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Sightseeing
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Short duration flights into space for the sightseeing
 
spectical and to experience weightlessness.
 
Near-Term: Perhaps on an as-space-available basis 
(-102 people/year) 
Mid-Term: Using personnel transporter 
@ $104 -10 5 each 
102 people/flight 
Far-Term: Probably in connection with hotel facilities 
10-l05 people/year 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: 	Shuttle to Advanced IOC:
 
Vehicles
 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: - POWER:
 
GROWTH: Moderate
 (Z106 people/yr.)
MANPOWER: 	 ($103 each)
 
($10 9 /year. )COSTS: 

ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT:
 
People
Tourism
 
Short Term
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Tourism
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Meditation Facilities
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
The silence, peace and lofty viewpoint of a space mediation
 
facility would be hard to compare. Perhaps furnished as one or two
 
person "pod" lifesupport systems to minimize interaction with others 
via structural vibrations. This could serve as the basis of a
 
spiritual movement. Isolation for internal awareness and sleep
 
inhancement could also be possible.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: Mid to Far-Term
 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH: Low 
5
(AP:0people/year)
MAN POWER: (,$10 3/person ) 
($10 8/year )(see Hotel)
COSTS: 

ESTABLI SHr' NT: 
OPERATI ON'S: 
PRODUCT:
 
C/we 
Medical
 
Isolation
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Medical
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Infectious Disease Isolation
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
The toally artificial environment that must be maintained to
 
support man-in-space suggests that a space habitat would be ideal
 
for infectious disease isolation. Perhaps "flip-top" rooms to
 
permit sterilzation by direct exposure to sunlight and vacuum. In
 
addition, total isolation is possible without possibility of spread­
ing to the Earth.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: Far-Term 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRAN4SPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: Low 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATION'S: 
SPRODUCI: 
People
Medical
 
Isolation 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Elimination of exogenous forces
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Biological Research
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Utilization of biorythms
 
(possibly treatment for diseases)
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: State of the Art IOC: 
SITE: LEO DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
People
 
Medical
 
Treatment
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
( 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEWORD: Medical 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Low Stress Environments
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
In reduced g or zero g, recuperation from many medical ail­
ment, may be easier or even faster. Sp6ciftc atmospheres are also
 
easily obtained to increase the oxygen content and/or reduce the
 
total pressure or provide a totally sterile environment., Recuperation
 
from major oporations, heart or respiratory difficulties are prime

candidates.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: OC: Mid to Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: low acceleration manned SUPPLIES:
transport E to LEO RT 
MASS: POER: 
GRO TH: Moderate 
IMAMPOAER: 
(,10 * affluent population 
( major operations/year 
COSTS: (see Hotel) 
(at- $103-104 each 
($10 1 0/yr. with 1/3 
ESTABLI S-'ENT: ~($10 (recuneration costs /yr.) 
OPEPATIONS: 
PRODUCT:
 
People
 
Medical
 
Treatment
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
Medical
KEYWORD: 

PRODUCT/SERVICE: Burn Treatment
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Severe burn victims need to be isolated from contact from
 
objects (floated) and from infection. The zero g and controlled
 
(sterilized) environments seem ideal for a LEO facility if trans­
portation (perhaps emersed in oil) is feasible.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: JOC: Mid to Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: Problem SUPPLIES: 
LASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
-MPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHMENT: 
OPE PATIO S: 
PRODUCT: 
People
 
Medical
 
Augmentation
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Medical
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Handicap Augmentation
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
People with handicaps such as leg amputees, spinal problems,
 
or muscular problems could have increased comfort and productivity
 
in zero or reduced g environments.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: ]OC: Far-Term 
SITE: LEO, HED DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
ASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: (see Colony) 
ESTABLI SHIENT: 
OPEPJ TI ON'S: 
PRODUCT: fo 
People
 
Entertainment
 
Ob3ects
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
Arts
KEYWORD: 

PRODUCT/SERVICE: Artwork Made in Space
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL, PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Art objects made in space using micro g, insolation, view or
 
vacuum. Example:
 
o 	Early; molten glass sphere inverse sculptured with
 
microbubbles either in3ected or formed by focused energy.
 
o 	Midterm; ma3or new sculpturing techniques will be possible
 
in space where major stresses are removed, i.e., large,
 
light etheral objects.
 
o 	Far-term; sculpturing features on the moon.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: JOC: Early to Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
1ASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: Low 
II4POWER: 
(Space phintings could 
initially sell for $10 4 ) 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHMENT: 
OPERATI OS: 
PRODUCT: 
reopie 
Entertainment
 
Objects
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Arts 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Reproductions Made From Space
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Use in space art for making masters from which many copies
 
can be made later on Earth as a means for getting early timing for
 
space art. Examples include lithography plates, holograms of space 
-
sculptures, sculpture molds, etc.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: lOC: Early to Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
1'ASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: Low 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHiENT: 
OPE ATI ONS: 
PRODUCT: 
People
 
Entertainment
 
Ob3ects
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
Arts
KEYWORD: 

PRODUCT/SERVICE: Ideas and Topics from Space
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
The new environments of space furnish the basis for new art
 
ideas and topics. Already there is SF art, art by astronauts, and
 
pictures of space, the Earth, the moon, mars, etc.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
JOC: Early to Far-Term
TECHNOLOGY: 

DIMENSION:
SITE: 

TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
POWER:
MASS: 

GROWTH: Low
 
IM1ANPOWER:
 
COSTS:
 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
1/
OPERATI ONS: ( PRODUCT: i 
Entertainment
 
Activities
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: 	 Entertainment (Spectator)
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Sports
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Near-Term: Special 2 man competition in habitable volume
 
^-10 3-10 4 mS
 
ex: personal combat, dodge ball, "water ball" 
-
each using zero g in LEO for minimal
 
orbital time.
 
Mid-Term: Small team competition in habitable volume 
- 10 5 -107m3 
ex. 	 races and timed events, basketball type
 
accuracy sports - each using zero g in
 
LEO during moderate orbital time.
 
Far-Term" 	 Any sports supported by space population,
 
variable g, large volume and possibly vacuum.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: see above
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
NPOWER:(to GROWTH: Low -$109/yr. ) 
MANPOWER: (only partly 
attributable toCOSTS: Mainly transportation and arena space.) 
ESTABLI SHI,?ET ay be spinoffs of other activities.wfh1T 

OPERATIONS:
 
PRODUCT: Sports spectaculars gross $5-1OM
 
-y e5 
People
 
Entertainment
 
Activities
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEY1ORD: Entertainment (Spectator)
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Movie/TV ("Special Effects")
 
DESCRIPTION CINCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Use space setting for Ealistic space special effects.
 
Near-Term: This will probably be with limited crews (3-6) 
and equipment (.I-1T) in LEO for short duration. 
Mid-Term. Use of the space base and other in situ facilitie 
and crews as well as- filming/acting staff of 10-
Ioo. 
Far-Term: Could see full scale productions in space, on the 
moon or near astroids. 
CHARACTERISTICS: see above 
TECHNOLOGY: lOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
AN P ONER: 
GROWTH: Low 
(to '$10 /year) 
COSTS: Major movies cost $10-25M 
ESTABLISHMENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: Major movies gross $20-50M 
People
 
-Entertainment
 
Activities
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: 	 Entertainment (Spectator)
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Dance
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
A new art form may be partial or zero g ballet or'hodern"
 
dance. The possibilities for enhanced grace, slow motion
 
and full 3D should provide major interest in space dance.
 
Ballet is based on speed, balance, and leaps ...adjustment
 
would be necessary.
 
CHARACTERI STI CS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: Mid to Far-Term
 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH: 	Very low
 
(to -$10/year)
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: Major ballet productions cost "-$1/2M
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS:
 
L[ PRODUCT:
 
/c9 
Peop±L
Recreation
 
Amusement Park
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORD: Tourism
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Amusement Park
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Recreation, sports and amusement facility in conjunction with
 
sightseeing and hotel facilities. Will provide zero g, variable g,
 
coriolis force, EVA, observations, etc. Many normal physical
 
activities will take on new dimensions in zero g such as dancing,
 
swimming, sexual congress, sleeping, etc. Should be synergistic
 
with space hotel.
 
Future versions could be in HEO and LSU but initially in LEO.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: lOC: Mid to Far-Term 
SITE: LEO, NSo, LSU DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATI ON: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: Lo . 
(0zlO people/yr) 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
(~$lO2 each 
(S$108 /year 
ESTABLI S1i'ENT: 
OPERATI ONS: 
PRODUCT: 
7 People 

Recreation
 
Hotel
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE'SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEY1ORD: Tourism 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Hotel
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Temporary lodging in space for tourists.
 
Mid-Term: a 102 people habitat (-10 staff) in LEO 
minimal quarters, mainly rooms and "free-fall hall"
 
and observational facilities.
 
Far-Term: --103-104 people habitats in LEO, HEO, LSU
 
CHARACTERISICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: 
SITE: DIMENSION:
 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES:
 
MASS: POWER:
 
GROWTH: Moderate 
MANIPOWER 
COSTS: 
(.Z0 6 people/yr.)($03 each ) 
(Z$lyear ) 
ESTABLISHMENT: Based on T/person for habitat 
OPERATIONS: Based on support in $/person-day. 
PRODUCT: 
- '/0
 
People
 
Recreation
 
Cabin
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
Tourism
KEYWORD: 

Space Cabin
PRODUCT/SERVICE: 

DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
Small one family habitats in LEO and later even HEO and LSU.
 
For the person wanting "to get away from it all". A logical
 
extension beyond the beach and mountain cabin.
 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
MASS: POWER: 
GROWTH: 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: (see Hotel) 
ESTABLISH ENT: 
OPERATIONS: 
PRODUCT: 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE Education
People

INDUSTRIAL GOALS In-Space
 
K'EYORD: Education 
PRODUCT/SERVI CE: In-Space 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE): 
Classes or instruction in space allows utilization of "natural"
 
environment for teaching science or global subjects (geography,
 
world wide perspective). Ex.:- sciences could utilize variable g
 
and vacuum for teching kinetics, actual student participation to learn
 
Newton's laws.
 
1) Broadcast to Earth 
2) In-Space Education 
3) Combination of 1) & 2) 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
-TECHNOLOGY: 
SITE: 
]0C: Mid to Far-Term 
DI lENS ION: 
TRANSPORTATION: 
1'tASS: 
Very inexpensive human SUPPLIES:transportation. 
POWER: 
GROWTH: Moderate 
MANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHiENT: 
OPEPAT 10I: 
PRODUCT: 
I 
People
 
Support
 
Social Isolation
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEY1ORD: Security
 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Maximum Security Prisons
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
A maximum security prison in orbit, on the moon or in an
 
astroid. Similar to the early use of Australia. This penal
 
colony could require no guards and only one-way ships.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
TECHNOLOGY: Colony level- closed IOC: Far Term
 
ecology, etc.
 
SITE: Any DIMENSION: Large
 
TRANSPORTATION: One way, expendableg SUPPLIES: Minimal
 
MASS: Large POWER:
 
GROWTH: Low
 
MNPOWER:
 
COSTS: After colonization efforts, -$10 I0
 
ESTABLISHMENT:
 
OPERATIONS: _$107-108
 
PRODUCT:
 1 //; 
ru j t 	 3 
Support
 
SoEciaacl 	 To tion 
_______a 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE
 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS
 
KEYWORJ: 	 Experimentation 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Social Alternative/Life Boat
 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE):
 
In tbe far term,space colonies could provide test beds for
 
social experimentation leading to new alternatives. These will also
 
provide mankind with a lifeboat in case-of disaster on Earth.
 
CHARACTERISTICS:
 
IOC: 	 Far-Term
TECHNOLOGY: 

I 	 SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATION: SUPPLIES: 
K 	 POWER:MASS: 
GROWTH:
 
IIANPOWER: 
l COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHMENT: 
3 OPEPATIOS: 
PRODUCT:
 J-/13 
-PeoplePOTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE 
INDUSTRIAL GOALS Ecological Isolat 
KEYWORD: Experimentation 
PRODUCT/SERVI CE: Ecology Labs 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE): 
By setting up environments isolated from the bLospbere alter­
native ecological systems can be tested without contamination.
 
CHARACTERISTI CS: 
TECHNOLOGY: IOC: Par-Term 
SITE: DI iENSI ON: 
TRANSPORTATI ON: SUPPLIES: 
MA SS: P4O.ER: 
GROWTH: 
IYNPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHF£&T: 
OPEPATI O1,S: 
PRODUCT: 
People
 
Support
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE SPACE 
 Ecological &
 
Social Isolation
INDUSTRIAL GOALS 

KEYWORD: Experimentation 
PRODUCT/SERVICE: Potentially Hazardous Developments 
DESCRIPTION (INCL. PROCESS & SPACE USAGE)'
 
Potentially hazardous developments and experiments (e.g., 
genetic engineering-recombinant DNA, CBW etc.) should be isolated from
 
the biosphere, a space lab would seem to be ideal.
 
CHARACTERI STICS: 
TECHNOLOGY: l0C: Near to Far-Term 
SITE: DIMENSION: 
TRANSPORTATI ON: SUPPLIES: 
IASS: PO:ER: 
GROWTH: Low 
IANPOWER: 
COSTS: 
ESTABLI SHI'ENT: 
OPEPATI ONS: 
( PRODUCT: 
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MEMORANDUM
 
TO: Rockwell International, Space Division
 
SUBJECT: International Law and Space Industrialization
 
The present memorandum,* which is designed to explore the
 
impact of international space law upon the future industriali­
zation of outer space, is divided into four main segments.
 
First, the concept of space industrialization is outlined.
 
Second, existing international agreements affecting the utiliza­
tion and development of outer space are examined in terms of
 
their respective influences on various types of space indus­
trialization. Third, current negotiations relating to the
 
formulation of international guidelines for the use of outer
 
space for particular purposes, including direct television
 
broadcasting, satellite remote sensing, and exploitation of
 
lunar resources, are assessed both as a means of projecting
 
possible international legal regimes in those particular
 
areas, and for identifying trends which could affect other
 
types of space utilization. Finally, recommendations for
 
actions designed to facilitate space industrialization are dis­
cussed.
 
*The views and conclusions contained in this memorandum
 
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect or
 
represent the views or policies, either expressed or implied,
 
of any organization, agency, or group.
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PART I: THE CONCEPT OF SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
For purposes of the present memorandum, the concept of
 
space industrialization is used in a broad sense to
 
encompass an extensive array of possible uses of outer space.
 
Five main categories of activities are encompassed.
 
A. Communications Services
 
The success of recent communications technology applications
 
programs conducted by NASA 1 and the prospects for resumption of
 
NASA communication satellite experimentation indicate that
 
technical and economic feasibility for a large number of innova­
tive communications services is likely to be achieved in the near
 
future. Among the communications activities which are projected
 
for near- or middle-term satellite implementation are:
 
1. 	teleconferencing;
 
2. 	direct television broadcasting;
 
3. 	electronic mail;
 
4. 	electronic funds transfer;
 
5. 	improved data communications;
 
6. 	business and home communications systems incorporating
 
computers and small-scale receiving terminals;
 
7. 	improved mobile communications for personal and
 
vehicular use;
 
8. 	medical information services, including telediagnosis,
 
patient monitoring and access to medical records;
 
9. 	improved disaster warning services based on enhanced
 
remote sensing and meteorological applications; and
 
10. search and rescue communications.
 
-3-

Although not exhaustive, this listing indicates the scope of
 
future possibilities for the utilization of outer space, and
 
particularly the geostationary orbit, 2 for communications.
 
B. 	Remote Sensing Services
 
Public and private experimentation in the satellite remote
 
sensing area centering around NASA's Landsat Program has
 
demonstrated the feasibility of using satellites for the
 
acquisition of data relating to the earth and its environment.
 
The breadth of experimental activities has facilitated identi­
fication of an extensive listing of potential applications
 
and services. 3 Set forth below is a listing of a number of
 
the general categories into which these applications may be
 
divided:
 
1. 	Mineral resources monitoring;
 
2. 	Ocean resources management, including living and
 
non-living resources;
 
3. 	Crop surveys, including insert and disease monitoring
 
and yield projections;
 
4. 	Land use management;
 
5. 	Population surveys;
 
6. 	Monitoring of pollution in the atmosphere, rivers and
 
streams and oceans;
 
7. 	Weather and climate forecasting; and
 
8. 	Non-meteorological disaster forecasting.
 
-4-
C. Satellite Power Systems
 
The 1973 embargo on the export of petroleum products to
 
certain o 1-consuming countries imposed by members of the
 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
 
subsequent events, including energy shortages, increasing
 
energy costs and their economic, social and foreign policy
 
implications, have promoted the search for cost-effective,
 
alternative energy sources. One possibility is the establish­
ment of generating facilities in orbit which would relay
 
resultant energy to the earth's surface using a microwave or
 
laser transmission system. Three main alternative methods of
 
power generation are under consideration solar energy,
 
nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. Relay of electrical
 
power generated either in space or on the earth's surface
 
via satellite to secondary receivers constitutes another
 
option for the industrialization of space.
 
-5-

D. 	Space Manufacturing
 
A number of experiments relating to physical and chemical
 
properties of matter in outer space conducted during NASA's
 
Skylab program indicate that certain unique characteristics
 
of outer space, including weightless, vacuum and extreme
 
temperature differentials, may permit the manufacture of
 
products which either could not be produced on the earth or
 
would be of significantly inferior quality. A number of specific
 
benefits have been identified, including:
 
1. 	production of superior electronic products, especially
 
semiconductor crystals;
 
2. 	pure vaccines and other pharmacentical products,
 
3. 	improved laser glass and optics manufacturing;
 
4. 	production of alloys of metals which are otherwise
 
immiscible in their respective liquid states;
 
S. 	production of superconductors,
 
6. 	assembly and maintenance of large space structures,
 
including space stations and vehicles.
4
 
E. 	Deep Space Operations
 
In contrast to the operations described above which would
 
be most likely to occur at altitudes above the earth between
 
100 and 22,300 miles, a number of activities relating to the
 
development of outer space could be undertaken advantageously
 
beyond that limit. Perhaps most important of these is the
 
mining of minerals on the moon and othef celestial bodies.
 
A
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PART II: APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
 
International space law applicable to the space industriali­
zation activities described in Part I is embodied in a series
 
of treaties and conventions adopted primarily under the auspices
 
of the United Nations. The fundamental Treaty on Principles
 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
1
 
resulted from initiatives within the United Nations and after
 
several years of negotiation was signed in 1967. In subse­
quent years, other treaties were negotiated to elaborate the
 
basic principles defined in the 1967 treaty. Perhaps most impor­
tant from the perspective of space industrialization is the Con­
vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
 
Objects, which entered into force for the United States in 1973.2
 
I. 	TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
 
IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE
 
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES
 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides the foundation for
 
the legal framework for all activities beyond the upper limits
 
of national airspace jurisdiction. Consequently, its provisions
 
are relevant to the consideration of all four major categories of
 
space industrialization. Particular consideration should be
 
given to the provisions governing"
 
1. 	permissible uses of outer space (Articles I, IV and IX),
 
2. 	non-appropriation of outer space (Article II),
 
3. 	applicability of international law (Article III);
 
4. 	military uses of outer space (Article IV);
 
5. 	responsibility of states for the acts of nationals in
 
space (Article VI);
 
6. 	international liability for damage caused in space
 
(Article VII);
 
7. 	the exercise of national jurisdiction in outer space
 
(Article VIII); and
 
8. 	relations between states relating to their respective
 
space activities (Article IX).
 
A. 	Article I
 
Article I, which establishes the most basic principles
 
governing activities in outer space, provides:
 
The exploration and use of outer space, including
 
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried
 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun­
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scien­
tific development, and shall be the province of all man­
kind.
 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
 
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all
 
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
 
equality and in accordance with international law, and
 
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial
 
bodies.
 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation
 
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
 
bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage inter­
national co-operation in such investigation.
 
i. 	Article 1(1): The "Common Interests" Clause
 
Paragraph 1 raises two main issues. first, whether this
 
provision constitutes a binding contractual obligation or is
 
-8­
merely declaratory of general objectives, and second, regarding
 
the meaning of the phrase "for the benefit and in the interests
 
of all countries." Related to the former is the question whether
 
the provision is self-executing. Some authorities argue that
 
although the so-called "common interests" clause of Paragraph 1
 
embodies one of the most fundamental principles upon which the
 
outer space regime is founded, its breadth precludes direct
 
application. Consequently, other, more limited expressions of
 
international consensus are required to give this provision
 
enforceable form. Under that approach, pending agreement on
 
specific operative principles elaborating the fundamental policy
 
of Article I(1), any use of outer space would be permitted under
 
1
 
Article I(2), provided it is peaceful in nature.

A contrary conclusion is reached by a number of other
 
authorities who take the position that the language of Article I(1)
 
is binding upon the signatories, as is any provision of an in­
ternational treaty. Two main reasons are advanced to support
 
this proposition. First, during consideration of the text of
 
the provision in the fifth session of the Legal Sub-Committee of
 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (CPUOS), a
 
proposal to delete the phrase "for the benefit and in the interests
 
of all countries" from Article I and place it in the preamble
 
was rejected.2 Similarly, the draft of Article I(1) was modified
 
when the words "irrespective of their degree of economic or
 
scientific development" were moved on the basis of a consensus
 
from initial position in the preamble to their present position
 
-9­
following the "common interests" clause, because the developing
 
countries advocated inclusion of the latter phrase as part of
 
the binding treaty commitment.3 Thus, it may be inferred that the
 
drafters intended Article I(1) to be binding. Second, even if the
 
provision is considered non-self-executing and the effectiveness
 
of the limitation is thereby somewhat diminished, its binding
 
character is not impaired and the legislative or executive acts
 
necessary to implement the binding provision are nonetheless
 
mandatory for all parties to the treaty.4
 
The content of the phrase "for the benefit and in the
 
interests of all countries" in Article I(1) is also open to
 
dispute. Some authorities take the position that the treaty's
 
admonition to use outer space for the benefit of all members
 
of the international community constitutes no more than a duty
 
upon each member not to misuse outer space in a way which could
 
diminish the value of space adtivities to other members.
5
 
Others have taken the closely related position that the
 
phrase means that the use of space objects should not be detri­
mental to the interests of other countries, including national
 
security, public order and sovereignty over natural resources
 
which are protected under international law.
6
 
The third possible interpretation would impose on space
 
powers the obligation either to permit other countries to use
 
the former's space vehicles or to share the financial benefits
 
of its space activities. Arguments supporting this position have
 
been raised in the discussions of the CPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
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relating to direct broadcast and earth resources satellites. 7 To
 
date, that approach has received little direct international
 
8
support. Nonetheless, a similar approach relating to the
 
exploitation of resources in another area located beyond the
 
limits of national jurisdiction, the deep seabed, has received
 
substantial support during the present series of United Nations
 
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. 9 Although a scheme for licens­
ing exploitation of the orbit and distributing the proceeds
 
equitably among the members of the international community has
 
been proposed, current developments in space law and the law of
 
the sea suggest that final agreement on such an arrangement is
 
not likely to occur in the near future.
 
An analysis both of relevant arguments and of trends in the
 
interpretation of Article I(1) as it applies to the utilization
 
of outer space for industrial purposes indicates a number
 
of conclusions. First, as an operative element of a treaty,
 
Article I(1) is binding upon all states which are parties to
 
the treaty. Second, the content of the "common interests"
 
clause is unclear and therefore requires further elaboration.
 
As a result, the clause may be considered non-self-executing for
 
purposes of space industrialization. Third, although the clause's
 
content is disputed at a minimum, it imposes a duty upon states
 
to use outer space in such a way that neither the earth-bound
 
interests of other states, including national security, or the
 
potential interests of the latter in the exploration or use of
 
outer space are jeopardized. Finally, although the upper
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limit of the "common interests" requirement is unclear under exist­
ing space law, Article I(1) does not require space powers to
 
share either their space vehicles or the profits derived from
 
space activities with non-space powers.
 
The impact of Article [(1) upon space industrialization
 
depends on the precise nature of the activity contemplated.
 
Communications satellites utilize segments of the electromagnetic
 
spectrum and portions of the geostationary orbit. Although both
 
are potentially subject to overcrowding, unilateral use of
 
transmission frequencies or orbital slots would not violate
 
Article I(1), since transmitter and space shuttle technology and
 
the potential ability to remove inoperative satellites from orbit
 
emphasizes the character of both the spectrum and the geostationary
 
orbit as renewable resources-which are non-depletable in any
 
permanent sense. Most applications would not jeopardize any of
 
the essentially terrestrial interests protected by Article I().
 
However, some nations have argued that the use of satellites for
 
the transmission of television programs directly to home or
 
community receivers could interfere with the internal political
 
or economic stability of "receiving states."' 0 Although some
 
concern may be justified despite good faith efforts by all
 
participating parties, the question will be decided in the con­
text of a separate declaration relating to direct broadcast
 
satellites, rather than in the context of Article I(l).
 
The impact of "common interests" clause on satellite
 
remote sensing is likely to be somewhat similar to its effect on
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communications applications. Although some sensing satellites-­
primarily those designed for earth resources applications-­
operate in low earth orbit, others, including meteorological
 
satellites, are likely to occupy geostationary orbital slots.
 
As noted above, use of the geostationary orbit consistent with
 
the applicable regulations of the International Telecommunication
 
Union (ITU) is not impeded by Article I(I). However, some
 
questions have arisen regarding interference with the national
 
security and economic interests of sensed states arising from
 
potential abuses of earth resources applications of remote sensing
 
technology. As a result, efforts to limit the use of earth
 
resources satellites or to place their use in the context of a
 
somewhat restrictive organizational structure have beeh initiated
 
in the United Nations.11  Although reference has been to Article
 
I(1) in the debates, the result of these debates is likely to take
 
the form of an international declaration of principles which
 
does not refer directly to the content of that provision.
 
If satellite power systems are implemented either experi­
mentally or operationallyyfour main questions are likely to
 
arise in the context of the "common interests" clause. First,
 
since such systems are likely to occupy segments of the geostationaryi
 
orbit to facilitate either power production or transmission, and
 
since the size of such satellites will require significantly
 
larger slots than are presently utilized by communications and
 
meteorological satellites, the question of orbital slot alloca­
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tion will undoubtedly arise. However, Article I(I) does not
 
present an obstacle. Second, as presently conceived, a satellite
 
power system would not affect adversely a state's sovereignty over
 
its natural resources, its political, social, cultural and economic
 
self-determination or domestic order among its citizens. Conse­
quently, those interests would not inhibit establishment and
 
operation of a satellite power system. A third potential concern
 
could arise among energy-producing countries that the establish­
ment of such systems by energy-consuming countries could under­
mine the economies of the former. However, as suggested below
 
in Section I.C., international law does not protect countries
 
against either economic competition or economic pressure.
 
Finally, the laser or microwave transmission mechanisms
 
likely to be used by satellite power systems to convey power
 
generated in orbit to relay stations on the earth's surface may
 
be said to constitute potential weapons for use against the
 
earth's surface. If the weapons potential were realizable, the
 
system qua weapon would be contrary to the interests of non­
allied countries protected by Articles I() and IV. However, the
 
assumption of the present memorandum is that satellite power
 
systems will incorporate adequate safeguards to prevent their use
 
as weapons and hence would not violate the interests of other
 
states embodied in Article Il).
 
Operation of manufacturing facilities in outer space would
 
not adversely affect any of the terrestrial interests of states
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with the possible exception of adverse economic influence result­
ing from the relative scarcity of products manufactured in outer
 
space and the accompanying high cost. As noted above, this fact
 
is insufficient in itself to present any restriction on space
 
operations. Since manufacturing facilities would not necessarily
 
require placement in geostationary orbit, interference with the
 
space-oriented interests of non-participating states in access
 
to particular areas of outer space is not likely to occur.
 
However, since those facilities are likely to generate various
 
forms of waste ranging from harmless gases to debris and nuclear
 
by-products, potential interference with the space activities
 
of other states, the provisions of Articles I(1) and IX probably
 
require the operation entities to take reasonable steps to
 
identify and avoid such potential interference.
 
In addition to the interpretation of the "common interests"
 
clause an assessment of the impact of Article I(l) on the use of
 
outer space for industrial purposes raises a set of issues
 
centering around the argument that Article I(l) requires states
 
to use outer space "for exclusively peaceful purposes."
1 2
 
Even assuming for the purposes of this analysis that the Ar­
ticle I(1) requirement that outer space be used "for the benefit
 
and in the interests of all countries" contains within it the
 
requirement that outer space be used "exclusively for peaceful
 
purposes," 13 the United States'position on the question signa­
ficantly diminishes the extent to which the latter requirement
 
could inhibit the industrialization of outer space. However,
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pressure from other governments could lead to general acceptance
 
of a more restrictive approach.
 
The main point of contention is the meaning of the term
 
"peaceful uses." Regardless of their respective positions on
 
the question of content, authorities agree that the main inter­
pretational alternatives are limited to two: "peaceful uses"
 
can be defined either as "non-aggressive uses," leaving open the
 
possibility of the use of outer space for defensive military
 
purposes or as "non-military uses," excluding both aggressive
 
and defensive activities.
1 4
 
The possibility that Article I(1) implicitly incorporates
 
the "peaceful use" requirement is based on the language of that
 
provision and on the context in which the treaty was drafted.
 
Applying the requirement that space activities be conducted
 
"for the benefit and in the interests of all countries" to the
 
question of military action in outer space, some authorities
 
conclude that the space activities can be conducted in the in­
"peaceful" in nature. 15
 terests of all countries only if they are 

In addition, it may be argued that since the term "peaceful" is
 
ambiguous and subject to conflicting interpretations, especially
 
in the context of a general statement of desirable purposes of
 
space initiatives, the drafters chose to substitute the concept
 
of use "in the interests of all countries.",1 6 Finally, proponents
 
of the "peaceful use" requirement maintain that since Article IV
 
and other provisions of the treaty did not completely prohibit
 
placement of weapons in outer space, the term "peaceful uses" was
 
avoid ambiguity.17
 omitted from Article I to 

'4 
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The case for the opposite position is based on the formula­
tion of Article IV, which in Paragraph 2 expressly limits activi­
ties on the moon and other celestial bodies to exclusively
 
peaceful purposes, but in Paragraph 1 omits any such limitation.
 
Although some advocates of the "peaceful use" interpretation of
 
Article I(1) explain the omission as the result of imprecise
 
drafting,1 8 the omission must be considered intentional since an
 
attempt to apply the phrase "exclusively for peaceful purposes"
 
to all areas of outer space was defeated.19 Since the Article IV
 
approach is expressly stated, and is supported by the "free use"
 
principle of Article 1(2), it cannot be altered by inferences
 
based on less explicit language.
 
Similar arguments apply to the dispute regarding the defini­
tion of "peaceful uses." In support of the "non-military"
 
interpretation it is argued that military activity can never
 
be "peaceful" and even purely defensive weapons cannot be in the
 
interests of all states.20 On that basis, it is argued that
 
adoption of Article I(1) embodying the expression of one of the
 
most fundamental principles of space law operates to prohibit
 
21
 
even defensive weapons in outer space.
 
The opposite view is based on the contention that "non­
aggressive" uses are permitted, first, by Article IV(l) which
 
prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer
 
space but omits the express requirement of peaceful uses applied
 
by Article IV(2) to the celestial bodies, and second, by Article
 
III which requires states to conduct space activities in accor­
dance with international law, including the United Nations
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Charter. Neither prohibits defensive or non-aggressive military
 
activity. Support for this approach is also found in the prac­
tice of states. Both major space powers use outer space for
 
military communications and reconnaissance. Although these
 
activities are "military" in nature, they are "non-aggressive."
 
Balancing of these arguments and the underlying policy
 
considerations leads to the conclusions
 
1. 	that although Article I(1) requires states to conduct
 
space activities "for the benefit and in the interests
 
of all countries," it does not prohibit all military
 
activity in outer space; and
 
2. 	that Articles I(1), III and IV combine to limit any
 
military activity in outer space to "non-aggressive"
 
conduct.
 
These conclusions suggest that under present international space
 
law, stationing military installations and weapons systems in
 
orbit may be permissible if they are defensive in nature and
 
do not contain nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass
 
destruction. Hence, the operator of a satellite power system
 
may be permitted to convey its products to orbital or terrestrial
 
military installations which are designed for defensive purposes.
 
The need to distinguish defensive from offensive purposes may
 
present a problem for the system operating in this context.
 
Finally, if used exclusively in conjunction with defense-oriented
 
systems and installations, the system may be operated by military
 
personnel.
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In general, activities relating to space industrialization
 
are not in themselves either aggressive or defensive as those
 
terms are used in a military context and hence would not violate
 
the alleged requirement that outer space be used exclusively
 
for peaceful purposes. However, in some cases, non-space powers
 
may argue that direct television broadcasting and satellite
 
remote sensing constitute "aggressive" activities and should
 
therefore be restricted. In the absence of other facts, however,
 
the current state of international law in this area would not
 
support these contentions.
 
Although not "aggressive" on their face, space industriali­
zation activities may be deemed aggressive because of the uses
 
made of the resulting products. The generations of electrical
 
power in orbit is illustrative for these purposes.
 
Satellite generated power could be put. to three arguably
 
military uses:
 
1. 	directly as a weapon used to attack terrestrial or
 
space targets for aggressive or defensive purposes;
 
2. 	to provide energy for the support of military installa­
tions and weapon systems in orbit or on earth, or
 
3. 	to relieve civilian demand on terrestrial power
 
generation facilities to ensure an adequate supply
 
of energy to terrestrial military installations.
 
The 	first use constitutes the main subject matter of Section
 
III.D. of Part II and is examined there in the context of Article
 
IV of the Outer Space Treaty. The connection of the third possible
 
use to military activities is too tenuous to support application
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of the prohibition of any military use of outer space inferred
 
by some authorities from the language of Article I(1). In
 
addition, a para-llsel approach could be used to prohibit national
 
exploitation of the minerals of the deep seabed for civilian
 
use, since that could increase the supply of minerals available
 
to the nation as a whole and hence to its military organizations.
 
That result is, however, directly contrary to the express pro­
visions of the international legal regime of the high seas
 
which both reserves use of the deep seabed for exclusively
 
peaceful purposes and authorizes exploitation of seabed minerals
 
22
for military purposes.
without reference to their possible use 

Thus, only the second possibility--that of direct use of
 
satellite generated power by military installations or weapons
 
systems--poses a potential problem under the alleged requirement
 
that outer space be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. If
 
some or all of the power is used by an orbital weapons system
 
which clearly is in violation, for example, of the Article IV(l)
 
prohibition on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in
 
orbit or by a military installation located on a celestial body
 
in violation of Article IV(2), the use of outer space for genera­
ting power would be unlawful to the extent that its power products
 
are consumed by the prohibited system installation. The result
 
is less clear when the power products are consumed by a military
 
installation or weapons system which is either legally in orbit
 
or is located on the earth. If power generated by a satellite
 
is utilized by a military installation or weapons system which
 
23 
is legally in orbit, the use of outer space for the power
 
generation activity would be permissible under the "free use"
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principle of Article 1(2). The legality of the stationing of the
 
installation or weapons system in question must be determined
 
by reference, first, to the specific prohibitions of Article IV,
 
and second, to the debate regarding the content of the alleged
 
"peaceful use" requirement.
 
As set forth in greater detail in Section I.D. below,
 
Article IV specifically prohibits a series of three activities
 
in outer space:
 
1. 	the stationing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of
 
mass destruction in orbit around the earth or elsewhere
 
in outer space;
 
2. 	the stationing of such weapons on the moon and other
 
celestial bodies,
 
3. 	the use of the moon and other celestial bodies for any
 
except exclusively peaceful purposes, as a result, the
 
establishment of military bases, installations and
 
fortifications, the testing of weapons of any kind and
 
the conduct of military maneuvers in those areas is
 
forbidden.
 
As 	suggested above, some authorities argue that the Article I(1)
 
requirement that outer space be used "for the benefit and in the
 
interests of all countries" includes a requirement that space be
 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes. If that argument can
 
be sustained, the activities of states in outer space would be
 
further limited. The extent of the limitation would depend on
 
whether all military activities or only aggressive activities
 
would be prohibited.
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2. Article 1(2): The "Free Use" Principle
 
The second paragraph of Article I contains two main pro­
visions which are likely to influence the industrialization of 
space. The most important, the "free use" principle, provides 
that "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be free for exploration and use by all States . 
This "free use" principle provides the international legal 
basis for all activity in outer space. In contrast to the 
restrictions imposed by other sections of the Outer Space Treaty, 
Article 1(2) affirmatively authorizes space activities, and 
hence serves as the point of departure for any argument in 
favor of a particular use of outer space. For that reason 
Article 1(2) has played an important role in the protection of 
space initiatives against unnecessary restrictions. 
Thus, although the "free use" principle is one of the
 
key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, and is sufficiently
 
broad to sustain the right of states to conduct activities in
 
outer space free from claims of sovereignty of subjacent states,
 
it is not unlimited.
 
As suggested above, Article 1(2) must be read in the
 
context of the "common interests" clause of Article I(1)
 
with the result that the advantages to be derived from rapid
 
development of outer space must be balanced against the require­
ment that the development be carried out in a manner beneficial
 
to all members of the international community. In that combina­
tion, the "free use" clause creates a tendency to limit the
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potential inhibiting effect of a restrictive construction of
 
Article I(1). As applied to the industrialization of outer
 
space, the "free use" principle has provided the conceptual
 
basis for resisting arguments that activity in outer space is
 
unlawful in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
 
it is being conducted for the benefit and in the interest of
 
all countries in accordance with Article I(i).24 Consequently,
 
Article 1(2) tends to shift construction of Article I(1) toward
 
the minimal duty to avoid conducting space activities in a
 
manner detrimental to the interests of non-participating states
 
as described above. In addition, the "free use" principle is
 
subject to the prohibitions both of Article II relating to
 
non-appropriation and of Article IV dealing with the stationing
 
of nuclear weapons in outer space. To the extent that space
 
industrial activities are likely to contaminate either outer
 
' 
space or earth, the "free use principle is also limited by
 
Article IX. 25
 
B. Article II: Non-Appropriation in Outer Space
 
The second major limit on the "free use" principle is
 
embodied in Article II, which provides:
 
Outer space, including the moon and other
 
celestial bodies, is not sub3ect to national appro­
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
 
or occupation, or by any other means.
 
affect the activities
The non-appropriation principle is likely to 

associated with space industrialization which involve either
 
or utilization of the geostationary
consumption of space resources 
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orbit. The language of Article II raises three main issues
 
with respect to industrial development in space:
 
1. the subject matter to which the prohibition applies;
 
2. the meaning of the term "appropriation", and
 
3. the validity of "appropriation" by entities other
 
26
 
than national governments.
 
The listing of space industrial activities set forth
 
in Part I contains two types of resource utilization. First,
 
satellite power systems arguably "appropriate" solar energy.
 
However, with respect to solar energy the Article II prohibition
 
clearly does not apply. One of the primary purposes of
 
Article II is to implement the "free use" policy of Article 1(2.27
 
Article II must therefore be construed to promote rather than
 
inhibit the exploration and use of outer space. Nearly all
 
satellites presently in service or planned for the-near future
 
will depend on conversion of the sun's energy to electrical
 
power for use in the operation of their respective payloads.
 
Large-scale use of alternative energy sources by satellites
 
has proven impractical. As a result, application of the
 
Article II prohibition to the use of the sun's energy would
 
sharply limit the scale, duration, and hence, the economic
 
viability of space development projects. Further, in the
 
absence of special circumstances, enforcement of Article II
 
against the "appropriation" of essentially inexhaustible space
 
resources would serve little purpose, 28 and should be avoided
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in favor of the-"free use" principle. Since the same policy
 
considerations apply to conversion of solar energy for use
 
on earth as well as for use by satellites in orbit, Article II
 
probably does not limit the use of solar energy by satellite
 
power systems.
 
Second, extraction of mineral ores and other substances
 
from the moon or other celestial bodies, which may eventually
 
constitute one of the most significant commercial space activities,
 
arguably constitute "appropriation" in violation of Article II.
 
29
 
As noted below, both the United States and the Soviet Union
 
have taken the position that although Article II prevents a
 
country from exercising sovereign control over portions of
 
the moon, it does not interfere with exercise of proprietary
 
rights over natural resources after they have been separated
 
from the moon's surface or subsurface. However, the inter­
pretation of Article II is a central issue in the negotiations
 
relating to the draft moon treaty before the CPUOS Legal Sub-

Committee. Final resolution of the dispute which has delayed
 
conclusion of the moon treaty will also depend on establishment
 
on the question of potential rights of each member of'the
 
international community to exhaustible lunar resources.
 
The second category of space industrial activities which
 
could be significantly affected by Article II require utilization
 
of the geostationary orbit. In theory, earth resources and
 
communications satellites, and satellite power systems could
 
be said to "appropriate" segments of the geostationary orbit.
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The use of a particular orbital slot is undoubtedly subject
 
to the terms of Article II, especially in light of its function
 
of providing support to the "free use" principle. The question
 
is most pressing for orbital power generation, and the analysis
 
below applies a fortiori to other satellites in geostationary
 
orbit. Because of the projected dimensions of a solar power
 
satellite,3 0 the size of the orbital slot required for safe
 
operation is substantially greater than that required for
 
existing communications or meteorological satellites. In
 
addition, stress factors resulting from the necessary length
 
of support beams suggest the need for safety zones similar in
 
concept to those established for installations engaged in
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exploitation of the resources of submarine areas. Although
 
the Article II prohibition clearly applies to the appropriation
 
of a particular orbital slot, the determination of the validity
 
of placing a solar power satellite in geostationary orbit is
 
dependent on the meaning of the term "appropriation" as used
 
in Article 1I.
 
Analysis of the concept of "appropriation" suggests the
 
existence of two subsidiary elements:
 
1. 	exclusive use; and
 
relatively permanent use, including consumption.
32
 
2. 

It has been argued that since use of a particular orbital slot
 
by a geostationary satellite is temporary, the requirement
 
of permanence is absent and the use of the orbital slot cannot
 
be considered an "appropriation" within the meaning of
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Article 11. 3 3 Other authorities conclude that national use of
 
particular segments of the orbital arc deprives other states of
 
the opportunity to use the same area and therefore constitutes
 
appropriation through occupation. 34 The key issue is the
 
permanence of the use. Evaluation of the economic viability
 
of a satellite power system is based on the assumption that
 
the system would operate for up to thirty years.3 5 Although
 
that period is extended, it does not indicate the permanence
 
necessary to invoke the prohibitions of Article II. However,
 
longer periods could exceed the limit and come within the
 
purview of Article II.
 
The third issue raised by the Article II prohibition focuses
 
on the identity of the system operator. Article II appears to
 
prohibit only national appropriation, suggesting that even
 
permanent use of an orbital slot by international organizations
 
or commercial entities would not necessarily constitute a viola­
36
 
tion of that provision, Consequently, a commercial consortium
 
would not be prohibited under Article II from maintaining a
 
solar power, earth resources or communications satellite in a
 
particular orbital slot for an indefinite period. Similarly,
 
subject to establishment of a clear distinction from other types
 
of organizations, an "international" organization would not be
 
prohibited either from operating a similar system or allocating
 
orbital slots among its members. For that reason, the activities
 
of the International Telecommunication Union described below
 
in Section III relating to the management of the geostationary
 
orbit do not violate Article II.
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Three potential limitations on these conclusions should be
 
noted. First, the interpretation set forth above would not
 
permit commercial or international organizations from claiming
 
exclusive rights to a particular area of outer space in the
 
absence of actual use. Thus, if such an organization had
 
maintained a satellite in a specific orbital slot for a sub­
stantial period of time and the satellite's station-keeping
 
systems subsequently failed, the organization would not be
 
entitled to prevent any other entity from occupying that slot
 
pending orbiting a replacement satellite by the original
 
occupant. Second, if an entity were established which although
 
commercial in form was essentially under the control of the
 
government of the country in which it is organized, permanent
 
use would constitute national, as distinguished from non-national,
 
appropriation.3 7 Third, dispute has arisen regarding the
 
minimum standard of universality which would determine whether
 
an international organization would be implicitly exempted
 
from the rule of non-appropriation. Professor Jenks has argued
 
that only the United Nations as a representative of the whole
 
international community should be exempt. 38 Presumably any inter­
governmental organization of relatively universal membership
 
satisfies the minimum standard. However, some question remains
 
regarding the exemption of an organization composed of a limited
 
3 9
 
number of governments.
 
Thus, the Article II prohibition against the appropriation
 
of outer space applies to exclusive use of a segment of the
 
geostationary orbit. However, the prohibition does not apply
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to the activities of either non-governmental entities or
 
relatively comprehensive international organizations. The
 
implications of the non-appropriation provision for space
 
industrial activities are further limited by the conclusion
 
that since the use contemplated is not permanent, exclusive use
 
for a limited period of time would not constitute "appropriation"
 
as that term is used in Article II. Hence, regardless of the
 
operating entity's institutional structure, it can expect to
 
conduct industrial activities in geostationary orbit without
 
concern that its action violates Article II.
 
C. Article III
 
Another fundamental principle affecting the utilization of
 
outer space is the general applicability of international law
 
as embodied in Article III, which provides:
 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on
 
activities in the exploration and use of outer space,
 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in
 
accordance with international law, including the
 
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
 
maintaining international peace and security and
 
promoting international co-operation and understanding.
 
As suggested in Subsections A and B above, Article III, through
 
its reference to the United Nations Charter, affects industrial
 
development of outer space, first, because it prohibits the
 
aggressive use of military force, and second, because it does
 
not prohibit the use of economic leverage for political
 
purposes. In both cases, the key is Article 2(4) of the
 
United Nations Charter which provides:
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All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain
 
in their international relations from the threat
 
or use of force against the territorial integrity
 
or political independence of any state, or in any
 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
 
Nations.
 
Interpretation of this provision in light of the remainder
 
of the Charter suggests that the use of armed force is prohibited,
 
except under certain specified circumstances when the use of
 
force in self-defense is authorized.4 0 Consequently, under
 
Article III use of outer space for defensive purposes is not
 
prohibited. That conclusion is strengthened by the language of
 
Article IV as described below in Section I.D.
 
In connection with the analysis of Article I(1) in
 
Section I.A. above, it was suggested that international law
 
would not prohibit the operator of a space industrial facility
 
from engaging in economic competition with other countries
 
which produce similar products or from using the-availability
 
of the products of those facilities to exert economic pressure
 
on consuming countries as a means of political persuasion.
 
Construction of Article 2(4) of the Charter limiting its
 
prohibition to the use of armed force is a significant part of
 
the conceptual underpinnings of that proposition. The conclu­
sion that economic leverage is not prohibited under Article 2(4)
 
41
 
is supported by significant authority. In addition, that
 
conclusion is consistent with prevailing general international
 
law. 4 2 As a result, the system operator need not be concerned
 
that any means of selecting or limiting consumers of the system's
 
products contravenes existing international law.
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D. 	Article IV
 
Some of the applications listed in Part I could be converted
 
to military purposes. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty,
 
which limits these possibilities, provides in part.
 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to
 
place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying

nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
 
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
 
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
 
any other manner.
 
The 	language of Article IV raises two main issues:
 
1. the implications for industrial development of outer
 
space of the Article IV prohibition against the
 
stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit;
 
and
 
2. 	the impact on Article IV on plans to establish military
 
facilities in orbit for the protection of a satellite
 
power system from attack.
 
In Section I.A.2. above, analysis of Article IV in the
 
context of the concept of the exclusive use of outer space for
 
peaceful purposes suggested, among others, the conclusion
 
that Articles I(1) and IV~l) implicitly authorize the esta­
blishment of military installations and weapons systems
 
in outer space -- but not on the celestial bodies -- which are
 
exclusively defensive in nature, provided they do not contain
 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Of the
 
activities described in Part I, only satellite power systems
 
and their microwave or laser transmission beams appear likely
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to be adaptable for direct use as weapons. The possibility
 
that the products of industrial facilities in outer space
 
could be used for military purposes is discussed in Section I.A.2.
 
above.
 
Because of the nature of the transmission beam, the argu­
ment may be made that the establishment of a satellite power
 
system potentially constitutes the stationing of a weapon of
 
mass destruction in outer space in violation of Article IV.
 
The system operator can make at least three responses. First,
 
the system is designed not as a weapon but as a utilitarian
 
device for the efficient use of solar resources. Any of the
 
present designs incorporates a series of safety devices to
 
terminate transmission of power when the transmission beam
 
moves outside the intended reception area.43 Although the
 
selection of a laser transmission beam could constitute a
 
safety hazard, the tendency among designers is toward the use
 
of a microwave beam which is considered less dangerous.44
 
Nonetheless, the potential harm from a microwave beam should
 
not be underestimated.4 5 Second, in geostationary orbit the
 
satellite's configuration and location would limit its use as
 
a weapon. Third, the system is not likely to be operated by
 
military or national security entities and is therefore less
 
susceptible to use as a weapon. Thus, although use of a satel­
lite power system as a weapon is clearly prohibited under
 
Article I.V.(l), the probability of such use as well as the
 
value thereof is rather small.
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Application of Article IV to the establishment of military
 
installations in space to protect space industrial facilities
 
is somewhat more complex. Once established, space industrial
 
facilities, especially those in geostationary orbit, would
 
present a desirable target for military or terrorist action.
 
The large size of power generation and manufacturing structures
 
would increase the margin of error for targeting purposes and
 
therefore decrease the level of military sophistication
 
required to ensure reasonable probability of a successful
 
attack. In addition, the potential importance of industrial
 
facilities to a nation's economic, political and military
 
potential suggests that destruction of the system would be
 
assigned a high priority in time of military or political
 
conflict. Finally, because an attack on the system could
 
create significant social and political impact without
 
jeopardizing human life, the system would represent a desirable
 
target for symbolic actions.
 
In theory, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the
 
procedure established in the Convention on International
 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects would provide
 
remedies for any damage except that caused by actions taken,
 
against the system not involving a space object. A laser
 
attack originating from a terrestrial installation is a
 
possible example. However, the procedures established by
 
treaty are not likely to be effective, especially in cases of
 
deliberate destruction. First, extensive delays must be
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anticipated prior to resumption of service, with obvious
 
consequences for the launching state's economic stability.
 
Second, since diplomatic claims settlement procedures are
 
involved, full recovery of damages specified in Article XII
 
of the Convention in Liability is not likely, first, because
 
damage claims are often discounted, and second, because few
 
countries have the economic capacity to repay the cost of
 
establishing a space installation. Third, a successful attack
 
could create potential hazards from debris in space and, in
 
the case of satellite power systems, from transmission beam
 
spillover on the earth's surface.
 
In light of the foregoing considerations, some means of
 
military protection is considered desirable. Terrestrial
 
weapons systems are likely to be limited in their ability to
 
defend space installations against attack either from outer
 
space or from the earth. Hence, some form of defensive weapons
 
system stationed in space in a position to protect the satellite
 
power system appears necessary.
 
In Section I.A.2., an analysis of Articles I(i) and IV
 
and the concept that outer space should be used exclusively for
 
peaceful purposes led to two main conclusions:
 
1. 	the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass
 
destruction in outer space is prohibited;
 
2. 	military activity in outer space is not prohibited if
 
it is defensive or non-aggressive in nature.
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The same principles apply to the establishment of a weapons
 
system in space for the protection of the space segment of
 
space industrial facilities. In principle, Articles I(1),
 
t 
III and IV do not prohibit the establishment of such a weapons
 
system provided it does not incorporate weapons of mass
 
destruction or require the use of installations on the moon
 
or other celestial bodies.
 
Some difficulty could arise, however, if a protective
 
system were incorporated which purported to be defensive in
 
nature but which could be trained on earth or other celestial
 
bodies, or upon large space objects and used for aggressive as
 
well as defensive purposes. Although it could be argued that
 
the exigencies of national security and modern warfare
 
require such flexibility, the dual purpose approach would
 
undermine the rationale for omitting defensive weapons systems
 
from the prohibitions of Article IV. As a result, such systems
 
may be considered unlawful to the extent that they are capable
 
of inflicting mass destruction.
 
E. Article VI
4 6
 
Article VI, which establishes the foundations for inter­
national responsibility for activities in outer space provides:
 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear inter­
national responsibility for national activities in
 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial
 
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
 
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities,
 
and for assuring that national activities are carried
 
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in
 
the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental
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entities in outer space, including the moon and other
 
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and
 
continuing supervision by the State concerned. When
 
activities are carried on in outer space, including

the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international
 
organization, responsibility for compliance with
 
this Treaty shall be borne both by the international
 
organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty

participating in such organization.
 
Thus, each state which is a party to the treaty is charged with
 
the obligation, first, to ensure that the activities of its
 
nationals comply with the provisions of the treaty, and second,
 
to accept responsibility for those activities which contravene
 
applicable provisions. In this manner, states are unable to
 
avoid the duty of compliance through the use of institutional
 
configurations which do not involve elements of the national
 
government. 4 7 Consequently, the responsibility of each state's
 
government is not affected by the juridical character of the
 
entity actually operating the satellite power system.
 
A state's duty to supervise the activities of its nationals
 
for practical purposes probably prohibits unregulated,
 
private undertakings. 4 8 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
 
reinforces the obligation by requiring the state under whose
 
registry an object is launched into outer space to retain control
 
and jurisdiction. In light of the potentially hazardous
 
character of many activities related to industrial development
 
in outer space, especially satellite power generation, the policy
 
considerations underlying Article VI suggest the need for
 
relatively strict supervision. 4 9 The provisions of Article VII
 
and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
 
by Space Objects,so which impose liability on the launching
 
state for damage resulting from space activity, are likely to
 
give rise to practical and foreign policy considerations which
 
create pressure upon national governments to exercise the
 
supervision necessary to ensure protection against the potential
 
hazards of orbital power generation.
 
Although governments are required to ensure compliance of
 
their respective nationals with appropriate provisions of the
 
treaty, Article VI does not have the effect of subjecting
 
non-governmental entities to provisions which would otherwise
 
not apply to them. For example, as suggested above in
 
Section II.A., Article II does not apply either to private
 
sector entities or to international organizations. Although
 
terms of Article VI require states parties to the treaty to
 
ensure compliance of their nationals with its provisions,
 
Article VI does not extend the prohibition against appropriation
 
to entities which are not covered by the terms of Article II.
 
F. Article VII
 
Article VII, which embodies the fundamental principles
 
governing liability for danger arising from space activities,
 
provides.
 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or
 
procures the launching of an object into outer space,
 
including the moon, and other celestial bodies, and
 
each State Party from whose territory or facility an
 
object is launched, is internationally liable for
 
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its
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natural or juridical persons by such object or its
 
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer
 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
 
Because of the wide range of potential environmental and other
 
hazards which could be created by establishment and operation
 
of space industrial facilities, the question of liability is
 
particularly significant. Potential injuries include:
 
1. 	Damage to body tissue of humans and wildlife exposed
 
to nuclear and electromagnetic radiation;
 
2. 	Radio frequency interferencc;
 
3. 	Interference with electronic instrumentation, especially
 
devices associated with medical, navigation, and
 
explosives detonation activities; and
 
4. 	Environmental modification, including weather and
 
climate alteration, resulting from increased heat
 
generation and interaction of the transmission beam
 
and launch vehicle exhausts with the upper atmosphere
 
and ionosphere.5
1
 
If injury results from the operation of a satellite power system,
 
the injured party is entitled to redress under Article VII.
 
Under its terms, the state which procured the launch of the
 
vehicle causing the injury and the state which launched the
 
space object are internationally liable to the entity actually
 
injured, or to its national government. The language of
 
Article VII raises two main issues.
 
1. 	the meaning of the word "damage"; and
 
2. 	the meaning of the phrase "internationally liable."
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Although the terms of Article VII provide no guidance on these
 
issues, the broad principles of Article VII were implemented
 
in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
 
by Space Objects. Since Article VII raises no issues which are
 
distinguishable from those raised by application of the
 
Liability Convention to space industrialization, discussion
 
of the Article VII principles is incorporated in Section II
 
of this Part, which examines the Liability Convention.
 
G. Article VIII
 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, pertaining to
 
the ownership and control of objects in outer space provides:
 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an
 
object launched into outer space is carried shall
 
retain jurisdiction and control over such object,
 
and over any personnel therefor, while in outer space
 
or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched
 
into outer space, including objects landed or constructed
 
on a celestial body, and of their component parts,
 
is not affected by their presence in outer space
 
or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth.
 
Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits
 
of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry
 
they are carried shall be returned to that State,
 
which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data
 
prior to their return.
 
The first sentence assists implementation of the provisions
 
of Articles VI and VII relating to international responsibility
 
and liability for activities in outer space, particularly
 
over nationals operating in non-governmental capacities.
 
Although the nature and scope of national control is likely
 
to vary from country to country, possibly giving rise to a
 
"flag of convenience" practice in outer space, Article VIII is
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likely to introduce or increase regulatory limitations on
 
industrial development in outer space. Consequently, entities
 
which are interested in participating in the development of
 
outer space should anticipate that current developments in
 
regulatory concepts and practices are likely to serve as
 
precedents for regulation of space activities. Hence, those
 
entities should consider whether regulatory developments in
 
relevant areas, both substantive and geographic, should be
 
monitored for purposes of identifying trends and formulating
 
plans for participating in the evolution of regulatory structures.
 
The second sentence is considered extremely important
 
to institution of operational industrial services in outer
 
space. By protecting the rights of ownership as established
 
in accordance with traditional international law, Article VIII
 
provides the basis for industrialization of outer space under
 
both commercial and national governmental organizational
 
structures. As suggested below in Section IV, the capital
 
investment necessary to develop, establish and operate a
 
satellite power system would be deterred or completely prevented
 
if rights of ownership are not protected.
 
H. Article IX
 
Article IX, the final provision of the Outer Space Treaty
 
which is likely to affect the industrialization of outer space,
 
provides:
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In the exploration and use of outer space,

including the moon and other celestial bodies, States
 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle

of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall
 
conduct all their activities in outer space, including

the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard
 
to the corresponding interests of all other States
 
Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty

shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
 
moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct explora­
tion of them so as to avoid their harmful contamina­
tion and also adverse changes in the environment of
 
the Barth resulting from the introduction of extra­
terrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt

appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State
 
Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an
 
activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals
 
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
 
bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference
 
with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful

exploration and use of outer space, including the
 
moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake
 
appropriate international consultations before pro­
ceeding with any such activity or experiment. A
 
State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe
 
that an activity or experiment planned by another
 
State Party in outer space, including the moon
 
and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially
 
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful

exploration and use of outer space, including the
 
moon and other celestial bodies, may request consulta­
tion concerning the activity or experiment.
 
Like Article II, Article IX operates as a limit on the
 
"free use" principle of Article [(2). The key provision
 
contained in the first sentence of Article IX requires states
 
to "conduct all their activities in outer space . ., with 
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States
 
52
 
Parties to the Treaty. The remaining three sentences
 
implement the "due regard" requirement.53
 
The limitation contained in the first sentence is particu­
larly relevant to the use of the geostationary orbit, where
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the problem of conflicting uses is complicated, first, by
 
potential interference among satellites which are located in
 
proximity to one another, and second, by disputes between
 
countries which intend to use a particular orbital slot in.the
 
present or the near future and countries which plan to use the
 
same slot in the more distant future and which are therefore
 
concerned about preserving their future interests. In an effort
 
to promote resolution of these potential conflicts, Article IX
 
provides the basis for consultation among the concerned parties.
5 4
 
The general policies of Article IX are applied to the utilization
 
of the geostationary orbit by the International Telecommunication
 
Convention and the Radio Regulations periodically revised by
 
ITU conferences.
 
The second sentence, which requires states parties to
 
the treaty to conduct activities in outer space so as to
 
avoid both harmful contamination of outer space and adverse
 
changes in the earth's environment resulting from the intro­
duction of extraterrestrial matter, could limit operation
 
of space industrial facilities, if liberally construed. On its
 
face, the second sentence is limited to environmental hazards
 
potentially created by extraterrestrial matter brought within
 
the earth's biosphere. Although the distinction between matter
 
and energy is not yet precisely defined for these purposes,
 
the passage of the satellite power system transmission beam,
 
for example, through the earth's atmosphere appears to fall
 
outside the scope of the second sentence.
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However, the combination of the first two sentences may
 
have the effect of extending the prohibition to the introduction
 
of any physical phenomenon which could adversely affect the
 
earth's environment. The first sentence implicitly incorporates
 
at least conceptually the requirement of Article I(1) that outer
 
space be used "for the benefit and in the interest of all
 
countries." To the extent the two provisions are coextensive,
 
the first sentence would require space powers to conduct their
 
space activities in a manner which does not prejudice the
 
"corxesponding" interests of non-participants. The definition
 
of the term "corresponding" is not clarified, but presumably
 
encompasses both space and terrestrial interests likely to be
 
affected by space activities, in a manner comparable to the
 
"common interests" clause of Article I(1).56 Consequently,
 
Article IX requires that consideration be given to the elimina­
tion of the adverse effects listed above, 57 especially to the
 
extent they effect the interests of states other than the state
 
conducting the activity in question.
 
The third and fourth sentences establish a minimum
 
standard for "due consideration." If the state undertaking
 
the activity has reason to believe that activities planned
 
by its nationals are likely to cause harmful interference with
 
the activities of other states parties to the treaty, it is
 
obligated to "undertake appropriate international consultations"
 
with the affected states prior to implementation of its plans.
 
Similarly, if one party has reason to believe that the activities
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of another party would cause potentially harmful interference
 
with activities relating to the explora-tion and use of outer
 
space, the former may request such consultations, even if its
 
own activities would not be adversely affected. 58 The consulta­
tion provisions raise three key issues.
 
1. 	when does a party have sufficient "reason to believe"
 
that harmful interference would result from the planned
 
activities?
 
2. 	what constitutes harmful interference9
 
3. 	what are the characteristics of "appropriate interna­
tional consultations?
 
Under the language of the third sentence of Article IX,
 
the obligation of a state planning to engage in space activity
 
becomes operative when it has "reason to believe" that execution
 
of plans would cause harmful interference with the activities of
 
other states in outer space. Thus, the determination that the
 
obligation has become operative is solely within the discretion
 
of the launching state. If it lacks sufficient information
 
relating either to interference factors or to the plans of
 
existing space activities of other states, the launching state
 
is authorized to proceed without consultation. 59 The scope of
 
this discretion may be limited, however, by communications from
 
states whose space activities would be adversely affected or from
 
third states to the launching states informing the latter of
 
potential interference and requesting consultations as provided
 
in the fourth sentence of Article IX.
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Article IX does not provide a clear standard for determining
 
when the activities of one state "could cause potentially
 
harmful interference" with the activities of another. 'The
 
language of the third sentence suggests that only interferences
 
with the space activities, as distinguished from the earth­
bound activities, of another state are relevant; however, since
 
a large proportion of space activity necessarily involves
 
support activities on the earth's surface, interference with
 
those also gives rise to the consultative obligation of
 
Article IX. 60 Further, interference can only occur with respect
 
61
 
to activities which constitute "peaceful uses of outer space.
 
Presumably, the term "interference" is used in its ordinary
 
meaning to signify conflicting uses resulting in obstruction,
 
creation of significant hazards or significantly diminishing
 
the efficiency of space activities.
 
The characteristics of "appropriate international consul­
tations" are left undefined. From the context, the term
 
'"consultation"refers to the joint examination -- including
 
the exchange of relevant information -- of the proposed
 
activities and the probable consequences for each consulting
 
party's interests. 62 Since the term "consultation" was
 
selected by the drafters of Article IX, the parties are obliged
 
only to make a good faith effort to conduct the joint examination
 
with a view to reaching satisfactory resolution of conflicts
 
among the consulting states. However, Article IX imposes no
 
obligation to achieve reconciliation. Although the form or
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forum of consultation is not significant, the consultation must
 
involve either diplomatic or scientific elements of the affected
 
governments. As emphasized by the use of the word "interna­
tional," the duty to consult is primarily bilateral in nature
 
although consultation under the auspices of an intergovernmental
 
organization is not precluded. 64 The suggestion that Article IX
 
consultation must include all parties to the Outer Space Treaty
 
cannot be supported.65
 
Thus, Article IX would require operators of space indus­
trial facilities to conduct their activities with due regard
 
at least to the space activities of other states. Although
 
that requirement is likely to affect most directly the use of
 
the geostationary orbit, it imposes a duty to remain alert to
 
the possibility of adversely affecting the space interests of
 
other states. In those cases where adverse consequences are
 
likely, the operator is required to consult in good faith with
 
the affected parties, with a view to the elimination of those
 
consequences. However, the Article IX duty to enter into
 
appropriate consultations does not impose an obligation to
 
accept unnecessary restrictions on the operation of industrial
 
facilities in space. Nonetheless, participation in such
 
consultations by the government of the state whose nationals
 
are conducting the space operations in question must be antici­
pated. Such participation is likely to limit the flexibility
 
of space industrialists in their consultations, by applying
 
pressure based on national foreign policy interests.
 
-45-

II. 	 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED
 
BY SPACE OBJECTS
 
Article VII of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty established
 
a basis for the imposition of liability for damage or injury
 
caused by a space object. However, due to the general nature
 
of its provisions, Article VII did not create specific principles
 
directly applicable to damage actually resulting from space
 
activity. In an effort to formulate appropriate principles,
 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (CPUOS)
 
stepped up its consideration of questions of liability. As a
 
result, a draft convention was submitted to the General
 
Assembly and adopted on November 29, 1971, in Resolution
 
2777 (XXVI).I The convention entered into force for the United
 
States on October 9, 1973. In its present form, the convention
 
contains six main sections:
 
1. 	Articles I-VII establish the fundamental principles
 
of liability and scope of coverage,
 
2. 	Articles VIII-XX set forth guidelines for presentation
 
and prosecution of claims,
 
3. 	Article XXI provides for special assistance in the
 
case of damage on a massive scale;
 
4. 	Article XXII generally applies the rules of liability
 
to international intergovernmental organizations;
 
5. 	Article XXIII limits the convention's impact on other
 
international agreements; and
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6. 	Articles XXIV-XXVIII establish the procedures for
 
signature, amendment and entry into force of the
 
Convention.
 
A. 	Articles I-VII
 
Article I contributes to the delimitation of the scope
 
of the convention, through its definitions of "damage" and
 
"launching state." Article I(a) defines "damage" to mean
 
loss of life, personal injury or other impairment 
of health, or loss of or damage to property of States 
or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of 
international intergovernmental organizations . . 
Although undoubtedly covering damage directly resulting from
 
launch or operation of a space object, that language leaves
 
open the question whether the definition covers consequential or
 
non-physical damage. 3 Since many of the potential damage categories
 
associated with space industrialization4 are either consequen­
tial or non-physical in nature, the ambiguity is significant
 
for entities potentially involved in space activities. A
 
survey of relevant authority suggests that the range of damage
 
categories intended to be covered is relatively broad.5
 
Consequently, impairment of mental and social well-being are
 
likely to be covered.6 Loss of consortium, other forms of
 
"moral" damage, as well as forms of non-physical damage,
 
including electronic interference are probably not covered.
7
 
The second element of Article I which contributes to the
 
definition pf the convention's scope is Paragraph (c) which
 
defines the term "launching State" to mean.
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(i) A State which launches or procures the
 
launching of a space object
 
(ii) A State from whose territory or facility
 
a space object is launched .
 
This definition is significant, since the liability described
 
in subsequent articles is imposed on the "launching State."
 
The content of Article I(c) is based on Article VII of the
 
Outer Space Treaty and is consistent therewith. As discussed
 
in greater detail below,8 the possibility that liability could
 
be imposed on three separate governments for damage caused by a
 
space object raises procedural complications which must be antipated.
9
 
Another ambiguity is created by the definition in Article I(d)
 
of the term "space object," which provides-

Cd) The term "space object" includes component
 
parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle
 
and parts therof.
 
Although by its terms, Article I(d) clearly covers a launch
 
vehicle and each of its components, as well as a "space object"
 
and its components, the language does not provide clear
 
guidance regarding the nature of a "space object." That term
 
is used in the Outer Space Treaty to describe objects launched
 
into outer space (Articles VII and VIII), objects in orbit
 
around the earth (Article IV) or objects which are simply
 
launched (Article X).1 0  Natural objects such as asteroids
 
are probably excluded unless some means of independent propulsion
 
were constructed on it. 11 Similarly, a question may be raised
 
regarding the status of objects which are manufactured or
 
assembled in orbit.
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Other limits on the applicability of the convention are
 
contained in Article VII, which excludes from coverage:
 
(a) Nationals of [the] launching State;
 
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they
 
are participating in the operation of [a] space
 
object from the time of its launching or at any
 
stage thereafter until its descent, or during such
 
time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a
 
planned launching or recovery area as the result of
 
an invitation by that launching State.
 
As a result, nationals of the launching state are limited
 
to the judicial or administrative remedies provided by the
 
law of the launching state. Presumably foreign nationals
 
participating in the launch, operation and recovery of a
 
space object would be limited to the same remedies.
 
Once it is ascertained, first, that the injury sustained
 
falls within the scope of the term "damage" and resulted from
 
the operation of a "space object" as those terms-are defined
 
in Article I, the convention imposes liability upon the
 
"launching State." The nature of the liability depends upon
 
the location at which the damage occurred. Thus, if a space
 
object causes damage on the surface of the earth or to an
 
aircraft in flight, Article II provides that the "launching
 
State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation" for the
 
damage. In that case no proof of negligence is required and
 
the launching state is liable even though it is able to demon­
strate that it complied with all applicable standards of care.

Thus, if industrial activities in space result in injuries or
 
damage to property on the earth's surface or while travelling
 
12 
-49­
in an aircraft, the launching state would be liable to pay
 
compensation upon demonstration
 
1. that the injury occurred, and
 
2. that it resulted from the operation of space
 
industrial facilities.
13
 
The rationale for absolute liability is, first, that space
 
acitivity is "ultrahazardous," and necessarily involves a
 
risk of serious harm which cannot be eliminated by the exercise
 
of utmost care, 14 and second, that the ability of a claimant
 
state to demonstrate fault on the part of a launching is likely
 
to be relatively limited.15
 
A possible weakness in the protection granted by Article II
 
is based on the contention that it appears to not cover damage
 
in airspace which does not affect aircraft in flight. 16 This
 
omission is partially remedied by the likelihood that damage
 
in the earth's atmosphere will result in injuries on the
 
earth's surface which would constitute "damage" as that term
 
is used in the Liability Convention. However, liability may
 
be avoided by establishing that "the damage has resulted
 
either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an
 
act of omission done with intent to cause damage on the part
 
of the claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it
 
represents," as provided in Article VI(1). In contrast,'if
 
damage is suffered in outer space, the launching state is
 
liable for compensation to the injured party under the terms of
 
Article III only upon a demonstration of fault of the launching
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state or of persons for whom it is liable.17 The rationale
 
for differing treatment is based on the contention that the
 
absolute liabflity imposed under Article II would be inappro­
priate for collisions between space objects, since the operator
 
of the more costly object would collect the difference
 
between the values of the space objects, even if the collision
 
were caused completely or preponderantly by the acts of the
 
more costly space object.18  However, as a practical matter,
 
the difficulty of demonstrating fault is likely to mean that
 
in the event of damage to space objects, each party is likely
 
to bear its own loss except in exceptional cases.19 For both
 
Articles II and III, the measure of damages is determined
 
under Article XII which provides that when compensation is
 
granted under the convention, the amount
 
shall be determined in accordance with international 
law and the principles of justice and equity in order 
to provide such reparation . . . as will restore the 
person, natural or juridical, State or international 
organization on whose behalf the claim is presented 
to the condition which could have existed if the 
damage had not occurred. 
Articles IV, V and VI introduce refinements of the general
 
framework established in Articles II and III. Under Article IV(l),
 
if damage is caused somewhere other than on the surface of the
 
earth to the citizens of one state or their property as the
 
result of the activities of a second state, and that interaction
 
results in injury to the citizens or property of a third state,
 
the first two are jointly and severally liable to the third
 
state. If under Subparagraphs (a) and (b), the damage to the
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third state occurs on the surface of the earth or to aircraft
 
in flight, the liability is absolute; however, if damage is
 
sustained by the third state's space objects to passengers or
 
property on board, liability is based on fault. Paragraph 2
 
of Article IV apportions the liability between the first two
 
states according to the extent to which each was at fault.
 
If no comparative fault can be established, the liability
 
is divided equally. Nonetheless, Article IV(2) expressly
 
preserves the right of the third state to seek the entire
 
compensation from any of the states which are jointly or
 
severally liable.
 
Article V de-fines liability in cases in which two or more
 
states jointly launch a space object. Under paragraph 1,
 
all participating states are jointly and severally liable.
 
After a state has paid compensation for damage caused by a
 
jointly launched space object, it is entitled to seek compen­
sation from other participants in the joint launching. The
 
extent of each participant's liability may be determined by
 
agreements among the participants, but such agreements do not
 
prejudice the right of the state whose nationals have sustained
 
damages to seek the full compensation from any or all of the
 
launching states. Paragraph 3 includes among the participants
 
the states from whose territory or facility a space ob3ect is
 
launched. The language of Article V provides little guidance
 
with respect to the definition of a joint launching. For
 
example, the question may be raised whether a state is a
 
participant or a joint launching state if.
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1. 	it is responsible for a relatively minor experiment
 
package on board the space object;
 
2. 	its nationals manufacture or supply a minor component
 
part; or
 
3. 	it is represented at launch by a technical observer.20
 
Finally, Article VI exonerates a launching state from
 
absolute liability if it can establish that the damage resulted
 
either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an
 
act 	or omission done with intent to cause damage which may
 
be ascribed to the claimant state or to th9 natural or juridical
 
persons which it'represents. However, Paragraph 2 prevents
 
exoneration where the damage resulted from activities of,the
 
launching state which were not conducted in accordance with
 
the applicable principles of international law, especially
 
the United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty.
 
Two main problems of construction are raised by the terms
 
of Article VI. First, the meafling of "gross negligence" is
 
left undefined and is subject to dispute. Second, the question
 
may 	be raised whether exoneration from absolute liability under
 
Article VI(l) relieves the launching state from all liability.
 
Some contend that Article VI(l) should be construed to relieve
 
liability only to the extent that the conduct of the nationals of
 
the claimant state caused the damage in question. 21
 
B. 	Articles VIII - XX
 
Articles VIII through XX of the Liability Convention
 
establish procedural guidelines for the presentation and
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prosecution of claims. Article VIII identifies the states
 
which are entitled to advance claims. Paragraph 1 authorizes
 
the state which has actually sustained damage or whose nationals
 
have suffered personal injury or property damage to present a
 
claim for compensation. However, under Paragraph 3 if the
 
state of nationality has not presented a claim, the state in
 
whose territory the damage occurred may demand compensation,
 
regardless of the nationality of the entity actually sustaining
 
damage. If neither of the first two governments has sponsored or
 
stated its intention to sponsor a claim, any state may present a
 
demand for compensation for damage actually suffered by any of
 
its permanent residents.
 
Article VIII has the effect of expanding the traditional
 
rule that only the state of nationality is authorized to
 
present a claim for damages. 22 However, the number of authorized
 
claimants presents three main problems. First, Article VIII
 
does not define the period of time within which the state of
 
nationality or the state within whose territory the damage
 
occurred must act to preserve its right. Second, Article VIII(2)
 
doe's not require the latter to ascertain whether the state of
 
23 
nationality intends to present a claim. Finally, the text
 
of this article does not solve the question of authorized
 
representation if under Paragraphs 2 or 3 a claim is properly
 
presented and the state of nationality presents a subsequent
 
claim. This question is particularly important to space
 
industrialists, in light of the general rule that a state
 
presenting an international claim is not obligated to pay any
 
compensation to the party actually injured. 24 If the state
 
of nationality were permitted to recover compensation from the
 
launching state, the injured party could reasonably expect
 
that political and economic considerations would motivate the
 
state of nationality to convey all or part of the compensation
 
to its injured nationals. However, if the state in whose
 
territory the injury actually occurred recovers, the injured
 
party would have a diminished prospect of recovery, since it
 
would possess a limited ability to exert effective political
 
pressure. This concern is diminished somewhat by the terms of
 
Article XI(2) which permits the injured party to seek redress
 
in the courts or administrative tribunals of the launching state.
 
Article IX places the claims procedure on a diplomatic
 
basis, subject to the provision for judicial or administrative
 
relief contained in Article XI(2). Time limits for the pre­
sentation of claims are established in Article X which has
 
the effect of establishing a one-year statute of limitation
 
measured from the date of occurrence or the date of identifi­
cation of the launching state, or the date on which the
 
claimant state could reasonably be expected to have discovered
 
those facts through the exercise of due diligence. However,
 
in cases in which the full extent of the damage is not
 
immediately determinable, the claimant state is entitled to
 
revise the claim and submit additional documentation until
 
one year after the full extent of the damage is known.
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Article XI(l) introduces an innovation into the practice
 
of states regarding international claims. Traditional rules
 
require the claimant to exhaust available local remedies prior
 
25
 
to the presentation of the claim through diplomatic channels.

However, for the types of injuries covered by the convention,
 
Article XI(l) expressly nullifies the traditional rule with
 
respect to local remedies available either to the claimant
 
state or to the natural or juridical entities represented by
 
the state under authority granted by Article VIII.
 
As noted above, as an alternative to diplomatic claims
 
procedures, Article XI(2) preserves the right of a state or
 
the natural or juridical persons it represents to pursue
 
administrative or judicial remedies available under the law
 
of the launching state. Thus, Paragraph 2 enables the injured
 
party to proceed directly against the party directly responsible
 
for the injury, potentially including parts manufacturers and
 
system operators. Depending on'the law of the launching state,
 
relief may also be available against the government of the
 
launching state. However, recovery under this direct approach
 
is likely to be limited, first, to the damage actually caused
 
by government officers and employees, and second, by the
 
problems inherent in judicial and administrative actions
 
between sovereign and non-sovereign parties.
 
A second problem posed by Article XI(2) is that as a
 
practical matter the decision to pursue a remedy under Paragraph 2
 
is likely to amount to waiver of a claim through diplomatic
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channels, since the second sentence of Paragraph 2 denies a
 
claimant state the right to present through diplomatic channels
 
a demand for compensation which relates to the same damage
 
or injury which serves as the basis for judicial or administra­
tive action under the law of the launching state. That
 
provision raises two questions. The prohibition on simultaneous
 
pursuit of parallel remedies combined with the consideration
 
that the time normally required to litigate a substantial claim
 
is likely to exceed one year would probably prevent presentation
 
of a subsequent claim through diplomatic channels. Hence, if
 
the statute of limitations for judicial or administrative
 
actions exceeds one year, the injured party should consider
 
delaying initiation of such actions pending determination of
 
diplomatic claims. The latter possibility raises the questions,
 
first, whether the judicial or administrative claim would be
 
barred by res judicata or related principles, and second,
 
whether the time limit for presentation of a claim established
 
in Article X applies to judicial and administrative actions
 
as well as to diplomatic claims. Although the language of
 
Article X does not directly answer the latt6r question, the
 
choice of words and Article X's relationship to Articles VIII
 
and IX suggests that its impact is limited to diplimatic
 
claims.
 
The measure of compensation to be paid to the claimant
 
state is to be determined under Article XII
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in accordance with international law and the principles
 
of justice and equity in order to provide such
 
reparation . . . as will restore the person, natural
 
or juridical, State or international organization
 
on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition
 
which could have existed if the damage had not
 
occurred.
 
From the perspective of space industrialists, the standard
 
is unsatisfactory, due to its vagueness. Particularly problematic
 
is the question of availability of interest from the time the
 
damage occurred, lost profits and the costs of pursuing the
 
claim. Article XII is supplemented by Article XIII which
 
requires the launching state to pay any compensation due in
 
the currency of the claimant state, unless the latter requests
 
payment in the currency of the launching state, or unless the
 
two states agree on some other form of compensation.
 
Articles XIV-XX provide for the establishment of a claims
 
commission to settle claims which are presented but are not
 
resolved through diplomatic procedures. In general these
 
procedures do not directly affect the interests of entities
 
contemplating industrialization of outer space. Nonetheless,
 
three provisions should be noted. First, Article XIV requires
 
the claimant and launching states to form a claims commission
 
if a claim presented through diplomatic channels in accordance
 
with the provisions of Article IX is not resolved within one
 
year from the date the claim is presented. Second, the claims
 
commission is authorized under Article XVIII to determine the
 
merits of the claimant to fix the amount of compensation, if
 
any, to be paid. Finally, Article XIX(2) provides:
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The decision of the Commission shall be final
 
and binding if the parties have so agreed' otherwise
 
the Commission shall render a final and recommendatory
 
award, which the parties shall consider in good
 
faith. The Commission shall state the reasons for
 
its decision or award.
 
The fact that decisions of the commission are binding only
 
if the states forming the commission so agree further weakens
 
the protections offered by the convention to potential space
 
entrepreneurs.
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III. 	 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONVENTION AND ITU
 
RADIO REGULATIONS
 
The third major international instrument which is likely
 
to influence industrial development in outer space is the
 
International Telecommunication Convention1 and the Radio
 
Regulations promulgated by the International Telecommunication
 
Union (ITU) under authority granted in the convention. The
 
principles embodied in the Convention and the Radio Regulations
 
are likely to be most important for space industrial installa­
tions which require utilization of the geostationary orbit.
2
 
As suggested above, 3 Articles I, II and IX of the Outer
 
Space Treaty establish general principles governing the utiliza­
tion of the geostationary orbit for all purposes, including
 
space industrialization. However, to date, international debate
 
regarding the practical application of those provisions to the
 
task of managing the geostationary orbit has occurred primarily
 
at the World Administrative Radio Conferences convened by the
 
International Telecommunication Union for the purpose of
 
regulating global telecommunications activity and accommodating
 
conflicting uses of the electromagnetic spectrum. During the
 
past fifteen years the ITU has also developed an interest in
 
the management of the geostationary orbit.
 
That interest is based both on the special characteristics
 
of the orbit which make it particularly valuable for communica­
tions satellite applications and on the character of the geo­
statiqnary orbit as a limited natural resource. Some experts
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argue that if mutual interference is to be avoided, the number
 
of satellites in geostationary orbit must be limited to 180.
4
 
Others contend that the spacing of satellites could be diminished,
 
leaving only the necessary safety margin to ensure avoidance
 
of collision, with the result that the capacity of the orbit
 
5
 
could be increased to nearly 1800 satellites. 5However, in
 
order to ensure avoidance of mutual interference under the
 
present state of communications satellite technology, the
 
spacing must be increased beyond the minimum necessary to prevent
 
collision. Thus, although the maximum capacity is dependent on
 
a number of technical variables, including frequency staggering,
 
signal polarization, signal format, location of earth stations,
 
and transmission power, and hence cannot be precisely calculated,
 
the geostationary orbit must be considered a limited resource.
6
 
The 1959 ITU Radio Regulations which govern the use of
 
the electromagnetic spectrum have been periodically revised to
 
respond to developments in satellite communications. In 1963
 
the ITU convened the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Confer­
ence in Geneva to allocate frequencies for use by satellites.
 
7-

Although the Radio Regulations were partially revised, the
 
conference did not alter the historical practice of permitting
 
individual states to assign transmission frequencies unilater­
ally. 8 Thus, the traditional "first come, first served"
 
approach was extended into the realm of satellite communication
 
where it applies both to the allocation frequencies and to
 
occupation of orbital "parking slots" by communications
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satellites. 9 Since that approach gives an obvious advantage
 
to those technologically advanced states which are presently
 
capable of establishing geostationary satellite systems, less
 
developed states began to exert pressure to preserve future
 
interests in use of the orbit against saturation by more developed
 
10
 
countries.
 
During the following eight years, utilization of the orbit
 
grew dramatically, causing increased concern among non-space
 
powers. Against this background, the ITU convened the 1971
 
World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommuni­
cations (WARC-ST) in Geneva. In opposition to proposals that
 
the ITU should allocate not only frequencies but orbital slots
 
as well, the United States argued that regulation of the orbit
 
11
 
would inhibit its development as a natural resource The
 
strength of the opposition and other complications resulted in
 
12
 
the general preservation of the status quo. Nonetheless,
 
some progress was made toward the accommodation of the conflicting
 
interests of states at various stages of economic and tech­
nological development. Article 9A of the Radio Regulations
 
was revised to establish a mechanism for cooidinating use of
 
13
 
the geostationary orbit. Section I requires a government
 
which intends to establish a satellite system to convey to
 
the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), the
 
entity responsible for management of the international use of
 
14
 
the electromagnetic spectrum, within five years prior to
 
commencement of service, information defined in Appendix 1B
 
of the Radio Regulations relating to the characteristics of
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the system's satellites and earth stations, including orbital
 
information. In particular with respect to geostationary
 
satellites, Section II requires any government considering the
 
use of the orbit to coordinate the planned use -- prior to notifi­
aation of the IFRB under Section I on commencement of service -­
with any other government which has registered an assignment
 
in the same band with the IFRB o which is engaged in or has 
completed coordinatton procedures under this section. Io 
facilitate coordination the former is to supply the information
 
defined in Appendix 1A of the Regulations The purpose of
 
this coordination procedure is to promote resolution of potential
 
conflicts prior to commencement of system construction.
 
Another element of the effort of delegates to the IARC-ST 
conference to resolve conflicts regarding management of the 
orbit is embodied in Resolution Spa 2-1, which reflected the 
concern of non-space powers regarding the management of the 
orbit. In part the resolution provides-
The World Administrative Radio Conference for
 
Space Telecommunications (Geneva, 1971),
 
considering
 
that all countries have equal rights in the use 
of both the radio frequencies allocated to various 
space radiocommunication services and the geostationary 
satellite orbit for these services, 
taktnq tnto account
 
that the radio frequency snectrum and the geo­
stationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources 
and should be most effectively and economLcally used, 
havng in mnd
 
that the use of the allocated frequency bands 
and fixed positions in the geostationary satellite
 
orbit by individual countries or groups of countries
 
can start at various dates depending on requirements
 
and readiness of technical facilities of countries,
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1. that the registration with the ITU of frequency
 
assignments for space radiocomnunication services and
 
their use should not provide any permanent priority
 
for any individual country or groups oF countries and
 
should not create an obstacle to the establishment of
 
space systems by other countries.....
 
rhe linkage between the revised version of Article 9A and
 
Resolution Spa 2-1 is embodied in Resolution Spa 2-2 which
 
reiterated the importance of achieving the best possible use
 
of the geostationary orbit and the frequency bands assigned to
 
the broadcasting satellite service, and which called upon
 
participating governments to establish and operate satellite
 
broadcasting systems in accordance with plans established by
 
general and regional conferences in which affected states are
 
15
 
entitled to participate. Although not binding on the parties
 
Conenton,16
 
to the International Telecommunication Convention, the
 
resolutions expressed a broadening consensus among participating
 
delegations and emphasized the fact that the Radio Regulation
 
does not provide permanent protection to spectrum and orbital
 
17
 
assignments for space broadcasting services. ,However, the
 
resolutions did not allay the concern of non-space powers that
 
present space activities will saturate the most desirable
 
segments of the orbital arc.
 
The third phase of the ITU's consideration of the problem
 
of allocating the geostationary orbit among potentially con­
flicting uses occurred at the Plenipotentiary Conference of the
 
ITU which was held in September and October 1973 in Torremolinos.
 
The basic purpose of the conference was to evaluate and, if
 
necessary, revise the ITU's fundamental structure and functions.
 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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In addition, the question of orbital slot allocation was included
 
18
 
in the agenda In that context the Israeli delegation proposed 
to modify the International Telecommunication Convention to
 
authorize ITU allocation of both the frequency spectrum and
 
geostationary orbital slots as a means of ensuring equitable
 
19
 
access by all parties. Although the Israeli proposal
 
did not receive the support required for adoption, the
 
Plenipotentiaiv Conference amended the listing of the dutle.S 
to be performed by the IFRB contained in Article 10 of the 
Convention to add relatively undefined responsibilities relating
 
to the geostationary orbit. In revised'form Article 10(3) provides.
 
The essential duties of the International 
Frequency Registration Board shall be.
 
a) to effect an orderly recording of frequency
 
assignments made by the different countries so as to
 
establish, in accordance with the procedure provided
 
for in the Radio Regulations and in accordance with 
any decision which may be taken by competent conferences 
of the Union, the date, purpose and technical charac­
teristics of each of these assignments, with a view 
to ensuring formal international recognition thereof.
 
aa) to effect, in the same conditions and 
for the same purpose, an orderly recording of the 
positions assigned by countries to eostationarv
 
satellites;
 
b) to furnish advice to Members with a view to
 
the operation of the maximum practicable number of
 
radio channels in those portions of the spectrum where 
harmful interference may occur, and with a view to the 
equitable, effective and economical use of the geo­
stationary satellite orbit, 
c) to perform any additional duties, concerned 
with the assignment and utilization of frequencies and 
with the utilization of the geostationary satellite 
orbit, in accordance with the procedures provided for 
in the Radio Regulations, and as prescribed by a 
competent conference of the Union, or by the Adminis­
trative Council with the consent of a majority of the 
Members of the Union, in preparation for or in 
pursuance of the decisions of such a conference . 
(emphasis added)
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In essence, the IFRB was instructed to record use of orbital
 
slots on the same basis as frequencies for space services.
 
Although the revised version of Article 10 authorized
 
recording of orbital use, the basic "first come, first served"
 
approach was not altered. However, in order to preserve the
 
interests of non-space powers, the Plenipotentiary Conference
 
also revised Article 33 to provide.
 
Rational Use of the Radio [requency Spectrum and of 
the Geostationary Satellite OrbLt 
In using frequency bands for radio space services
 
Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and
 
the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural
 
resources, that they must be used efficiently and
 
economically so that countries or groups of countries
 
may have equitable access to both in conformity with
 
the provisions of the Radio Regulations according to
 
their needs and the technical facilities at their
 
disposal.20
 
Read in combination, the revised version of Articles 10
 
and 33, which became effective January 1, 1975, lead to a series
 
of conclusions regarding the status of management of the
 
geostationary orbit'
 
1. 	Countries are entitled to utilize the geostationary
 
orbit and to record such use with the IFRB:
 
2. 	At least during the period of active use of an orbital
 
slot, the system operator is protected against harmful
 
interference from subsequently established systems 
by the coordination requirements of Article 9A,
 
3. 	The system operator is not entitled to permanent
 
utilization of any particular orbital slot, and
 
-66­
4. 	Governments operating geostationary satellites are
 
required to conduct their operations in such a way
 
as to permit equitable areas to orbital slots by
 
other governments subsequently establishing communica­
tions systems based on the use of geostationary
 
satellites.
 
At the 1977 World Administrative Radio Conference for
 
the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in the
 
12 G0Iz band (WARC-BS), principles to govern the management
 
of the geostationary orbit were discussed. During
 
21
 
the debates, Columbia and other equatorial
 
states raised the question of national sovereignty
 
over the geostationary orbit. At the 1975 session of the
 
First Committee of the General Assembly, Colombia had asserted
 
that the geostationary orbit is a natural resource over which
 
equatorial states are entitled to exercise sovereign rights in
 
relation to the segments of the arc located over their respective
 
22
 
territories. Similar contentions had been incorporated in the
 
23
 
Bogota Declaration of December 3, 1976. The states which
 
supported that document raised the question at WARC-BS and
 
stated their opposition to allocation of orbital slots in an
 
effort to promote international recognition of national jurisdic­
tional control. Recognition of that approach would permit the
 
equatorial states to control access to the orbit, most likely
 
on a licensing basis. However, conflicts with the "free use"
 
principle of Article 1(2) and the Article II prohibition against
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appropriation as well as the low level of support from non­
equatorial states suggest that the establishment of an interna­
tional consensus on this approach is unlikely.
 
The remaining delegations divided their support between
 
development of an a priori plan and evolutionary planning for
 
orbital slot and frequency allocation. Under the first approach,
 
a comprehensive plan covering all aspects of the allocation
 
question would be developed in an attempt to accommodate to the
 
maximum possible extent the whole set of needs foreseen by the
 
24
 
period covered by the plan. In contrast, under evolutionary
 
planning, systemdesign and deployment would be undertaken within
 
limits imposed by a series of general sharing principles and
 
would be based as prior consultations with other governments
 
whose existing systems could be affected by the establishment of
 
new systems. Under that approach, no advance assignments of
 
orbital slots, frequencies and signal polarizations are made,
 
permitting actual use to benefit from advancing technology.Zs
 
The a priori approach enjoyed substantial support from
 
a significant number of non-equatorial states in Regions I and III.
 
The United States led another bloc of states including Canada
 
and Brazil which opposed a priori planning supporting instead
 
various forms of evolutionary allocation for Region II. When
 
the WARC-BS ended, no a priori plan was approved for Region II,
 
but a conference of Region II countries, including North and
 
South America and the Caribbean states, was scheduled for 1982,
 
26
 
at which a "detailed plan" is to be considered. Thus, the
 
conference did not significantly alter the existing regime with
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respect to use of the geostationary orbit by the United States,
 
Canada and Latin America. However, technological advances are
 
likely to result in increased pressure to preserve rights of
 
access for states which do not yet possess the capability to
 
operate satellite systems.
 
In June and July 1976, the Administrative Council of the
 
ITU met in Geneva to determine, among other things, the agenda
 
for the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference. In its
 
27
 
present form, the agenda calls for the review and, if necessary,
 
revision of Articles 9 and 9A relating to the coordination,
 
28
 
notification and recording of frequency assignments. As noted
 
above, Article 9A establishes procedures for coordinating use
 
29
 
of the geostationary orbit.
 
In the context of discussions of Article 9A, the issue of
 
allocating orbital slots is likely to be raised. Participating
 
delegations are expected to align themselves along the lines
 
drawn at the WARC-BS. Equatorial states will continue to press
 
their claims that the geostationary orbit is a natural resource
 
subject to the sovereign control of individual countries which
 
lie along the equator. The non-equatorial developing countries
 
and those which are considered developed but which do not yet
 
possess the capability to onerate sophisticated satellite systems
 
can be expected to press for adoption of a comprehensive
 
frequency and orbital slot allocation plan which would ensure
 
future access to segments of the geostationary orbit suitable
 
for national or regional use. The United States and other
 
space powers are likely to continue their support of evolutionary
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planning in order both to ensure maximum use of the orbit and
 
to incorporate technological advances into the allocation scheme
 
as rapidly as they occur.
 
The debate will be given a sense of urgency by intervening
 
communications satellite experimentation and the evolution of
 
planning for operational domestic, regional and global satellite
 
networks. Canadian and American experimentation using the ATS-6
 
and CTS systems will focus on applications of geostationary,
 
high-power broadband satellites transmissions in conjunction
 
with small terrestrial receiving terminals. 3 0 In addition,
 
experimental activities by the European Space Agency (ESA)
 
and the Japanese National Space Development Agency (NSDA)
 
31
 
expected to demonstrate the utility of new applications.
are 

These experimental activities will provide the basis for
 
expanded operational use of geostationary communications satellites.
 
Significant expansion of the Intelsat network and deployment
 
of new Intelsat V satellites are projected.3 2 On the regional
 
level, the Arab League's Telecommunications Union is considering
 
establishing a system based on geostationary satellites for the
 
provision of broadcast and telephone services to each member
 
33
 
country. Expanded domestic systems are either under devel­
opment or in the planning phase in the United States, Canada,
 
Indonesia, Iran and Japan. In addition, a number of countries,
 
including Algeria, Zaire, Brazil, Nigeria and Norway have leased
 
or are considering leasing transponders from Intelsat for
 
dedicated use in domestic systems. 34
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Increases in existing and planned use of the geostationary
 
orbit for communications and other purposes will provide impetus
 
for the 1979 WARC debate regarding allocation of the geostationary
 
orbit. Because of the key role played in the existing law of
 
outer space by the "free use" principle of Article 1(2) and the
 
non-appropriation principle of Article II, and in light of the
 
potential economic and social value of the proposed satellite
 
applications based on the use of the geostationary orbit, the
 
claims of equatorial states to sovereign control over large
 
segments of the orbit are unlikely to receive broad international
 
recognition. Thus, the main struggle is likely to take place
 
between comprehensive advance allocation of frequency and
 
orbital slots and allocation according to actual use, taking
 
into account existing systems and advancing technology.
 
Current positions and trends of discussion indicate that
 
although substantial discussion of the problem will occur at
 
the 1979 WARC, no definitive solution will be reached, because
 
of the strength of the competing interests involved. Proposals
 
for both a priori and evolutionary planning are likely to be
 
referred for consideration to regional conferences. After
 
consideration there, the resulting recommendations will probably
 
be re-examined at a general WARC in the mid-1980s. Debates
 
at the 1979 WARC and subsequent conferences are likely to reveal
 
a trend toward the assignment within each region of orbital
 
segments dedicated to individual communications services.
 
Within each segment, each country would be assured equitable
 
access to orbital slots, but no specific frequency or orbital
 
-71­
slot allocations would be made in advance of actual use. Despite
 
a trend toward that approach, complicating factors including
 
non-communications applications such as satellite power generation
 
are likely to delay establishment of an effective compromise
 
among competing interests.
 
Thus, the impact of the 1979 WARC on the development and
 
establishment of satellite power systems is likely to center
 
on identification, first, of the problems of coordinating
 
potential uses of the geostationary orbit to avoid mutual
 
harmful interference, and second, of the competing interests
 
of equatorial, developing and developed countries in the use
 
of the orbit. In particular, since satellite power systems
 
are not likely to be operational prior to 1995 and therefore
 
are dependent on long-term orbital management activities,
 
the progress projected for the 1979 WARC is likely to emphasize
 
the importance of preliminary planning and evaluation of future
 
orbital requirements for satellite power systems in order to
 
ensure that future conferences take into account both the need
 
to establish such systems and, if established, their projected
 
orbital requirements.
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PART III
 
The treaties and conventions discussed in Part III
 
provide the general legal framework within which the industriali­
zation of outer space is likely to evolve. As technological
 
advances make establishment of experimental and operational
 
systems imminent, various members of the international community will
 
initiate efforts to elaborate the general instruments discussed
 
above by establishing more specific guidelines to govern
 
particular activities. Thus, for example, planning and experi­
mentation relating to direct broadcast and earth resources
 
satellites have promoted extensive consideration of relevant
 
technical, organizational and legal guidelines by the United
 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (CPUOS)
 
and its subcommittees. To the extent that the concept of space
 
industrialization encompasses the direct television broadcasting
 
via satellite, remote sensing and closely related activities,
 
the CPUOS debates provide a basis for predictions regarding
 
the structure of international space law at the time such
 
systems become fully operational. The CPUOS debates also
 
indicate trends which are likely to influence future negotiations
 
relating to uses of outer space which are not yet under
 
consideration in CPUOS, including satellite power systems and
 
space manufacturing.
 
In addition to trends indicated by CPUOS activities,
 
other evidence regarding the future of international space law
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can be derived from developments in other areas of international
 
law. One example is the analogy which can be drawn to the
 
positions taken by various delegations on legal and institutional
 
issues at the present series of United Nations Conferences on,
 
the Law of the Sea as reflected in the negotiating texts.
 
Another example is the evolving concept of "the common heritage
 
of mankind" which has received some measure of support in
 
negotiations relating to the management of both the seas and
 
outer space. Further guidance on questions relating to
 
potential organizational configurations for entities engaged
 
in space industrialization can be derived from current trends
 
as evidenced by the practice of Intelsat, Inmarsat and Aerosat.
 
The purpose of Part III is to examine the most important
 
of these trends'
 
1. direct broadcast satellites;
 
2. earth resources satellites; and
 
3. the draft moon treaty.
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I. 	 IMPLICATIONS OF TIE rMrOS DEBATES ON DIRECT SATELLITE
 
BROADCASTING FOR SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
NASA research and development activities utilizing the
 
ATS and CTS systems have demonstrated the technical feasibility
 
of direct broadcast satellites capable of transmitting program
 
carrying signals directly to small-scale ground receivers,
 
bypassing the complex terrestrial redistribution networks
 
1
 
presently employed by existing systems.

Direct broadcasting from satellites promises a number of
 
benefits, including more efficient and extensive program
 
dissemination on a national level both for educational and
 
entertainment purposes and for increased interchange of ideas
 
and information between cultures. Perhaps the most important
 
of these is the potential for improving the quality of education.
 
In all of the developing countries, and even in some of those
 
considered developed, a shortage of well-qualified teachers
 
has hindered national development, setting in-motion a search
 
for means to overcome the shortage. Educational television
 
has been used successfully in many parts of the world to
 
distribute over a wide area resources previously available
 
only in isolated special teaching facilities. In a large
 
number of countries, however, the absence of a well-developed,
 
in-place terr&strial distribution system for educational
 
programming, compounded by the difficulty of installation
 
due to high costs, difficult terrain or a widely dispersed
 
population, has prevented full realization of television's
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educational potential. Direct satellite broadcasting technology
 
is capable of overcoming these barriers, provided that certain
 
economic and technical obstacles are overcome.
 
Along with its promise of increased interchange among
 
peoples, direct broadcasting has also created concern among
 
potential "receiving states" that the new technology will be
 
exploited for purposes of propaganda or for cultural or economic
 
imperialism. As early as 1963 that concern generated demands
 
that a restrictive international legal regime be imposed on
 
the use of direct broadcasting to prevent potential misuses.
 
The significant initiatives in that regard have centered in
 
the United Nations, taking place in a variety of agencies,
 
including CPUOS, the ITU and UNESCO.
 
A. Main Positions
 
During the United Nations debate, three main positions
 
have emerged. After a short initial period at the opposite
 
pole, the Soviet Union has led Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, France
 
and the Eastern European bloc in expressing concern over
 
the potential for satellite transmission of politically
 
subversive or culturally disruptive broadcasts across national
 
boundaries without the prior consent of the receiving state.
 
A number of less developed states have echoed the Soviet concern
 
over propaganda. Morocco, Iran, Sierra Leone, and India,
 
among other Third World states, have been especially concerned
 
about cultural imperialism and the possibility that commercial
 
advertising by the industrial powers would disrupt the social
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fabric of developing nations. Some Third World nations have
 
suggested that any television program displaying consumer­
oriented societies in a favorable light would create a demand
 
for consumer goods among their own citizens which could delay
 
or perhaps even thwart national plans for social and economic
 
2
 
development. The key elements upon which these states would
 
ultimately base an international institutional response are
 
the principles of national sovereignty and the need to protect
 
established cultures against intrusion from abroad.
 
Opposition to the restrictive regulatory approach taken
 
by the Soviet Union has been led by the United States, which
 
has argued, first, that any regulation was premature, since
 
no one could determine with any degree of certainty either the
 
configuration of future direct broadcast systems or the nature
 
of the political, economic and legal problems likely to arise
 
when such systems finally become operational, and second, that
 
an excessively restrictive policy could stifle the initiatives
 
necessary to develop and implement direct broadcast technology.
 
The third tenet of the United States' position has been the
 
contention that a regime of prior consent and program control
 
would violate both the First Amendment and the principle of the
 
free flow of information contained in the Declaration of Human
 
Rights, and would, therefore, be unacceptable as a matter of
 
constitutional policy.
 
Sweden and Canada have taken an intermediate position,
 
recognizing the need to incorporate both the free flow of
 
-77­
information and the protection of national sovereignty and
 
cultural diversity into any viable regulatory scheme. To
 
achieve that goal, the two states have advocated a regime based
 
on international cooperation expressed in a prior agreement
 
between the broadcasting and receiving states. Under the
 
Swedish-Canadian proposal, program content would be determined
 
by the bilateral prior consent agreement rather than by a
 
global agreement as proposed by the Soviets.
 
The current series of CPUOS negotiations began in 1969
 
when the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites was
 
convened in New York pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
 
2453 B (XXIII).3 After the Working Group held five sessions,
 
the main debate regarding appropriate governing principles
 
shifted to the Legal Sub-Committee in 1974, where some progress
 
has been made toward the establishment of an international
 
consensus. The basic foundations of the debate were embodied
 
in proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States
 
and jointly by Sweden and Canada.
 
i. The 1972 Soviet Draft Convention
 
Concerned about the American progress with communications
 
satellite technology, the Soviet Union unexpectedly introduced
 
its restrictive Draft Convention on Principles Governing the
 
Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Televi­
the General Assembly on 8 August 1972.4
sion Broadcasting to 

In a letter addressed tn the Secretary-General, Soviet Foreign
 
Minister Andrei Gromyko requested that the twenty-seventh
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session of the General Assembly examine the feasibility of
 
an international agreement for satellite broadcast regulation
 
and that the Soviet proposal be included on the agenda.
5
 
The Soviet Union intended its draft to provide the foundation
 
for a universally binding treaty approved by the CPUOS Legal
 
Sub-Committee.
 
As submitted, the Soviet draft conta±ned nearly all of
 
the restrictive principles proposed during the previous
 
meetings of the Working Group, including a strict provision
 
permitting direct satellite broadcasting to foreign states
 
"only with the express consent of the latter. '6 Article IV
 
provided that any party to the proposed convention would
 
undertake to exclude from programming transmitted via satellite
 
"any material publicizing ideas of war, militarism, nazism,
 
national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, as
 
well as material which is immoral or instigating in nature
 
or is otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs
 
or foreign policy of other states." Article VI elaborated
 
the general statements of Article IV, listing specific categories
 
of satellite broadcasting which would be illegal:
 
(a) 	Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of
 
international peace and security;
 
(b) 	Broadcasts representing interference in intra­
state conflicts of any kind;
 
(c) 	Broadcasts involving an encroachment on funda­
mental human rights, on the dignity and worth
 
of the human person and on the fundamental
 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
 
sex, language or religion;
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(d) 	Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors,
 
pornography, and the use of narcotics;
 
(e) 	Broadcasts undermining the foundations of the
 
local civilization, culture, way of life,
 
traditions or language;
 
(f) 	Broadcasts which misinform the public in these
 
or other matters.
 
The ban on specific categories of program content was
 
supported by Article XII, which would have denied any party
 
to the convention the right to enter into any subsequent
 
international agreement which conflicted with the convention.
 
Thus, the proposed program content limitations were apparently
 
intended to apply even if the broadcasting and receiving states
 
had agreed to waive one or more of the limitations. Consequently,
 
under the Soviet draft, any third state which considered the
 
programming exchanged between the broadcasting and receiving
 
state--even if pursuant to an agreement between the two--to
 
fall 	within the proscribed categories, could invoke the
 
remedial procedures foreseen in the Soviet draft, even if
 
there were no possibility that the third state's citizens
 
would receive the allegedly objectionable transmissions. In
 
addition, the proposal also forbade advertising, except "on
 
the basis of specific agreements specially concluded between
 
those states concerned."
7
 
The foundation for the remedial process was laid by
 
Article VI, which imposed international liability of states
 
against a broadcasting state where programming contained
 
proscribed materials. Article VII extended the liability of
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the broadcasting state to include any act of illegal broadcasting
 
by one of its nationals, whether or not the broadcast was
 
actually transmitted by a government agency. The imposition
 
of international liability presumably made available to the
 
objecting state all of the normal remedial procedures provided
 
by international law. Article IX, however, also permitted the
 
target state to "employ the means at its disposal" to counteract
 
the illegal irradiation of its territory by a foreign state.
8
 
The convention did not state explicitly whether retaliatory
 
military action against the satellite would be permissible in
 
such cases. However, that interpretation was given credence
 
by language contained in Foreign Minister Gromyko's letter
 
conveying the draft convention to the Secretary-General.
 
States may utilize the means at their disposal to
 
counteract illegal direct broadcasting of which
 
they are the object, not only in their own territory
 
but also in outer space and other areas beyond the
 
limits of national jurisdiction of any state. 9
 
Gromyko's statement leaves open a number of undesirable responses
 
by the target state, including the destruction of the satellite
 
in space. Eventually, however, the Soviets indicated that
 
only "lawful" measures would be authorized under the convention.
1 0
 
The Secretary-General referred the Soviet draft to the
 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which in turn
 
approved consideration of direct broadcast issues by the
 
Working Group at its fourth session.11
 
At the fifth session of the Working Group, the Soviet
 
Union also took a slightly moderated position, substituting a
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draft declaration of principles for the draft convention. 1 2
 
The substantive provisions were essentially identical to those
 
of the 1972 draft convention, with two exceptions. The first
 
exception was the draft declaration's omission of the listing
 
of prescribed categories of program content in Article VI of
 
the draft convention. 13 Although the specific listing is omitted,
 
the general prescriptions of programs promoting militarism,
 
racial hatred and cultural subversion contained in Article IV
 
of the convention are retained in Article IV of the draft
 
declaration, leaving the scope or effect of the limits on
 
program content substantially unaffected.
 
A second difference between the two drafts relates to the
 
issue of spillover. Under Article VIII(2) of the 1972 draft
 
convention, any state believing itself subjected to uninten­
tional radiation would have been entitled only to request
 
consultations with the broadcasting state. The draft declaration
 
would have authorized the offended state to compel immediate
 
consultations regarding program content if the unintentional
 
spillover were receivable in its territory by ordinary receivers
 
or receivers augmented by simple devices. 14 Both drafts would
 
have proscribed any intentional broadcast unless authorized
 
by prior agreement between the broadcasting and receiving states.
 
The final difference between the two Soviet drafts is
 
found in the remedial provisions. Article IX(l) of the 1972
 
draft convention would have permitted any party to the convention
 
to:
 
employ the means at its disposal to counteract
 
illegal television broadcasting of which it is the
 
object, not only in its own territory but al-so
 
in outer space and other areas beyond the limits
 
of the national jurisdiction of any State,
 
leaving open the possibility that an offended state might
 
consider itself entitled to destroy the satellite relaying
 
16
 
allegedly unlawful programming. The counterpart to
 
Article IX(l) in the draft declaration limits the response of
 
the complainant state to those "measures which are recognized
 
legal under international law.
17
 
as 

Despite the near identity between the operative provisions
 
of the 1972 draft convention and the 1974 draft declaration,
 
the former represents a moderation of the Soviet position.
 
By accepting a non-binding declaration, rather than a treaty,
 
as the appropriate mode for expressing an international consensus,
 
the Soviets moved toward compromise with the American and
 
Swedish-Canadian positions.
 
2. The Swedish-Canadian Draft PrincipZes
 
Also considered at the fourth session of the Working
 
Group in 1973 was a draft declaration submitted jointly by
 
the Swedish and Canadian delegations. Officially entitled
 
The Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting
 
by Satellite, 1 8 the Swedish-Canadian proposal attempted to
 
reconcile the free flow of information with national sovereignty
 
through the application of the basic principles of cooperation
 
and participation. Like the Soviet draft convention, the joint
 
Swedish-Canadian proposal would have required the broadcaster
 
to secure the consent of the recipient state'
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Direct television broadcasting by satellite to any
 
foreign State shall be undertaken only with the
 
consent of that State. The consenting State shall
 
have the right to participate in activities which
 
involve coverage of territory under its jurisdiction

and control. This participation shall be governed
 
by appropriate international arrangements between
 
the States involved .... 19
 
The draft declaration did not, however, include an explicit
 
program code. Instead, Article VIII would have mandated
 
participation of the recipient state in "the scheduling, content,
 
production and exchange of programmes and all other aspects,
 
including if appropriate, the training of technical and programme
 
''20
personnel. The combination of prior consent and participation
 
provisions would have nullified the potential for offensive
 
program content, while permitting the participatory states to
 
tailor programming to their respective needs. Although the
 
prior consent provision was comparable to that proposed in
 
the Soviet draft, the Swedish-Canadian draft would have
 
permitted interested states to consent to any type of programming,
 
while the Soviets advocated the establishment of prohibitions
 
against specific categories of content.
21
 
The Swedish-Canadian draft declaration also would have
 
distinguished between technically unavoidable spillover and the
 
intentional transmission of television signals to a foreign
 
country. While the prior consent clause would not have
 
operated in the case of unavoidable spillover, the draft
 
declaration specified that the consent and participation
 
provisions were to be applicable in situations*
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(a) where coverage of the territory of a foreign
 
State entails radiation of the satellite signal
 
beyond the limits considered technically unavoidable
 
under the Radio Regulations of the International
 
Telecommunication Union; or
 
(b) where notwithstanding the technical unavoid­
ability of spillover to the territory of a foreign
 
State, the satellite broadcast is aimed specifically
 
at an audience in that State within the area of
 
spillover.22
 
If any state concluded that another was violating the principles
 
set forth above, the joint document would have authorized the
 
former to call upon the latter to enter into consultations
 
regarding the alleged violations. If the consultations did
 
not reach a mutually acceptable settlement, the aggrieved state
 
would have been entitled to seek a settlement through the
 
established procedures for the resolution of disputes "such
 
as conciliation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement."23
 
The Swedish-Canadian draft appears to be a useful com­
promise between the Soviet draft convention and the arguments
 
presented orally by the American delegation. The proposal
 
contained an explicit prior consent provision, similar to that
 
sought by the Soviets, but it omitted the controls on program
 
content so vehemently opposed by the American delegation.
 
Nonetheless, the ommission was potentially compatible with the
 
Soviet position, since the shared control of specific programming
 
could serve as an effective substitute. The joint proposal
 
would also have assured American broadcasters that they would
 
not be forbidden to transmit commercial programming to other
 
nations on the basis of objections based on content, provided
 
they were able to persuade the receiving state to consent to
 
receive direct broadcasting. In addition, a state irradiated
 
by spillover resulting from consented transmission between two
 
other states could not interfere with the transmissions on
 
the ground that it had not also consented, if the spillover
 
were technically unavoidable and not specifically directed at
 
the complaining state. Finally, the fact that the document
 
did not authorize censorship or contain a list of proscribed
 
programs could have eased the American constitutional objections
 
to international broadcast regulation.
 
3. The United States Draft Principles
 
During the first four sessions of the Working Group,
 
the United States consistently argued that any international
 
declaration or treaty on direct broadcasting would impede
 
development and operational implementation of the technology.
 
However, in response to the Soviet and Swedish-Canadian
 
initiatives, the United States delegation submitted its
 
own draft declaration of principles to the fifth session of
 
the Working Group. Framed in general terms, the American
 
Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites 24 did not
 
attempt to enumerate illegal broadcast applications. In
 
contrast to the Soviet document, the American proposal took a
 
positive approach, encouraging rather than limiting the use
 
of direct broadcast satellites. The draft recognized the need
 
for direct broadcasting to develop within the limits imposed by
 
the ITU technical parameters and procedures, as well as by
 
international law, including the United Nations Charter and
 
the Outer Space Treaty.25 In its proposal the United States
 
also included the principle that direct broadcasting should
 
be carried out in a manner both compatible with the maintenance
 
of international peace and sensitive to the differences among
 
26
 
cultures. Within that framework the American delegation
 
proposed that the evolving technology be applied so as to
 
"encourage and expand the free and open exchange of information
 
and ideas." 27 Implementation of the fundamental principle of
 
the free flow of information was to be achieved by promoting
 
access of every state to both transmitting and receiving
 
28
 
technical obstacles could be overcome.
facilities insofar as 

The organizational and programming barriers were to be overcome
 
through cooperative efforts of international organizations
 
and regional broadcasting associations,29 with any disputes
 
to be resolved by established procedures. 30 Finally, the draft
 
principles introduced by the United States delegation called
 
upon the United Nations and its member states to "review the
 
questions of the use of satellites for international direct
 
television broadcasting if practical experience indicates the
 
need for such a review.31
 
From the beginning of the direct broadcast debate, the
 
basic tenets of the American Position had been the free flow
 
of information, deferral of regulation until concrete problems
 
have arisen, and application of the evolving technology through
 
regional cooperation. Thus, in one sense, the proposed principles
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simply formalized the previously established position. None­
theless, the American draft represented an important step
 
toward compromise. Until the Working Group's fifth session,
 
the United States had opposed any attempt to establish limitations,
 
whether binding or not, on direct broadcasting. By introducing
 
its own set of draft principles, the United States accepted
 
the proposition that the establishment of such non-binding
 
principles would facilitate the development of the technology.
 
The American proposal also recognized for the first time the
 
need to include a provision for broad access in order to ensure
 
the two-way flow envisioned in the principle of free flow
 
of information. Although conditioned upon the ability to over­
come unspecified "practical difficulites," the shared access
 
principle represented another step toward resolution of the
 
direct broadcast controversy.
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B. Present Status of the Direct Broadcast Debate
 
Since 1974 the CPUOS Legal Sub-Committee has made some
 
progress toward a consensus on direct broadcast issues. The
 
following subsections are intended to describe the current
 
status of the debates on specific key issues.
 
1. Purposes and Objectives
 
At the final session of the Working Group in 1974, the
 
delegations agreed that direct broadcasting should have as
 
its goals the promotion of international peace, the facilitation
 
of global economic and social development and the furtherance
 
of'intercultural understanding.3 2 The report concluded that
 
all direct broadcasting activities should be conducted exclu­
33
 
sively in a manner compatible with those goals. 3However, at
 
the fourteenth session of the Legal Sub-Committee, one group
 
of delegates argued that that policy should be made mandatory,
 
while others contended that the principle in question should
 
remain a non-obligatory statement of a general policy.
34
 
During the fifteenth session, the delegations agreed on the
 
latter approach.
 
2. Applicability of InternationaZ Law
 
The report of the fourteenth session of the subcommittee
 
recognized that the United Nations Charter, the Outer Space
 
Treaty, and the International Telecommunication Convention
 
with its Radio Regulations had established general limits
 
within which direct broadcasting would have to evolve.
36
 
Left unresolved, however, was the issue whether the draft
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principle regarding the applicability of international law
 
should state that direct broadcasting "should be" conducted
 
in accordance with generally recognized rules or whether such
 
a provision should impose on states the obligation to ensure
 
the compliance of activities within their jurisdiction.3 7 In
 
addition, disagreement remained relating to the inclusion among
 
the principles to be applied of the Universal Declaration of
 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
 
Rights and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. 38
 
Article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears to
 
resolve the first question by obligating states who are parties
 
to the treaty to conduct activities in outer space in accordance
 
with international law.3 9 Consequently, the obligation of
 
states to comply with international law would not be diminished
 
by omission of an express statement of the obligation. Thus,
 
the decision of the subcommittee at its fifteenth session to
 
endorse non-obligatory language does not seriously limit the
 
legal impact of the draft declaration ultimately approved by
 
CPUOS. 40
 
Although the inclusion of general references to the
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Declaration
 
of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
 
and Cooperation Among States could be justified as an additional
 
step toward the establishment both of a liberal regine for
 
direct broadcasting which would facilitate educational application
 
4 
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-,and of customary rules regarding an international obligation
 
protect human rights, the practicalities of international 
negotiation in the present case seem to indicate that reference 
will be made only to those principles particularly relevant 
to the direct broadcast controversy, namely sovereignty, non­
intervention, and the free flow of information. In order to 
facilitate establishment of a consensus, the subcommittee 
agreed in 1976 to substitute the phrase "the relevant provisions 
of . . . international instruments relating to friendly relations 
and co-operation among States and to human rights" in place of 
reference to specific instruments as previously proposed.
41
 
3. Rights and Benefits
 
At the 1974 session of the Working Group, the participating
 
delegations agreed that all states have an equal right to
 
conduct or authorize direct broadcasting, and that all states
 
are entitled to share in the benefits of the new technology,
 
scientific development. 4 2
 
regardless of their degree of economic or 

The sharing of benefits thus foreseen was to include increasing
 
opportunities for access to direct broadcast systems, based
 
on specific agreements between the states concerned.4 3 The
 
basic consensus was not disturbed at the fourteenth session of
 
the Legal Sub-Committee. Two sub-issues were, however, left
 
unresolved.4 4 First, some delegations advocated inclusion of
 
a provision limiting direct broadcast activities to either
 
governmental agencies or entities under government supervision.
 
The inclusion of such a provision would be important to the
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imposition of the international liability of states, and
 
would therefore be an essential part of any regime designed to
 
impose enforceable restrictions on program content. In all of
 
its proposals, the Soviet Union has consistently sought to
 
restrict direct broadcast activities to those entities controlled
 
by their respective governments. 45 The United States has
 
resisted such attempts in order to preserve the use of direct
 
broadcast satellites for commercial programming. A second sub­
issue arose regarding whether the right of equitable sharing
 
in the benefits of direct broadcasting should be stated in
 
obligatory or normative terms. 4 6 The subcommittee reached
 
agreement at its 1976 session based on normative rather than
 
obligatory language and on the deletion of express references
 
to both supervision by governments and activities of individuals
 
47
 
in outer space.
 
4. International Cooperation
 
Strong recognition was given to the principle of inter­
national cooperation in the report of the fifth Working Group
 
which described corporations as a "touchstone for the development
 
and use of direct television broadcasting by satellite," and
 
called upon states and international organizations, both
 
governmental and non-governmental, to make every effort to
 
enhance the capabilities of interested states to take advantage
 
of direct broadcast technology. 48 Disagreement surfaced, however,
 
in Legal Sub-Committee discussions regarding the application
 
of the principle. Some delegations argued that direct broad­
casting should be "based on" international cooperation, while
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others advocated a regime in which direct broadcasting would
 
"encourage" international cooperation.49 The former position
 
was consistent with the Swedish-Canadian position that
 
international cooperation is essential to the realization
 
of the educational potential of direct broadcasting, and
 
that any set of governing principles should include a
 
general prior consent provision. The position that direct
 
broadcasting should "encourage" international cooperation
 
expressed optimism regarding the educational value of direct
 
broadcasting, but did not mention -- and presumably implicitly
 
rejected -- the principle of prior consent. A compromise
 
was reached at the fifteenth session of the Legal Sub-Committee
 
which provided that direct broadcasting activities "should
 
be based upon and encourage international co-operation." so
 
5. State ResponsibilZ-ty
 
A consensus was also obtained by the fourteenth session
 
of the Legal Sub-Committee on the issue of state responsibility.
 
The delegations at the fifth Working Grou had agreed that
 
states should bear international responsibility for direct
 
broadcast activities as described in Article VI of the Outer
 
Space Treaty. 51 Beyond that point disagreement on the issue
 
surfaced. Some delegations argued that a state should bear
 
international responsibility for all activities carried out
 
by its nationals, regardless of whether the government had
 
any authority under its constitution and laws. Other delegations
 
rejected that argument, contending that the advantage of such
 
a principle would have made states internationally liable
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for the content of programming, a result which would have been
 
unacceptable, especially for those states whose broadcasting
 
entities were not subject to state control.
52
 
The Legal Sub-Committee's drafting group resolved the
 
disagreement and achieved a complete consensus regarding the
 
question of state responsibility for direct broadcasting.
 
Building on the foundation laid in the Outer Space Treaty,
 
the draft principle accepted by the drafting group would
 
impose responsibility on a state to ensure that all activities
 
carried out by the state or under its jurisdiction are conducted
 
53
in conformity with the whole set of draft principles. Where­
direct broadcasting is carried out by an international
 
organization, international responsibility would be borne
 
54
 
both by the organization and by individual member states.

The essential elements of this agreement were not altered by
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the negotiations of the subcommittee's fifteenth session.
 
6. Duty and Right to Consult
 
At the conclusion of the fourteenth session, no consensus
 
was established on conflicting proposals regarding consultation
 
between states with respect to direct broadcasting. The
 
subcommittee reported two alternative proposals. 56 The first,
 
supported mainly by potential "receiving" states, would have
 
authorized a state which had reason to believe that its
 
interests would be adversely affected by the direct broadcast
 
activities of another state to request consultations with the
 
broadcasting state. Under that approach, the broadcasting
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state would have been required to enter into appropriate
 
consultations without delay. The second alternative would
 
have provided that any state which received a request for
 
consultation regarding the direct broadcast activities of
 
either should agree to commence such consultations without
 
delay. At its fifteenth session, the subcommittee was able
 
to reach agreement on a draft principle which parallels the
 
second alternative described above.
57
 
7. Prior Consent
 
The most difficult problem in the resolution of the direct
 
broadcast controversy is the prior consent issue. At the
 
close of the fifth session of the Working Group, the delegations
 
remained divided into three main factions on the issue of
 
prior consent, with the largest group favoring a legal regime
 
granting the receiving state the right to deny its consent.
 
That group argued that prior consent is consistent with the
 
recognized right of each state to regulate its own communica­
tions system, and that a prior consent regime would avoid
 
contravention of national broadcasting legislation.58 The
 
same faction also noted that the international community had
 
already adopted the principle of prior consent when it adopted
 
Article 7, 9428A of the ITU Radio Ragulations at the 1971
 
WARC-ST Conference.
 
The second major group maintained that a clear distinction
 
must be drawn between direct broadcasts intentionally transmitted
 
to a foreign state and those received there as a result of
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unavoidable spillover. In the first case, it was argued,
 
prior consent should be required, because the principle of
 
sovereignty gives each state the right to determine the form
 
of its own political, economic and social systems, and therefore,
 
the flow of information in its territory. Further, the
 
inequality of opportunity to use direct broadcast technology
 
strengthens the need for the protection which would be provided
 
in a regime based on the concept of prior consent.60
 
The third major faction rejected the principle of prior
 
consent altogether. These delegations argued that the right
 
of prior consent would give the receiving state the authority
 
to veto the transmission of any given program, thereby pro­
gressively undermining the principle of the free flow of
 
information contrary to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
 
of Human Rights. 6 1 In addition, the imposition of a regime
 
based on prior consent would inhibit full realization of direct
 
broadcast technology, particularly for domestic systems, if
 
the principle were applied to spillover. 6 2
 
When the Legal Sub-Committee adjoined its fourteenth
 
session, two main positions on the questions of prior consent
 
remained. Proponents of the first position would prohibit
 
direct broadcasts to any state unless that state had consented.
 
If consent were given, the consenting state would have the
 
right to participate in activities related to coverage of its
 
territory. These consent and participation principles would
 
not apply, however, where coverage of the foreign state
 
resulted from technically unavoidable spillover as defined in
 
the ITU's Radio Regulations. 63 This position appears to
 
correspond to the principles proposed by the Swedish and Canadian
 
delegations to the fourth session of the Working Group.
64
 
The second faction rejected the principle of prior consent,
 
preferring instead a legal regime based on an undefined founda­
tion of participation and cooperation.6 5 The sole concrete
 
element of cooperation approved by the second faction called
 
upon the broadcasting state to consult with any receiving
 
state on the request of the latter; however, the principle
 
proposed would call for such consultations only with respect
 
to restrictions imposed by the broadcasting state. 66
 
During the 1976 session, the subcommittee was unable to
 
report any progress. The reports of the fourteenth and
 
fifteenth sessions contain identical sets of two alternative
 
67
 
draft principles.

8. Spillover
 
On the spillover issue, two main positions remained at
 
the end of the Working Group's fifth session. The first group
 
argued that since some spillover would be unavoidable, inter­
national principles should be elaborated to minimize international
 
conflict. The other faction responded that technical develop­
ments might eliminate most problems created by spillover before
 
individual reception in spillover areas will have become
 
possible, thus obviating the need for a legal framework to
 
resolve spillover disputes, particularly when technical pro­
cedures are already available under the auspices of the ITU.
68
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During the fourteenth session of the subcommittee, these
 
positions crystallized somewhat. One position would require
 
the broadcasting state to use "all technical means available
 
to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the radiation
 
over the territory of other countries" unless a prior agreement
 
has been reached between the broadcasting and receiving states.
69
 
The other position would impose no requirement, but merely
 
states that "all reasonable means should be used to reduce to
 
a minimum any unintended radiation of the territory of other
 
70
 
countries. The latter position is consistent with the
 
unlimited regime advocated by the United States, while the
 
former would be an integral part of the prior consent regime
 
proposed in the Swedish-Canadian drafts.
 
Some movement on the spillover issue was evident at the
 
1976 session. Previous session reports had incorporated a
 
separate draft principle covering the spillover question.
71
 
During the fifteenth session, the separate spillover principle
 
was deleted, and its substance was incorporated into the
 
Alternative A of the proposed consent principle which would
 
permit the receiving state to deny its consent to direct
 
72
broadcasts. 

9. Program Content
 
Another key issue upon which the delegations were unable
 
to establish a consensus was the question whether a set of
 
international principles governing direct broadcasting should
 
proscribe certain categories of program content. One group
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of delegations argued that any such legal regime should
 
combine a prior consent provision with an obligation to
 
exclude from direct broadcasts programs which would threaten
 
international peace, or which would promote war, militarism
 
or social hatred, or which would undermine the foundations
 
of the local civilization in any way. 73 The listing of programs
 
to be banned resembled those contained in both the Soviet
 
Union's 1972 draft convention and its 1974 draft declaration of
 
74
 
principles.
 
The second main position was similar to that advanced
 
by the Swedish and Canadian delegations in previous sessions.
 
The report of the fifth Working Group noted that some delegations
 
had espoused the view that because of political, eononomic,
 
social and cultural differences among states, the establishment
 
of general principles or objective criteria for applying those
 
principles would be very difficult, if not impossible. Further,
 
it was argued that the inclusion of a principle of prior
 
consent in a legal regime governing direct broadcasting would
 
render restrictions on program content unnecessary, particularly
 
if prior consent were complemented by a principle providing for
 
participation of the receiving state. 75 The related view was
 
expressed that, if the conduct of direct broadcasting was to be
 
governed by the key principle of international cooperation, the
 
inclusion of limitations effectively dictating program content
 
would be inappropriate.
76
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During the Legal Sub-Committee debates, the American
 
position merged with the Swedish-Canadian positions despite
 
the conflict between the two on the question of prior consent.
 
They proposed a principle calling for cooperation between states
 
with respect to programming, program content, production and
 
77 
exchange of programs. The fourteenth session report also
 
notes a position, like that advocated consistently throughout
 
the debates by the Soviet delegation, which would require states
 
to exclude, regardless of other agreements, programming material
 
which: 1) is detrimental to the maintenance of international
 
peace; 2) publicized war, militarism, nazism or racial hatred,
 
3) is aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of other
 
78
 
states; or 4) undermines local culture in any way.
 
During the Working Group debates regarding program content,
 
the question of the permissibility of commercial programming
 
or advertising arose. One faction supported the view that
 
to the extent direct broadcast advertising created a demand
 
in the receiving state for a particular product or in any
 
other way generated conditions unfavorable to local industry,
 
such programming would be undesirable and should be permitted
 
only when expressly permitted by the receiving state. 79 Other
 
states argued that no distinction should be drawn between
 
advertising or commercial programming and any other category
 
of program content. 80 The same positions were taken in the
 
Legal Sub-Committee, with the result that a third disputed
 
paragraph relating to program content would permit commercial
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advertising only on the basis of prior agreements was incor­
porated in the session report. 81 During its 1976 session, the
 
Legal Sub-Committee was unable to achieve progress on any
 
aspect of the program content issue.
8 2
 
10. Unlawful or Inadmissible Broadcasts
 
Closely related to the questions of prior consent and
 
program content is a draft principle defining unlawful or
 
inadmissible broadcasts. The first clause of the draft principle
 
reported by the subcommittee is taken verbatim from Article VI
 
of the draft principles presented to the fifth session of the
 
Working Group by the Soviet delegation.8 3 It provides that
 
the international liability of states arises when either
 
broadcasts are conducted without the express consent of the
 
receiving state, or the broadcasts contain proscribed material,
 
or when unintentional spillover is compounded by the broad­
casting state's failure to enter into appropriate consultations
 
with the receiving state. 84 The draft principle again drew
 
from the Soviet proposals to the fifth Working Group when it
 
authorized the receiving state to take any remedial measures
 
recognized as legal under international law, without placing
 
any priority upon negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or any
 
of the other conflict resolution techniques preferred in the
 
United Nations framework. 85 The states which opposed a direct
 
broadcast regime based on program content limitations or prior
 
consent, and consequently opposed outlawing any broadcast,
 
rejected the draft principle in toto.
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C. Prospects for Resolution of the Direct Broadcast Debates
 
When the direct broadcast debates began in 1963, they
 
were not characterized by any special sense of urgency, since
 
direct satellite broadcasting was neither technologically nor
 
economically feasible in the foreseeable future. Since then
 
the pressure to impose international controls to prevent potential
 
abusive applications of the technology has increased sharply,
 
primarily because of rapid, highly visible technological progress.
 
NASA's experimental communication satellite programs, especially
 
those using Application Technology Satellites (ATS) 1, 3, 5
 
and 6, and the operational successes of the Intelsat system
 
have been particularly instrumental in overcoming technological
 
barriers to direct broadcasting. 86 These experiments, combined
 
with ambitious plans for more advanced experimentation, including
 
the Indian-American SITE experiment and the Canadian-American
 
CTS projects, 8 7 have motivated other countries to develop their
 
own experimental or operational direct broadcast programs.
 
At the Panel Meeting on Satellite Broadcast Systems for Education
 
convened by CPUOS in Tokyo in April 1974, Japan announced
 
that it would launch an experimental direct broadcast satellite
 
88
 
in 1976, and the Canadian and Brazilian delegations outlined
 
plans to launch new domestic satellites to facilitate communi­
cations with their vast, remote hinterlands. 89 The French
 
delegation offered free time on its Symphonie satellite to
 
French-speaking African nations for educational programming,
90
 
and the European Space Research Organization announced plans
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to establish an operational regional broadcast system by 1980.91
 
Indonesia and Iran announced long-range preparations for
 
educational television broadcasting via satellite, and Malaysia
 
discussed its program to install 5,500 television and radio
 
receivers and 2,000 electric generators in rural locations
 
in order to improve its national educational system. 92 Although
 
the Malaysians plan to rely on terrestrial distribution, they
 
could become users of the Japanese satellite if costs prove to,
 
be sufficiently low.
 
Although the technological developments justify some
 
international institutional response, the magnitude of the
 
response seems disproportionately large in comparison to the
 
imminence of potentially abusive application. Examination
 
of the United Nations debates in direct broadcasting indicate
 
the presence of three factors which have disrupted the processes
 
which normally operate to establish an equilibrium between the
 
forces which motivate technological development and those
 
which support the creation of a regulatory institution to
 
control abuses of the evolving technology.
 
The first of these is the failure to gauge accurately the
 
relationship between specific experimental developments and the
 
final technical configuration of a direct broadcast system
 
which could be used for the purposes cited by proponents of a
 
restrictive international legal regime. For example, the report
 
of the first Working Group concluded that satellite transmission
 
of television signals direct to unaugmented home receivers
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was "not foreseen for the period 1970-1985," because present
 
technology did not possess the means to transmit sufficiently
 
93 
powerful signals from satellites. A number of governments
 
erroneously interpreted this statement at future meetings of
 
the Working Group to mean that telecasting directly to home
 
installations would begin in 1985. Actually, the Working Group
 
concluded that it would not be economically practical at any
 
time before 1985, and perhaps not for some time after that.
94
 
National position papers submitted to later sessions of the
 
Working G~oup based their analyses of the direct broadcast
 
issues on the figures established during the first session.
 
Not always accurate, the initial findings alarmed those nations
 
concerned about propaganda and cultural imperialism, and may
 
have added a note of urgency to their draft recommendations for
 
the Working Group.
 
The second factor which has upset the normal equilibrium
 
between technological and regulatory interests is the failure
 
to assess realistically the limitations imposed on operational
 
direct broadcasting by economic factors. In those more
 
developed countries which have equipped themselves at great
 
cost with an extensive terrestrial network for the distribution
 
of television programming, transition to operational use of
 
direct broadcast satellites would entail a radical realignment
 
of the existing distribution patterns. In the United States,
 
for example, transmission to home receivers would eliminate
 
the need for local television stations, the common carrier land
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lines connecting the local stations with the central program
 
production facilities of the major television network organi­
zations and cable television companies. Understandably,
 
therefore, special interest groups have opposed the use of
 
direct satellite broadcasting for national programming. Until
 
a reliable economic analysis balancing the cost of the necessary
 
realignment against the benefits of a direct broadcast network
 
has been made, countries already possessing extensive television
 
distribution networks are not likely to make a rapid transition
 
to direct broadcasting.
 
For those reasons, the newly evolved technology will
 
probably be most beneficial to the less developed countries.
 
Such states generally have television broadcast facilities
 
which serve only a few major cities. The construction of a
 
comprehensive national network using conventional ground
 
facilities is often economically unfeasible due to the present
 
cost of hardware. The broadcast satellite can dramatically
 
reduce these costs, especially when serving a large geographic
 
area, difficult terrain, or a widely dispersed population.95
 
In addition, a direct broadcast television network could
 
become operational in a fraction of the time needed to construct
 
a terrestrial system based on cable and microwave. Both of
 
these factors recommend direct broadcasting to such nations
 
as Brazil, India and Indonesia, where topographical features
 
prevent the construction of truly national television systems.
 
Once operational, a direct broadcast system could contribute
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significantly to national development by facilitating national
 
integration and improving the quality of the country's educa­
tional system. 96 In addition, users of direct broadcasting
 
would probably reap other less direct benefits, including
 
national economic development and access to foreign and
 
international information resources.
 
Despite the relatively large range of advantages to be
 
derived from direct broadcasting by those countries which do
 
not yet have an extensive investment in terrestrial distribution
 
systems, two main economic impediments still delay operational
 
use by those countries. First, the cost %f operating a direct
 
broadcasting satellite system will still remain prohibitively
 
expensive for individual less developed countries. At the
 
United Nations Panel Meeting on Satellite Broadcasting Systems
 
for Education, sponsored by CPUOS in Tokyo during February,
 
and March, 1974, the UNESCO representative presented an analysis
 
of the financial requirements for satellite broadcasting,
 
concluding that a viable system dedicated exclusively to
 
educational television would require a population base of
 
100 million, assuming a gross national product of $200 per
 
capita.97 He further noted that other combinations of popula­
tion and income could lead to viability, and that Iran, for
 
example, could support a viable direct broadcast educational
 
network with a population of thirty million, but a $1,000 per
 
capita income.9 8 By the same formula, if the annual per capita
 
income were $100 -- the prevailing income level of many African
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and Asian nations -- it would take a population of 200 million
 
to support the satellite system. In these cases, therefore,
 
the introduction of satellite television will depend upon
 
cooperative arrangements on a regional basis, 99 on the use
 
of multipurpose satellites capable of telephone and data
 
switching, as well as television broadcasting, and on inter­
national financial and technical assistance.
 
The second economic factor is the shortage and high cost
 
of ground receivers. At present, few Third World states have
 
an adequate number of receivers to make any form of television
 
broadcasting useful. In Asia, for example, only Japan and
 
Singapore have enough television sets per capita to meet the
 
minimum standard established by UNESCO as necessary if television
 
is to serve as a useful educational tool. 100 The shortage
 
of standard receivers is compounded by the fact that, at the
 
current state-of-the-art, standard ground receivers require
 
extensive augmentation to pick up the relatively weak signals
 
transmitted by the satellites now in orbit. Augmentation
 
increases the price of both individual receivers and the entire
 
receiver network.
 
The report of the first Working Group estimated the cost
 
of modifications to standard television receivers necessary
 
for use as community receivers at $150, while the cost for
 
estimated at $40 - $270.01
modification of home receivers was 

The high cost of the receivers places them beyond the reach
 
of the vast majority of individuals in nearly every country.
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Hence, in the absence of substantial governmental assistance,
 
economic factors will prevent the establishment of a network
 
of receivers which is both capable of receiving signals
 
broadcast directly from outer space and large enough to justify
 
the enormous investment needed to establish the space segment
 
of a direct broadcast network. The necessity of governmental
 
assistance in establishing the receiver network facilitates
 
governmental control and hence provides added protection against
 
potentially abusive application.
 
The third factor disturbing the balance between technolo­
gical and regulatory pressures is the failure of direct
 
broadcasting antagonists to understand the extent to which
 
existing technical regulations perform the functions of the
 
proposed international legal principles. The most important
 
examples are the ITU regulations which restrict satellite
 
telecasting to frequencies several times higher than those
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normally used by standard television receivers, and those
 
which require the broadcaster to use all means technically
 
available to reduce as much as possible the signal radiation
 
over the territory of other countries in the absence of an
 
agreement to the contrary.1 03 The first group of regulations
 
increases the complexity and, therefore, the cost of the
 
necessary receivers, thus reinforcing the economic factors
 
limiting the application of direct broadcast technology. The
 
second group is arguably identical in effect to the prior
 
consent regime supported by advocates of a restrictive approach
 
to the technology.
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An international consensus on principles to govern direct
 
broadcasting should strike an effective balance between the
 
interests motivating technological progress and those advocating
 
a restrictive regulatory response. At present an imbalance
 
exists in favor of regulation, with the consequences, first,
 
that the implementation of the technology is likely to be
 
deterred, and second, that agreement in the international
 
area is unlikely until an equilibrium is established. While
 
policy considerations may dictate some regulation at this time,
 
any regulatory scheme should reflect a realistic assessment
 
of the impediments to technology applications already established
 
by technical and economic factors and existing regulation.
 
Although the delegates to the fifteenth session of the Legal
 
Sub-Committee were unable to reach a consensus on the key
 
issues of prior consent, program content and spillover, the
 
foundation for compromise seems to be present, and an effective
 
accommodation of the competing interests upon that foundation
 
should bring to fruition attempts to establish preliminary
 
international regulatory structures to direct the development
 
of direct broadcast technology.
 
Negotiations in the Working Group and the Legal Sub-

Committee have failed thus far to reach agreement on the key
 
questions of prior consent, program content, spillover and
 
equal access, 104 and the resolution of these points of conflict
 
would make possible the establishment of a consensus on a
 
full range of general principles to guide the development of
 
direct broadcast technology. The evolution of national
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positions during the fifth session of the Working Group and the
 
fourteenth and fifteenth meetings of the Legal Sub-Committee
 
suggests that agreement will be reached in the next few years
 
on a set of principles designed to protect the interests of
 
those states concerned with direct broadcasting's potential
 
for abuse without imposing undue restriction on, and consequently
 
delaying, the development and operational implementation of
 
the technology. The discussion below projects probable bases
 
for compromise derived as a result of examination of the key
 
points of conflict remaining after the May 1976 session of the
 
Legal Sub-Committee.
 
1. Ltmited Prior Consent
 
The growing pressure for protection against real or
 
imagined abuses of the technology suggests that the final
 
declaration of principles probably will center around a
 
provision which would permit direct broadcasting only when the
 
receiving state has given its express consent. Nearly every
 
proposal before the Working Group and the Legal Sub-Committee
 
has recommended the establishment of a prior consent regime,
105
 
and the United States has been the only major dissenter.
 
Three main arguments have been raised against the adoption
 
of a prior consent rule. First, prior consent is said to
 
abrogate the principle of the free flow of information embodied
 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other inter­
national instruments.1 0 6 However, the principle, even if
 
established as binding upon all nations, is not absolute. In
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for
 
example, Article 19(2) delineates the free flow principle. In
 
the third paragraph of that article, however, certain restric­
tions are permitted, including those for the preservation of
 
the rights and reputation of others, and the protection of
 
the national security, the public order, and public health
 
and morals. Also imposing limits on the free flow principle,
 
Article 20 provides:
 
1. 	Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited
 
by law.
 
2. 	Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
 
hatred that constitutes incitement to dis­
crimination, hostility or violence shall be
 
prohibited by law.1 0 7
 
Thus, the argument that the principle of free flow of informa­
tion would be improperly abrogated by a principle granting
 
a receiving state a right of prior consent may exaggerate the
 
scope and legal significance of the principle. A better
 
approach would be to provide for a flexible balance with
 
10 8
 
other principles.

The second major argument against the prior consent
 
principle is that any restrictive regulation is, for the
 
near future at least, premature. The problems likely to
 
arise with the use of direct satellite broadcasting cannot
 
be effectively evaluated at this time, first, because the
 
necessary technology is not yet adequately developed, and
 
second, because no country has concrete plans to deploy an
 
operational system capable of broadcasting directly to
 
0 9 
unaugmented receivers. That argument could be allayed
 
significantly by the decision to approve a declaration of
 
principles rather than a binding treaty.
 
Another argument against prior consent is that although
 
such a rule would dispel fears of intrusive transmissions,
 
it could also frustrate the development of direct broadcasting
 
technology. Rejection of prior consent, however, seems
 
equally likely to hinder rather than promote technological
 
development. il l The United States, for example, is interested
 
primarily in broadcasting by commercial entities. If these
 
entities intend to broadcast normal commercial programming
 
based on advertising, most receiving states seem unlikely to
 
take the steps necessary to make direct broadcasting commer­
cially feasible, especially by encouraging production and
 
installation of augmented receivers. If these elements are
 
absent, direct broadcasting based on commercial programming
 
would remain unprofitable for some time. If, on the other
 
hand, broadcasters would provide only educational programming,
 
direct broadcasting could become profitable, but only under
 
contract with the receiving state. In that case, however,
 
the receiving state would undoubtedly insist on some control
 
with respect to frequencies used, broadcasting time, and at
 
least to some extent, over the nature of the programming.
 
By accepting a prior consent rule, the United States
 
could expect to derive important benefits, including the
 
creation of an atmosphere conducive to early widespread
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implementation of operational direct broadcasting. The
 
establishment of such a rule would facilitate bilateral and
 
multilateral exchanges leading eventually to the creation of
 
regional organizations for satellite broadcasting. 112 In
 
addition, the United States could expect to gain support from
 
those countries which traditionally support the free flow of
 
information, but which have advocated a prior consent rule to
 
prevent the imposition of one country's values on others through
 
direct broadcasting. 13 Finally, rapid implementation would
 
maximize the benefits the United States expects to derive from
 
the export of direct broadcasting hardware and technical
 
assistance.
 
The acceptability of a prior consent regime to proponents
 
of the free flow principle is also dependent upon the content
 
of other components of the legal regime. The Soviet Union,
 
for example, has consistently tied its prior consent proposal
 
to principles limiting program content.1 14 The Swedish-Canadian
 
proposals have omitted any mention of program content, preferring
 
to leave any limitations to specific agreements between the
 
broadcasting and receiving states.115  Since the negotiations
 
necessary for a prior consent regime would probably give the
 
receiving state some control over content, the Swedish-Canadian
 
approach seems likely to prevail, because it gives adequate
 
protection against offensive programming, while avoiding the
 
difficult and excessively time-consuming process of negotiating
 
a set of limits on program content which would be both effective
 
and universally acceptable.
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The Swedish-Canadian prior consent rule has, however,
 
been criticized as giving inadequate protection to the free
 
flow of information, because it fails to place adequate limits
 
on the receiving state's right to deny its consent. As presently
 
drafted, the joint proposal would apparently permit the
 
receiving state to withhold its consent arbitrarily and without
 
any obligation to consider the principle of free flow of
 
information. 116 In addition, the Swedish-Canadian recommen­
dations seem to permit the receiving state to withhold its
 
consent on a program-by-program basis. Such an extensive right
 
of review would permit prior restraint on free speech and
 
would, by permitting official examination of each program,
 
unnecessarily burden the flow of information across national
 
borders. 117
 
Two sets of limitations on a strict prior consent rule
 
will probably result from the pressure to preserve an atmosphere
 
conducive to technological progress. First, where the broadcast
 
signal is not actually receivable in the receiving state with
 
I18
 
available equipment, consent is not likely to be required.
 
Second, the negative effects on the free flow of information
 
of an unlimited consent requirement could be mitigated by
 
tailoring the requirement closely to the optimum balance between
 
the free flow of information and the purposes for conditioning
 
the right to broadcast on the receiving state's consent. The
 
1972 UNESCO declaration on guiding principles for direct broad­
casting distinguishes among four main categories of programming,
 
and recommends basic principles for each type. Article V(l)
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declares that the main objective of direct broadcasting with
 
respect to the free flow of information is "to ensure the widest
 
possible dissemination among the peoples of the world, of
 
news of all countries, developed and developing alike.1 19
 
The second paragraph of Article V imposes no requirement on
 
news broadcasts other than to make every effort to ensure
 
factual accuracy and to identify the source of the news
 
items. 120
 broadcast and, where appropriate, of particular news 

In the case of direct broadcast news programming, the receiving
 
state's right to consent will be limited to the right to
 
demand assurances of the factual accuracy and identification
 
of news sources.
 
Article VI of the UNESCO declaration establishes the right
 
of the receiving state to determine the content of educational
 
programming broadcast via satellite -to its people and, in
 
cases where such programming is produced in conjunction with
 
other countries, to take part in the planning and production
 
on an equal footing.1 21 The receiving state's ihterest in
 
preventing propagandistic or otherwise offensive programming is
 
strongest with respect to educational programming. In that
 
area, receiving states will probably secure a relatively
 
unrestrained right to deny their consent.
 
The interest of the receiving state is somewhat weaker
 
in the case of cultural programs, including artistic performances
 
and sporting events. In such cases,- the UNESCO declaration
 
called for a balance between the enrichment of all cultures
 
through cultural exchange, while respecting the values of each
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culture and the right of all peoples to preserve their cultures
 
as part of the "common heritage of mankind.,1 2 2 Debates in the
 
Legal Sub-Committee suggest the evolution of a consensus on a
 
provision permitting the receiving state to deny its consent
 
to cultural programming only where it can demonstrate that sub­
stantial harm to its own culture would result from transmission
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of the challenged program.
 
The final progrAmming category delineated by the UNESCO
 
declaration related to commercial advertising. Implicitly
 
recognizing the potentially disruptive influence of consumer­
oriented advertising originating in more advanced societies,
 
the UNESCO declaration called upon the broadcasting state to reach
 
a specific agreement with the receiving state prior to the trans­
mission of commercial advertising. 1 24 Since advertising is one
 
of the programming areas most threatening to less developed
 
states, 25 and since the free exchange of advertising is less
 
essential to values underlying the free flow of information than
 
other types of programming, 1 26 the establishment of a relatively
 
unrestricted right of the receiving state to deny its consent
 
appears probable. The inclusion of a principle giving the receiv­
ing state the right to deny its consent--subject to the conditions
 
described above--to direct satellite broadcasts would provide
 
an optimum balance between legitimate interests in both the free
 
flow of information and national political and cultural integrity.
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2. Spillover
 
Another critrcism of the prior consent rule is that it
 
would interfere with direct broadcasting by giving the right to
 
deny consent not only to the intended receiving state, but also
 
to any neighboring state inadvertently irradiated by the satellite.
1 27
 
Initially, spillover is not likely to be a major source of fric­
tion because the first direct broadcast systems will probably
 
be national systems in large, underdeveloped countries, followed
 
shortly by regional systems based on regional linguistic and cultural
 
1 28
 
similarities.
 
Once spillover becomes a source of conflict, however, the
 
undesirable effects could be limited through the exercise of control
 
by the government of the receiving state over community receivers.
 
That solution, however, carries several undesirable consequences.
 
First, the cost of avoiding the effects of spillover would be
 
borne entirely by the receiving state. 129 The costs include not
 
only the financial cost, but also the political costs of appearing
 
to impose censorship for the benefit of the government. Second,
 
government control of receivers would tend to subjugate freedom of
 
information to direct and indirect assertions of national security
 
130
 interests.
 
The Legal Sub-Committee is more likely to place the burden of
 
reducing spillover on the broadcasting state, thereby providing
 
some protection to the spillover states, while reducing the incen­
tive for receiving states to exert international political pressure
 
for broader restrictions. The growing consensus is based primarily
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on Article 7, §428A of the Radio Regulations adopted by the ITU
 
at its 1971 convention. Paragraph 428A requires the broadcasting
 
state to reduce spillover to the maximum extent practicable unless
 
a prior agreement has been reached between the broadcasting state
 
and the states receiving spillover.1 31 Building on that founda­
tion, the Swedish-Canadian proposal to the fourth and fifth
 
sessions of the Working Group provided that the right of consent
 
shall apply in those cases:
 
(a) where coverage of the territory of a foreign
 
State entails radiation of the satellite signal beyond
 
the limits considered technically unavoidable under the
 
Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication
 
Union or
 
(b) where notwithstanding the technical unavoid­
ability of spill-over to the territory of a foreign 
State, the satellite broadcast is aimed specifically at 
an audience in that State within the area of spill- , 
over . *132 
The Legal Sub-Committee could yield'to pressure by the United
 
States to extend the Swedish-Canadian proposal so that the limited
 
prior consent rule as described above would apply in all cases
 
except where:
 
1) the elimination of spillover is considered technically
 
impossible under the present state of the art, as deter­
mined in accord with the ITU Radio Regulations;
 
2) the direct broadcast system is entirely domestic in
 
character; or
 
3) 	the broadcast, although irradiating a part of the
 
complaining state's territory, is not actually receivable
 
using standard or easily augmented receivers readily'
 
available in the area irradiated.
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second paragraph would restore the right to deny consent where
 
the spillover broadcast was aimed specifically at an audience
 
within the receiving state. A third paragraph taken from the
 
Soviet draft declaration submitted to the fifth session of the
 
Working Group could be added to the spillover article to ensure
 
that international cooperation and consultation will govern the
 
relations between broadcasting and receiving states with regard
 
to spillover:
 
1. If any State has reason to believe that activi­
ties connected with direct television broadcasting
 
planned by that State will cause potentially harmful
 
interference to other States or will lead to uninten­
tional radiation of their territory, it shall hold
 
appropriate consultations before undertaking such
 
activities.
 
2. If a State has reason to believe that uninten­
tional radiation of its territory will occur as a
 
result of direct television broadcasts by another
 
State, it may request that appropriate consultations
 
be held. If, as a result of such unintentional radia­
tion, foreign programmes can be received in the
 
territory of a State by ordinary receivers or by
 
receivers fitted with simple additional devices, the
 
broadcasting State shall immediately enter into con­
sultations with the former State on its request 153
 
regarding the content of the programmes received.
 
Participation or Equal Access
 
A further controversial issue is the question whether
 
receiving states should participate in the use of direct broadcast
 
systems. The 1972 UNESCO declaration of principles for direct
 
broadcasting set forth the right of the receiving state to
 
participate on an equal footing with any other state in the pro­
duction of educational programming destined for the receiving
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state. 134 The Swedish-Canadian draft declaration submitted to the
 
fifth session of the Working Group went further, giving the
 
receiving state not only the right to deny its consent to satellite
 
broadcasting, but also to participate in activities related to
 
programming broadcast into its territory.135 It has further been
 
proposed that all states receiving broadcasts should have the right-­
in law and in fact--to have access to the system on an equal foot­
ing, including the rights ,of access to transmitters and to suffi­
cient international assistance to enable those states to make
 
meaningful use of the access rights. 13 6
 
Both the UNESCO and Swedish-Canadian participation principles
 
are intended to enhance the receiving state's ability to influence
 
the programming broadcast to its citizens. In Article VI(2),
 
he UNESCO version gives the receiving state the right to parti­
cipate on an equal footing in the planning and production of pro­
gramming, but only as an adjunct to the provision proclaiming the
 
right of the receiving state to determine the content of educational
 
programming.1 37 By including its participation provision in the
 
general prior consent paragraph, the Swedish-Canadian draft
 
declaration extends the right to participate to encompass all types
 
13 8
 
of programming and all stages of programming activities.

The inclusion of a right of participation for the purpose of
 
ensuring the receiving state's power to affect the content of
 
broadcasts beamed to it would alter the balance in favor of those
 
interests demanding that the receiving states' cultural and politi­
cal integrity be protected against the intrusion of unwanted foreign
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broadcasting over the interests in realizing the benefits of direct
 
broadcasting through operational use. As a result, operational
 
application would probably be delayed substantially.
 
A second rationale advanced for inclusion in the proposed
 
declaration of a principle permitting the receiving state to parti­
cipate in direct broadcasting over its territory is to give effect
 
to the principle of free flow of information. I On numerous
19 

occasions, potential broadcasting states, particularly the United
 
States, have based their arguments supporting an unrestrictive
 
regulatory scheme for direct broadcasting at least partially on
 
the contention that a restrictive regime would inhibit the free
 
flow of information.
14 0
 
Sound policy considerations support the integration of the
 
free flow principle into the structure of legal principles to
 
govern direct broadcasting. At present, the two most-important
 
requirements for effective development of satellite communication
 
technology for operational use are, first, the uninhibited exchange
 
and testing of information and ideas, and second, the assurance
 
that the value of investments in development will not be nulli­
fied by the imposition of unnecessarily restrictive regulations
 
upon innovative systems. A legal structure designed to promote
 
rather than inhibit the free flow of information will encourage
 
designers and planners to explore the potential uses and benefits
 
of recent technical advances.
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Viewed pragmatically, however, the principle of free flow
 
of information is reduced to a fiction unless it is coupled with
 
a second principle calling upon the international community to
 
promote development of satellites and ground facilities in such a
 
way as to facilitate access to transmitter and program production
 
facilities by any state willing to contribute to development and
 
operating costs. In the absence of an equal access clause,
 
free flow of information would probably mean a unidirectional
 
flow from the more developed countries to the less developed. The
 
principle of free flow opposes not only unnecessary limitations on
 
the influx of information from abroad, but also monopolization
 
of a medium for ideological purposes. 141 That potential imbalance
 
is the source of the fears of cultural and economic imperialism
 
expressed by potential receiving states, with detrimental effects
 
for both international cooperation and technology development.
 
The inclusion of an equal access provision, however, would both
 
allay those fears and set in motion a search for means to achieve
 
the goal of equal access without sacrificing the interests of the
 
broadcasting states.
 
Although an equal access principle is likely to be included
 
in a declaration of principles, the lack of certainty regarding
 
the circumstances under which operational direct broadcasting
 
will be conducted makes necessary a particularly careful choice
 
of language to avoid interference with the balance of interests
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established in the preceding discussions of the prior consent
 
and spillover provisions-. The form of the final participation
 
provision probably will parallel the principle presented by the
 
United States in its draft declaration submitted to the fifth
 
session of the Working Group. This draft entitles every state
 
to share in the benefits of direct broadcastihig and provides
 
further that such sharing "should increasingly include, as prac­
tical difficulties are overcome, opportunities for access to
 
the use of [direct broadcasting] technology for the purpose of
 
142 
sending as well as receiving broadcasts." As this right
 
of access becomes available from a practical standpoint, alloca­
tion of transponder time should be made available on a non-dis­
criminatory basis.
 
Presumably, a receiving state would exercise its right to
 
obtain transponder time on a non-discriminatory basis at least
 
initially for the purpose of transmitting its own programming
 
to its own citizens. Self-sufficiency in that sense is desirable,
 
and broadcasting states should be encouraged to provide the tech­
nical assistance necessary to achieve that goal. To impose an
 
obligation to provide such assistance is, however, unnecessary
 
since investment in technical assistance would provide a two­
fold return. First, increased interest in direct broadcasting
 
systems would accelerate demand for the exportation of the
 
necessary technical equipment and software expertise from the
 
broadcasting states.14 5 Second, an increasing right of partici­
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pation would create a greater community of interests between
 
broadcasting and receiving states, with the result that the
 
latter would promote rather than inhibit the operational appli­
cation of direct broadcast technology.
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CPUOS DEBATES ON EARTH RESOURCES
 
SATELLITES FOR SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
The second set of current activities which is likely to
 
influence the future development of international space law
 
centers around the CPUOS debates relating to international principles
 
to govern the use of earth resources satellites. Consideration
 
of the earth resources satellite issue began with the establish­
ment of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satel­
lites. 1 The CPUOS Legal Sub-Committee devoted a small portion
 
of its 1977 session to a preliminary review of relevant issues.
2
 
Since then satellite remote sensing has had significant attention
 
in each subcommittee session.
 
A. Main positions
 
During the evolution of the satellite remote sensing debates,
 
three major blocs have emerged. The main tenets of each posi­
tion are represented in a series of three proposals for interna­
tional guidelines for the use of earth resources satellite tech­
nology.
 
1,. Argentina and Brazil" Treaty on Remote Sensing
 
of Natural Resources by Means of Space Technology,
 
Draft Basic Principles
 
At the 1974 session of the General Assembly, the
 
delegations of Argentina and Brazil jointly submitted a draft
 
treaty to govern satellite remote sensing. 3 The draft is now
 
co-sponsored and strongly supported in all of its provisions
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by each of the other Latin American delegations represented on
 
CPUOS: Mexico, Venezuela and Chile. Although a number of
 
delegations privately express support for the Latin American
 
submission, only the Latin American delegations have argued
 
directly for adoption of the draft treaty.
 
The tone of the draft is established in its preamble, where
 
it refers both to consequences of the implementation of remote
 
sensing technology "which create legal problems that require an
 
immediate and equitable solution in the framework of a general
 
treaty . " and to the concept of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, which allegedly gives a state the sovereign
 
right to control not only the natural resources located within its
 
territory, but information regarding those resources as well. The
 
need for a binding international legal framework is a recurrent
 
theme in formal speeches and private conversations not only
 
among the Latin American delegations, but among the Third World
 
and Soviet bloc delegations as well.
 
The Latin American draft treaty proposes in Article V to
 
implement the alleged rights of permanent sovereignty over natural
 
resources by imposing a duty on any state engaged in earth resources
 
satellite activities to refrain from gathering data from the terri­
tory of any state which had not consented. In addition, Article IX
 
would prohibit any state obtaining information regarding the
 
natural resources of another state through satellite remote
 
sensing from conveying such information in any manner "to a third
 
state, international organization or private entity, without
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the express consent of the [state] to which the natural resources
 
belong . . ." If entered into force, these prohibitions would be 
strengthened by Article XIII which contains a provision similar 
to that in Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty4 imposing 
on each state the responsibility to ensure the compliance of its
 
nationals, including commercial entities, with established
 
rules of international law. Article VI of the Latin American
 
proposal would permit a party to the draft treaty to take all
 
measures authorized by international law to protect its territory
 
against any unauthorized surveillance. Both prohibitions could
 
interfere with the provision of commercial earth resources
 
services.
 
If one party to the proposed treaty authorized another to
 
gather information regarding the former's natural resources, the
 
draft treaty would provide the former with specified benefits.
 
In exchange for its consent, Article VII would entitle the
 
surveilled state to participate in the satellite remote sensing
 
activities of the state granted consent on the basis of arrange­
ments made during negotiation of consent, except that as a minimum
 
such arrangements must include a guarantee that the sensing state
 
will provide technical assistance to the consenting surveilled
 
state. In addition, once the latter has given its consent,
 
Article VIII of the draft would give it the right to full and
 
unrestricted access to "all data obtained through those activities."
 
That provision does not specify whether or not "all data" is
 
limited to data related to the surveilled state's territory.
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However, such an interpretation seems correct, in light of draft
 
Article IX, which would prohibit the sensing state from distri­
buting any earth resources data it had gathered relating to the
 
territory of another state without the express consent of the
 
surveilled state.
 
In summary, the Argentine-Brazilian Draft Treaty would:
 
1. 	impose legally binding obligations under international
 
law;
 
2. 	subject satellite remote sensing activities to the
 
prior consent of the sensed state;
 
3. 	subject data dissemination activities to the prior
 
consent of the sensed state; and
 
4. 	require participation and broad-scale technical assis­
tance as consideration for the consent of the sensed
 
state.
 
2. 	France and the Soviet Unvon: Draft Princ-bples
 
Governing Activities of States in the Field of Remote
 
Senssng of Earth Resources by Means of Space TechnoZogy
 
The second proposal currently before the Committee on
 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was presented jointly by the
 
Soviet and French delegations in May 1974. 5 At present, the
 
Soviet-French draft declaration enjoys monolithic support from
 
the Eastern European members of the committee- Bulgaria,
 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland,
 
and Romania. In addition, the proposal shares with the Latin
 
American draft treaty the support of a number of non-aligned and
 
Third World countries including Egypt, Iran, Chad, Mongolia and
 
Nigeria.
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The theoretical underpinning of the Soviet-French draft
 
resembles that of the Latin American approach, but differing
 
interests have created some important divergences.
 
After restating the principles in Article I and III of
 
the Outer Space Treaty relating to free use of outer space and
 
compliance with international law and the United Nations Charter,
 
the Soviet-French draft calls upon sensing states to respect
 
in particular the principles of sovereignty, placing special
 
emphasis on the right of a state to exercise permanent sovereignty
 
a basic element of self-determination.
6
 
over natural resources as 

However, rather than applying strict prior consent provisions
 
like that contained in the draft treaty to the gathering of earth
 
resources data by satellite, the Soviet-French proposal would
 
implement the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural
 
resources primarily by granting the surveilled state the right
 
to deny its consent to dissemination of information related to
 
its resources to any private party, international organization,
 
or other government, or using the data in any other manner detri­
mental to the interests of the surveilled state. 7 An exception
 
would permit the sensing state to make public without the consent
 
of the surveilled state information relating to natural disasters
 
or phenomena detrimental to the general environment.
8
 
In other respects, the draft declaration is similar to the
 
Latin American proposal. Article 4 would require the sensing
 
state to relay data regarding the territory of another state
 
to the latter on mutually agreeable terms. In addition, the
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surveilled state would be granted the right to participate in the
 
remote sensing activities of the sensing state on the basis of
 
a consensus between the two states. 9 Finally, the Soviet-French
 
proposal would permit any state to receive and process on the
 
basis of equality and on mutually acceptable terms earth resources
 
satellite information relating to territory outside the juris­
diction of any state. 1
0
 
The primary reason for the Soviet Union's opposition to a
 
prior consent regime with respect to data acquisition is that it
 
intends to expand its activities in the field of remote sensing
 
and does not wish to be limited by restrictive principles or
 
treaty provisions. At the 1977 session of the CPUOS Scientific
 
and Technical Sub-Committee, the Soviet delegation made numerous
 
references to Soviet activities in the area of satellite remote
 
sensing. The Soviet Union has attempted privately to per­
suade the United States to accept prior consent with regard to
 
data dissemination in order to ensure ultimate adoption of an
 
international regime which would not limit data acquisition
 
activities.
 
The Soviet position on the question of commercial imple­
mentation of the technology should be carefully monitored, since
 
the Soviets currently consider the sale of earth resources data
 
and services to be inappropriate. Although it is possible that
 
Soviet opposition is based solely on its argument that no legal
 
basis currently exists for the sale of those items, a more
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credible explanation is ideological resistance to "capitalist
 
enterprise." In the CPUOS debates on d-irect broadcast satellites,
 
the Soviets have proposed that activities by non-governmental
 
entities be prohibited.
 
If adopted, the Soviet-French draft declaration would:
 
1. 	not in itself impose legally binding obligations on
 
members of the international community;
 
2. 	permit data acquisition via satellite in the absence
 
of the prior consent of the sensed state,
 
3. 	subject data dissemination to the prior consent of
 
the sensed state; and
 
4. 	place participation of the sensed state in the earth
 
resources satellite program of the sensing state on
 
a contractual basis between the two states.
 
3. 	United States: Remote Sensing of the Natural
 
Environment of the Earth from Outer Space, Working
 
Paper on the Development of Additsonal Guidelines
 
In the context of these drafts the United States issued
 
a working paper based on the considerations that the optimum
 
benefits from earth resources satellite technology will depend
 
on international cooperation and the sharing and use of data
 
on a regional and global basis. 11 The keystone of the working
 
paper is the provision in Article I that remote sensing shall be
 
conducted in
 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations
 
Charter, the Treaty on Principles Governing the
 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
 
Bodies, and other generally accepted principles of
 
international law relating to man's activities in
 
outer space.
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The reference to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is particularly
 
important in that respect, because it provides the legal
 
foundation for the United States delegation's resistance to prior
 
consent in any form. Article 1(2) of the Outer Space Treaty
 
provides:
 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
 
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all
 
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis
 
of equality and in accordance with international law,
 
and there shall be free access to all areas of
 
celestial bodies.
 
The American delegation has argued repeatedly, first, that this
 
"free use" principle authorizes all satellite remote sensing
 
activities in the areas above the vertical limits of territorial
 
sovereignty, subject only to the requirement that contemplated
 
uses be peaceful in nature, and second, that a prior consent
 
requirement would be in direct conflict with the "free use"
 
principle.
 
Building on that foundation, Article IV calls upon states
 
with satellite remote sensing programs to encourage the broadest
 
feasible participation in appropriate phases of those programs.
 
In addition, Article V would require states receiving earth
 
resources data directly from satellites to make that data available
 
"to interested states, international organizations, individuals,
 
scientific communities and others on an equitable, timely and
 
non-discriminatory basis." The same article encourages sensing
 
states to facilitate sharing of earth resources data by publishing
 
lists of publicly available data.
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To dispel concerns about mineral or grain futures specula­
tion based on early reception of data, Article VI would require a
 
sensing state to distribute any data it acquires regarding the
 
territory of another state to its government as soon as practicable,
 
and at least as soon as to any state other than the sensing state.
 
In addition, sensing states would be required under the American
 
draft to facilitate direct reception of data from earth resources
 
satellites by other interested states on equitable terms, if
 
technically possible. Further, Article VIII calls upon sensing
 
states "within their capabilities to endeavor to assist on an
 
equitable basis" non-sensing states in understanding the tech­
niques and benefits of satellite remote sensing. Articles IX and X
 
encourage regional cooperation as well as assistance by international
 
organizations for the purpose of facilitating operational
 
applications of earth resources satellite technology.
 
The United States working paper differs in several signifi­
cant respects from the two proposals described above. First,
 
the Argentine-Brazilian submission is a draft treaty which,
 
if entered into force would be legally binding upon the
 
signatories. Although the Soviet-French proposal was presented
 
in the form of a draft declaration, which would be non-binding
 
if adopted, a large number of the delegations supporting that
 
proposal have made reference both publicly and privately to
 
the need for a binding international instrument, indicating
 
reasonably strong support in that bloc for a treaty on remote
 
sensing. In contrast, the United States working paper takes
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a much less concrete approach, at least from a legal perspective,
 
offering instead "possible operative provisions." The starkness
 
of the contrast is enhanced by the fact that the main issue of
 
the debate over the form the final instrument should take is
 
not whether it should be a treaty or a declaration of principles,
 
but rather whether a declaration should precede the treaty
 
or whether CPUOS should draft a treaty as the initial step.
 
Most delegations are persuaded that the final instrument will
 
be -- and ought to be -- a treaty. The only remaining question
 
relates to the presence or absence of intermediate steps.
 
Second, the United States working paper rejects by omission
 
the concept of permanent sovereignty, at least insofar as it
 
is said to extend to the right to restrict access even to
 
information regarding a state's natural resources. As a result,
 
the working paper does not subject either acquisition or dissemi­
nation of earth resources data to the consent of the surveilled
 
states. On the contrary, the American draft promotes a policy
 
of open dissemination of data. That difference is important
 
in light of the strength of the support for prior consent evi­
denced in speeches and private remarks by representatives of the
 
members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
 
Third, the working paper makes repeated reference to broad
 
international participation in the remote sensing activities
 
of space powers, technical assistance and regional cooperation.
 
Although the other drafts make some reference to those principles,
 
the American proposal takes a relatively strong position. The
 
reasoning is that the defeat of an earth resources regime
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based on prior consent will only occur if the United States can
 
demonstrate a strong likelihood that substantial benefits will
 
inure to other countries if the American proposal is adopted.
 
Fourth, the proposal submitted by the United States would
 
not, like the Latin American draft, impose international respon­
sibility on each state for the activities of its nationals. The
 
advantage of including such a provision in the instrument
 
ultimately adopted is that it implicitly recognizes and authorizes
 
non-governmental entities, especially corporations, to conduct
 
operations in outer space. The potential disadvantage that the
 
government would be responsible for enforcing international
 
legal prohibitions against its own nationals is not a new
 
disadvantage, since a similar clause appears in Article VI
 
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. If such a provision were
 
adopted by CPUOS in the context of earth resources technology,
 
the 	private sector would be able to argue that an international
 
consensus approving commercial satellite remote sensing
 
activities has been established, and that domestic policy
 
should be made consistent with that consensus.
 
In summary, the United States position is based on the
 
following main principles:
 
1. 	no prior consent for either satellite data
 
acquisition or data dissemination;
 
2. 	open dissemination of data to any customer;
 
3. 	dissemination to sensed state as soon as to
 
any other government, and
 
4. 	broad technical assistance and international
 
participation.
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B. Current Status of the Earth Resources Satellite Debate
 
During its fifteenth session, CPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
 
established a working group on the legal implications of remote
 
sensing of the earth from outer space. On the basis of five
 
"common elements" derived from the draft declaration submitted
 
by the Argentine, Brazilian, Soviet, French, and American
 
delegations, as well as from views expressed during the sub­
committee's fourteenth session,1 2 the working group formulated
 
five draft principles applicable to satellite remote sensing
 
during the 1976 session. In addition, the working group
 
identified three new common elements.
13
 
1. Principlte I
 
As formulated by the Legal Sub-Committee, the first draft
 
principle provides:
 
Remote sensing of [the natural resources of the
 
earth] [and its environment] from outer space and
 
international co-operation in that field [shall]
 
[should] be carried out for the benefit and in the
 
interests of all countries [mankind], irrespective
 
of their degree of economic or scientific development,
 
and taking into consideration, in international co­
operation; the particular needs of the developing
 
countries.
 
Principle I is based on Article I(1) of the 1967
 
Outer Space Treaty which requires that the use of outer space
 
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
 
development. The impact of the draft principle on operational
 
implementation of remote sensing technology is dependent on
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the construction of the parallel language in Article 1.
14
 
Some CPUOS delegations have argued that the treaty language
 
entitles less developed countries to enjoy the benefits of
 
earth resources satellite technology even though they are unable
 
to conduct independent space programs. If that position
 
became generally accepted, the range of institutional arrange­
ments available to the United States for implementing a
 
national earth resources satellite system on an operational
 
basis would be limited. In particular, the option to provide
 
earth resources information services on a commercial basis would
 
be jeopardized. Because of the potentially adverse consequences
 
for both national and international interests which could
 
result from adoption of the restrictive interpretation of
 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty and Principle I of the
 
draft declaration on satellite remote sensing, it appears that
 
all states, including less developed countries, will benefit
 
most from the combination of organizational and legal principles
 
which promote initiation of earth resources information services
 
on an operational basis as quickly as possible to the broadest
 
range of potential users. If scope and quality of service
 
provides the basis for international policy in this area, the
 
restrictive approach would be dysfunctional. However, if
 
national participation is considered by the international
 
community to be more important than service characteristics,
 
the interpretation of Principle I urged by the developing
 
countries is likely to be adopted. The latter approach is,
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however, not likely to be with the near-term interests of the
 
entities which decide t6 invest in the industrialization of
 
outer space.
 
The text of the draft principle contains three sets of
 
bracketed words. The first pair was apparently inserted as
 
a result of the suggestion by the United States delegation
 
that the scope of the draft declaration be expanded from
 
include the entire natural environment. 1 5
 natural resources to 

In light of the possibility that the final declaration may be
 
somewhat restrictive in character, an expansion of the scope
 
of coverage has given rise to some concern in the private
 
sector. The second pair of brackets resulted from disagreement
 
among the CPUOS delegations regarding the strength of the
 
declaration to be adopted. However, since the final product
 
is likely to be a non-binding declaration of principles, the
 
disagreement in this point is not considered significant.
 
The proposed use of the word "mankind" rather than the
 
word "countries" in the third set of brackets may well result
 
in increasing reference to the broader concept of the "common
 
heritage of mankind." This broader concept has been embodied
 
in General Assembly resolutions and negotiations relating to
 
16
 
the law of the deep seabed, as well as to the moon treaty
 
presently under consideration by CPUOS, 17 and has been used by
 
less developed countries to assure access on an equitable
 
basis to the natural resources of both areas regardless of
 
their ability to exploit them.18 A parallel construction might
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enable a state to obtain satellite-acquired remote sensing
 
information, regardless of its ability to pay for the information.
 
Although mentioned here in the context of the remote sensing
 
satellite debate, the notion that all states should have access
 
to the products of space activities without consideration of
 
financial ability to participate in these activities has
 
potentially adverse implications for all facets of space indus­
trialization. In particular, adoption of the "common heritage
 
of mankind" approach could inhibit commercial participation in
 
the development of outer space.
 
2. Principle II
 
The second draft principle formulated by the working group
 
provides:
 
Remote sensing of [the natural resources of the
 
earth] [and its environment] from outer space [shall]
 
[should] be conducted in accordance with international
 
law, including the Charter of the United Nations and
 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.
 
The language is consistent with and apparently based on the
 
text of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. In addition,
 
the text is essentially identical to the text of the second
 
common element formulated during the Legal Sub-Committee's
 
fourteenth session.1 9 The two sets of brackets were included
 
as a result of the same general positions which necessitated
 
inclusion of parallel bracketed terms in Principle I.
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In its present form, Principle II would not have any
 
adverse impact on optimum availability of benefits, unless
 
either general international law or the terms of a remote
 
sensing declaration were deemed to include such concepts as
 
"prior consent," "the common heritage of mankind" and "permanent
 
sovereignty over natural resources." To date the United States
 
has been consistent in its opposition to adoption of prior
 
consent principles with respect to both acquisition and dis­
semination of satellite-acquired data. The same approach
 
should be taken with respect to the concept of "permanent
 
sovereignty over natural resources," which has supplied one
 
of the main policy foundations for prior consent arguments.
 
As embodied in a series of General Assembly resolutions, the
 
concept would give each state the right to control access not
 
only to its natural resources but to information regarding those
 
resources as well. 20 Although an examination of those texts
 
demonstrates that the concept has not yet been extended that
 
far, the extension would be accomplished by adopting a principle
 
similar to that in a working paper submitted by Mongolia during
 
the subcommittee's fifteenth session which provides.
 
States participating in remote sensing should
 
respect the principle of full and permanent sover­
eignty of all States and peoples over their wealth
 
and natural resources as well as their inalienable
 
right to dispose of their natural resources and of
 
information concerning those resources. 21
 
Because of the potential inhibiting effect it could exert on
 
the establishment of an operational earth resources satellite
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system, the concept of permanent sovereignty should be limited
 
to its current scope. Opposition to the Mongolian proposal is
 
also considered important, because such opposition would
 
undermine support for the extreme prior consent proposals. As
 
a result, compromise would be facilitated in other areas.
 
3. PrincipZe III
 
As drafted by the Working Group on Remote Sensing at
 
the fifteenth session of the Legal Sub-Committee, Principle
 
III provides:
 
1. States carrying out programmes for remote sensing
 
of [the natural resources of the earth] [and its
 
environment] from outer space [should] [shall] promote
 
international co-operation in these programmes. To
 
this end, sensing States [should] [shall] make avail­
able to other States opportunities for participation
 
in these programmes. Such participation should be
 
based in each case on equitable and mutually acceptable
 
terms due regard being paid to elements
 
2. In order to maximize the availability of benefits
 
from such remote sensing data, States are encouraged
 
to consider agreements for the establishment of shared
 
regional facilities.2 2
 
Principle III is based on two common elements identified
 
by the Working Group on Remote Sensing during the fourteenth
 
session of the Legal Sub-Committee. 23 According to the session
 
report, the delegations agreed:
 
1. that the maximum benefits to all countries could
 
be obtained by international co-operation at all
 
levels, particularly on a regional basis; and
 
2. that States undertaking programmes for remote
 
sensing activities by means of space technology should
 
encourage international participation.24
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The texts of the draft principle and the underlying common
 
elements raise the question of the meaning of the terms
 
"cooperation" and "participation" and the relationship between
 
the two. Article 1(3) of the Outer Space Treaty requires
 
states to "facilitate and encourage international co-operation
 
in (scientific) investigations." Since the term "co-operation"
 
is not used again in any operative provision which relates
 
to activities in outer space, 2 5 it may be construed in the
 
limited context of Article 1(3) relating to scientific investi­
gation. Thus, "co-operation" is not necessarily mandated,
 
except for experimental activities. The Outer Space Treaty
 
does not give any significant clue to the meaning of "co­
operation." The fact that Paragraph 1 of Principle III refers
 
to the promotions of "international co-operation in (the)
 
programmes" of sensing states suggests that the working group
 
equated "co-operation" with "participation." That inference
 
is supported by the second sentence of Paragraph I which
 
establishes "participation" as the most important element,
 
if not the only element, of "co-operation."
 
Actual foreign participation in programs conducted by the
 
United States or its nationals would jeopardize corporate
 
interests. First, to the extent that the federal government
 
permits foreign participation, the alternatives for interface
 
between the public and private sectors are limited. If, for
 
example, the federal government cooperates in the construction
 
of an extensive network of readout stations for distribution
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of raw data, it cannot logically support commercial implemen­
tation. Second, foreign participation in profit-oriented
 
operations would both undermine the commercial basis and
 
jeopardize United States technological leadership. Similarly,
 
significant participation in United States programs is likely
 
to result in international pressure to limit providers of
 
data and services to activities in their own regions, thus
 
reducing both competition and the quality and scope of services
 
available to users.
 
The United States delegation is not likely to support
 
deletion of the references to participation, because it has
 
supported strong cooperation and participation as a means
 
of avoiding imposition of prior consent principles. In fact,
 
the draft declaration submitted by the United States delegation
 
during the thirteenth session of the Legal Sub-Committee
 
contains the provision that:
 
States undertaking programmes designed for remote
 
sensing of the natural environment from satellites
 
shall encourage the broadest feasible international 26
 
participation in appropriate phases of these programmes.
 
Three alternatives for minimizing these difficulties
 
could be considered. First, Paragraph 1 of the third principle
 
could be amended to limit its scope to experimental activities.
 
Second, the language relating to participation could be made
 
discretionary rather than mandatory, and could be limited as
 
provided in Article 4 of the working paper submitted by the
 
United States delegation during the thirteenth session of the
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Legal Sub-Committee to "feasible participation" in "appropriate
 
phases" of United States programs. Third, the paragraph could
 
be amended to limit the participation foreseen therein to
 
governmental, as distinguished from commercial, programs.
 
The language in the final sentence of Paragraph 1 relating
 
to the terms of participation raises another problem of construc­
tion. That sentence, which places participation on the basis
 
of "equitable and mutually acceptable terms," appears to be
 
a broadened version of Article 5(a) of the draft declaration
 
submitted jointly by the Soviet and French delegations which
 
would have entitled any state whose territory is affected by
 
the remote sensing activities of a second state to participate
 
in the latter's program on "equal and mutually acceptable
 
terms." Although the phrase "mutually acceptable terms" appears
 
to be a broadened version of Article 5(a) of the draft declara­
tion submitted jointly by the Soviet and French delegations
 
which would have entitled any state whose territory is affected
 
by the remote sensing activities of a second state to participate
 
in the latter's program on "equal and mutually acceptable terms."
 
Although the phrase "mutually acceptable terms" appears to
 
provide a basis for commercial implementation, questions of
 
interpretation could arise, since the source of the provision
 
suggests an intention to place implementation on a non-commercial
 
basis. Further, the omission from the draft principle of the
 
language in the Soviet-French draft which implicitly limits
 
participation to those states affected by the remote sensing
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program in question would expand the scope of foreign partici­
pation and hence exacerbate the adverse consequences of such
 
participation. The most desirable solution to the problem
 
appears to be to ensure that any participation provision is
 
discretionary in nature and limited to those states which are
 
significantly affected by the program in which the sensed state
 
wishes to participate.
 
The impact of the second paragraph of Principle III on
 
operational implementation depends on the organizational or
 
institutional configurations selected for routine operations.
 
If, as suggested by CPUOS, complete reception and data manage­
ment facilities are to be established in each region, the
 
international market for private sector services could be
 
significantly diminished. Consequently, the regional facilities
 
recommended in Paragraph 2 of Principle III should be limited
 
to facilities for specialized processing of preprocessed data
 
and distribution of information products.
 
4. Principle IV
 
The fourth draft principle formulated by the Working
 
Group on Remote Sensing provides:
 
Remote sensing [of the natural resources of earth]

[and its environment] from outer space [should] [shall]
 
promote the protection of the natural environment of the
 
earth. To this end States participating in remote sensing
 
[should] [shall] identify and make available information
 
useful for the prevention of phenomena detrimental to the
 
natural environment of the earth. 27
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In its present form, the language of the fourth principle would
 
not adversely affect implementation of the technology, even
 
if made mandatory. The use of information products as implied
 
in the second sentence for the prevention of phenomena detri­
mental to the environment could expand the market for earth
 
resources information products. However, to ensure implemen­
tation of this principle in a manner consistent with practical
 
operational considerations, recipients of the information
 
should be identified as international organizations responsible
 
for environmental management and to governments of states
 
likely to be affected adversely by phenomena detrimental to
 
the environment. That limitation could be incorporated through
 
the addition of language at the end of the text which would
 
make available to all states likely to be affected and to
 
concerned international organizations. In addition, the
 
information should be made available on "mutually agreeable"
 
terms.
 
5. Princtple V
 
The fifth draft principle provides:
 
States participating in remote sensing of [the
 
natural resources of the earth] [and its environment]
 
from outer space [should] [shall] make available
 
technical assistance to28other interested States on
 
mutually agreed terms.
 
If implemented in its present form, Principle V would create
 
pressure to export every facet of earth resources satellite
 
technology and related ground technologies. That pressure could
 
undermine both United States technological leadership and the
 
-146­
basis for the provision of commercial earth resource information
 
services not to mention possible national security concerns.
 
However, if the provision were limited to technical assistance
 
relating to specialized processing of data products and to the
 
creation of infrastructures in less developed countries capable
 
of applying information products effectively, it would be more
 
likely to result in rapid national and regional development
 
than would concentration of efforts on the sale of expertise,
 
reception and preprocessing equipment. Since that approach
 
would expand rather than contract the international market
 
for the services not only for providers of satellite data
 
services but for American exporters generally, the focus on
 
infrastructure development appears desirable. Similarly,
 
those terms are
since "information" rather than "data," as 
 29
 
defined by the Working Group on Remote Sensing is the source
 
of the benefits to be derived from satellite remote sensing,
 
the emphasis of international cooperation and technical
 
assistance programs should be placed on the acquisition and
 
application of "information."
 
6. Principle VI
 
1977 session, the Legal Sub-Committee formulated
During its 

a series of new draft principles, based either on previously
 
established
identified common elements or on a consensus 

during the 1977 session.3 0 The first of these is Principle VI
 
which provides:,
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1. The United Nations and its relevant specialized
 
agencies [and the International Atomic Energy Agency]
 
[should] [shall] promote international cooperation,
 
including technical assistance, and play a role of
 
coordination in the area of remote sensing of [the
 
natural resources of the earth] [and its environment].
 
2. States conducting activities in the field of
 
remote sensing of [the natural resources of the earth]
 
[and its environment] [shall] [should] notify the
 
Secretary-General thereof, in compliance with article
 
XI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,

including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
 
This principle was based on the first of the common elements
 
identified during the 1976 session.31 In its present form,
 
Principle VI makes a general statement regarding a possible
 
coordinating role for the United Nations which would be
 
desirable from the perspective of the United States if imple­
mented within the limits described in the discussion of
 
Principle V. The second paragraph merely applies Article XI
 
of the Outer Space Treaty to satellite remote sensing and is
 
considered inoffensive, provided the level of information
 
required does not exceed the nature and scope of information
 
currently supplied regarding satellite launches.
 
7. Princtple VII
 
Principle VII, which provides:
 
Information obtained by remote sensing [of the natural
 
resources of the earth] [and its environment] indicating
 
an impending natural disaster shall be disseminated as
 
promptly as possible to those States likely to be affected.
 
was based on the second common principle identified during
 
the 1976 session of the Legal Sub-Committee.32 Adoption of
 
this element in its present form also appears desirable. If
 
included in a package of general services, the disaster warning
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service could be used to demonstrate to other delegations that
 
the value of potential benefits significantly exceeds the cost
 
of potential abuses of earth resources satellite technology.
 
8. Principle VIII
 
Principle VIII provides:
 
Taking into account the principles I and II above, remote
 
sensing data or information derived therefrom [shall]
 
[should] [not] be used by States [to the detriment of]
 
[in a manner compatible with] the legitimate rights
 
and interests of other States.
 
Based on the third common element, 33 that language is closely
 
related not only to the concept embodied in Article IX of the
 
Outer Space Treaty that states should conduct their space
 
activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of
 
other states,34 but to the interpretation of Article I(1)
 
urged by developing states which would prohibit activities in
 
outer space, unless they are conducted "in the interests and
 
for the benefit of all states." 3 5 Because of those similarities,
 
Principle VIII is likely to generate similar controversies,
 
particularly regarding the construction of the term "interna­
tional detriment."
 
The bracketed phrases permit both a negative and a positive
 
interpretation. However, from the perspective of potential
 
private sector interests, both approaches could be considered
 
detrimental, when read in the context of Article VI of the
 
Outer Space Treaty which imposes international responsibility
 
on states parties to the treaty for the space activities of their
 
respective nationals, whether governmental or non-governmental
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entities. 36 Broad or uncertain construction of the terms of
 
Principle VIII could lead to restriction of legitimate, desirable
 
activities, paxticularly based on commercial initiatives.
 
Although private sector operations may be possible within the
 
framework of such a principle, adverse political repercussions
 
resulting from disputed constructions of the common element
 
are considered both probable and detrimental to United States
 
interests. Consequently, in its present form, the eighth draft
 
principle is considered undesirable.
 
9. Principle IX
 
The ninth principle incorporated in the new draft was
 
agreed upon during the 1977 Legal Sub-Committee without
 
prior consideration during the 1976 session. Principle IX
 
provides:
 
States participating in remote sensing [of the natural
 
resources of the earth] [and its environment], either
 
directly or through relevant international organization
 
[shall] [should] be prepared to make available to the
 
United Nations and other interested States, particularly
 
the developing countries, upon their request, any

relevant technical information involving possible opera­
tional systems which they are free to disclose.
 
The apparent rationale for inclusion of this provision is
 
to promote exchange of information regarding the character­
istics of operational systems as a means of enabling devel­
oping countries to keep pace with technical and institutional
 
developments. Since the availability of this type of infor­
mation is likely to alloy some of the concerns of less
 
developing countries concerning potential abuses of the
 
technology, this level of information exchange is considered
 
desirable.
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10. Principle X
 
The second new principle formulated during the 1977 session
 
provides:
 
States [shall] [should] bear international respon­
sibility for [national] activities of remote sensing
 
[of the natural resources of the earth] [and its
 
environment] [irrespective of whether] [where] such
 
activities are carried out by governmental [or non­
governmental] entities, and [shall] [should] [guarantee
 
that such activities will] comply with the provisions
 
of these Principles.
 
In essence, Principle X restates the provisions of Article VI
 
of the Outer Space Treaty, and hence, does not necessarily
 
increase the potential burdens imposed by the supervision
 
requirement of that article. However, the fact of the restate­
ment combined with the potential for more direct language
 
indicates the existence of a trend toward full-scale national
 
governmental supervision of all space activities. Consequently,
 
Principle X has given rise to s6me concern in the private sector
 
regarding the possible limitations on non-governmental space
 
activities.
 
11. Principle XI
 
The final draft principle formulated this year by the
 
Legal Sub-Committee provides:
 
A sensed State [shall] [should] have timely and non­
discriminatory access to data obtained by remote
 
sensing [of the natural resources of the earth] [and
 
its environment] from outer space, pertaining to its
 
territory on reasonable terms [to be mutually agreed
 
upon with the sensing State] and to the extent feasible
 
and practicable, [shall] [should] be provided with
 
such data on such terms [on a continuous and priority
 
basis] [and in any case no later than any third state].
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In some respects, this draft principle appears to correspond
 
to certain of the positions taken by the United States in an
 
attempt to avoid adoption of a prior consent regime. Particu­
larly important are the classes relating to "timely and non­
discriminatory access" and access "in any case no later than
 
any third state." If ultimately adopted, the language of
 
Principle XI could serve to limit the flexibility of operations
 
available to theientity managing the system. In its present
 
form, Principle XI could interfere with traditional private
 
sector management and marketing procedures and should therefore
 
be carefully examined prior to final adoption.
 
C. 	Prospects for Resolution of the Earth Resources
 
Satellite Debate
 
The main tenet of the present United States policy is
 
strict opposition to the adoption of an international regime
 
based on prior consent. This approach is essentially consistent
 
with the interests of the public and private sectors. If data
 
acquisition were subject to the consent of the surveilled state,
 
as proposed in the Latin American draft treaty, acquisition
 
procedures would be disrupted, causing increased costs while
 
decreasing the value of the data. Strict adherence to the
 
prior consent rule on data collection would require the capa­
bility either to turn off the satellite sensors, or to separate
 
out and dispose of information pertaining to the territory
 
of a state which had not given its consent. The first approach
 
would increase the cost of satellite construction and operation,
 
and the second would increase processing time and costs. Both
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approaches would be complicated by fluctuating geographic
 
patterns of consent, especially in politically unstable regions.
 
These consequences would affect the viability of both inter­
national and domestic earth resources services, regardless
 
of the institutional configurations employed. In particular,
 
with respect to operation of the space segment, the principle
 
of prior consent would force operational entities to negotiate
 
directly with foreign governments, which would in turn give
 
rise to all of the problems which characterize relations
 
between a sovereign and non-sovereign entity.
 
Related complications would arise if data dissemination
 
were subject to prior consent. Both the Soviet-French and
 
Latin American drafts would prevent transfer of satellite­
acquired earth resources data from the government operating
 
the satellite to any third party, public or private, without
 
the express authorization of the surveilled state. If strictly
 
construed, those provisions could prevent the United States
 
government from distributing data to its own nationals, unless
 
permitted by the foreign government in question. Strict
 
construction seems warranted, since the provision would be
 
meaningless if the United States government were free to
 
disseminate all of the earth resources information in its
 
possession to its nationals, who would in turn be free to convey
 
the same information to any other entity, public or private.
 
In the absence of foreign governmental consent, American
 
public and private entities could be inhibited from providing
 
effective services in border areas, both because of the problems
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of spillover and because of the inability to provide services
 
regarding phenomena affected by stimuli which originate or
 
operate exclusively in foreign territories. Although the
 
domestic market would enjoy the advantages of the relatively
 
cordial relations between the United States and the adjacent
 
countries, the delays and potential instability associated
 
with consent relationships would make the situation undesirable.
 
The same problems would be exacerbated in the international
 
market. In most regions the relatively small areas controlled
 
by each government would increase the problems arising from
 
the need to incorporate information from the territories
 
of another state into an effective analysis of conditions
 
in the consenting state. In the same regions border tensions
 
and other forms of competition between neighboring states will
 
interfere with the process of securing the necessary authori­
zations. Even where consent is initially obtained, continuation
 
is dependent on political factors.
 
As noted above, one of the main policy foundations for
 
the prior consent proposals has been the argument that the
 
concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources"
 
embodied in a series of General Assembly resolutions gives a
 
state the right to control access not only to its natural
 
resources but to information regarding these resources as well.
 
An examination of those texts demonstrates that the concept has
 
not yet been extended that far. To date, the United States
 
delegation has not demonstrated particularly strong opposition,
 
probably because of the political dynamics within the Outer Space
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Committee. Limitation of the concept of permanent sovereignty
 
to its current scope could weaken support for the extreme prior
 
consent proposals and make possible compromise on some basis
 
which permits relatively free access to data.
 
As an alternative to the prior consent proposals, the United
 
States delegation has offered a strong policy of open dissemina­
tion of data. One of the main arguments against prior consent
 
is that a prior consent regime would either defeat implementa­
tion of the technology altogether or give a monopoly on remote
 
sensing data to those highly industrialized states capable of
 
operating their own satellites. Under the open dissemination
 
policy sensing states would make data "available to interested
 
States, international organizations, individuals, scientific
 
communities and others on an equitable, timely and non-discrimi­
natory basis." Although the current United States policy could
 
exclude the sensing state from the non-discrimination requirement
 
and could in theory permit earlier access to its nationals,
 
the non-discrimination aspect suggests that the State Department
 
may be tending away from policy choices--and hence institutional
 
configurations--which would permit access to earth resources
 
satellite data prior to complete circulation through the federal
 
Landsat processing network.
 
Another potential disadvantage could arise from the fact
 
that the United States usually bases its argument in favor of
 
open dissemination on the fact that the Landsat program has
 
made a vast amount of information available to states which
 
otherwise would have had no opportunity to secure it. The
 
-155­
response has been, first, that NASA's current dissemination
 
policy is entirely unilateral in nature and is therefore subject
 
to unilateral alteration, and second, that the United States
 
has not provided any assurance that the Landsat program will
 
be continued on medium-term -- much less, a long-term -- basis.
 
In its effort to secure a consensus on its open dissemination
 
policy, the United States may feel compelled to commit itself
 
to continuation of federally supported earth resources programs
 
for the foreseeable future. The legislation introduced by
 
Senator Ford to establish an operational earth resources
 
satellite system under the control of NASA and the Department
 
of the Interior would be consistent with that approach.
37
 
Because of reliance interests developed by other governments,
 
a decision to utilize an organizational structure or selection
 
of a means of distribution substantially different than the
 
present method of selling partially refined data at the cost
 
of reproduction is likely to subject the State Department to
 
serious foreign pressure.
 
The third major element of current United States policy
 
is the encouragement by sensing states of the broadest feasible
 
international participation in appropriate phases of their
 
respective programs. To facilitate that goal, the United
 
States has proposed that sensing states should provide, within
 
the limits of their capabilities, assistance to other interested
 
states regarding the acquisition, interpretation and application
 
of satellite-gathered earth resources data. The 'implication is
 
that the United States government will continue encouraging
 
other governments to participate in its Landsat program by
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establishing national or regional ground stations and data
 
interpretation facilities. Participation and technical
 
assistance are likely to generate a dependence among other
 
countries upon U.S. government programs, thus increasing the
 
international pressure to continue or even expand the current
 
programs. The scope of the assistance actually provided
 
will determine the extent to which the combination of readily
 
available data and essentially gratuitous transfer of appli­
cations expertise will jeopardize the viability of the inter­
national marketing activities. However, in light of United
 
States foreign policy interests, the level of assistance is
 
likely to become substantial.
 
Although the differences between the interests of the
 
Carter Administration and those of previous administrations
 
may cause some changes in present United States policy, a
 
number of considerations are likely to diminish the magnitude
 
of any policy shifts. First, the federal government has a
 
number of interests which would be advanced by an open data
 
dissemination policy enhanced by technical assistance efforts.
 
The federal government is primarily interested in procuring
 
the benefits of satellite remote sensing technology for its
 
citizens. Among these benefits are increased supply of raw
 
materials, increased information for managing the national economy
 
and enhanced ability to monitor the national environment for
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purposes of preventing or reversing environmental degradation.
 
Consequently, the government is concerned that the policies it
 
advocates will facilitate: a) effective, accurate service;
 
b) on a real-time basis; c) at a reasonable cost.
 
A second primary interest is the selection bf a combination
 
of national and international policies which will develop the
 
technology to operational status as soon as possible consistent
 
with the realization of other goals. Third, the federal govern­
ment is concerned that it reduce its expenditures as far as
 
possible consistent with the achievement of other goals. The
 
implications of this consideration are complicated by the fact
 
that the government has a potential dual role as both provider
 
and consumer of earth resources data services.
 
Fourth, federal policymakers are interested tn expanding,
 
exports through satellite remote sensing in two ways. First,
 
by promoting the international role of earth resources data
 
and receiving and data processing equipment, the United States
 
would improve its balance of payments and generate the foreign
 
policy benefits discussed below. The federal government probably
 
also intends to use earth resources satellite data at a second
 
level as a tool, first, to develop previously underdeveloped
 
food and mineral resources in order to increase supply and
 
decrease world raw materials prices, and second, to encourage
 
other states, especially the developing states, to use revenues
 
from their increased volume of raw material exports to increase
 
their imports, particularly from the United States. This
 
broader approach seems to promise greater benefits for the
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United States economy as a whole. That promise is increased
 
by the apparent tendency of the American economy, vts-a-vis
 
the economies of other countries, to specialize in the
 
provision of information services. To maximize the benefits of
 
the broader approach, access to earth resources data must be
 
extended as far as possible.
 
Fifth, federal policy has traditionally enabled American
 
private enterprise to exploit technology for commercial purposes,
 
but the tendency has been limited by the extent to which other
 
governmental interests have outweighed the interest in promoting
 
commercial involvement.
 
In addition to those domestic policy factors, the United
 
States has a wide range of foreign policy interests which could
 
be affected by its choice of an international remote sensing
 
policy. The first of those interests is the desire to continue
 
reaping the benefits of other nations' recognition for United
 
States technological leadership. To accomplish that goal,
 
continued research and development is essential, indicating
 
the need for continuing federal involvement in the earth
 
resources field. Further, the United States must be able to
 
demonstrate highly visible technical progress. On a more
 
subtle level, these prestige benefits are also contingent on
 
showing that the benefits of technological progress extend
 
beyond the borders of the United States to less advanced
 
countries.
 
The second set of foreign policy interests centers around
 
the use of satellite remote sensing as a foreign policy tool.
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If the U.S. government retains some measure of control over the
 
allocation of earth resources data and services, it will be
 
able to use the technology as a reward-or-punishment tool to
 
advance its other foreign policy interests. Transfer of control
 
to the private sector, however, would limit the flexibility of
 
the tool.
 
The avoidance of foreign policy disadvantages could also
 
militate against seic tron ol a poli,-v conducive to transter to 
private enterprise. A profit-oriented organization is not likely 
to be especially concerned about the international political ramifi­
cations of the uses made of its work products by customers of
 
refined earth resources data. Consequently, aggravation of inter­
national disputes could result particularly with regard to
 
boundary placement in regions where satellite imagery indicates
 
the existence of valuable natural resources Blame would fall
 
on the United States, even if its system were not operated by
 
the government. Government control could limit the adverse
 
consequences.
 
Similarly, government control could limit the negative response
 
sometimes generated by an aggressive profit-oriented applications
 
program. Direct profits for the earth resources industry might
 
be reduced, but the benefits to the whole economy might, as noted
 
above, be greater over time. Concerns expressed in the United
 
Nations regarding the potential for economic imperialism if
 
earth resources satellites were operated by a single government
 
or private entity may lead the State Department to favor some
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inter-governmental arrangement designed to give at least the
 
appearance of international control.
 
The third disadvantage to be avoided by non-private
 
control of earth resources activities is the problem of
 
international backlash which could result from transfer
 
to the private sector. NASA has entered into a number of
 
bilateral agreements with othEr governments [or cooperation
 
on earth resources satellite experiments. Each of those agree­
ments calls for NASA to permit access to its Landsat system,
 
and the other party agrees to construct an earth station and
 
pay its own costs of participation. In addition, NASA has made
 
attractive proposals which would encourage other states to invest
 
in earth resources technology. In 1970, NASA proposed that the
 
United States government adopt a program under which launching
 
states would make data available to interested states at the
 
cost of duplication, while a special United Nations facility
 
would be established initially to service such United Nations
 
agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and later to assume such
 
other responsibilities as were assigned to it by the world
 
community.38 Four years later, at the third session of the
 
CPUOS Working Group on Remote Sensing, the United States offered
 
to provide any international earth resources center with a
 
master copy of the data collected during NASA's experimental
 
39
ERTS program. The agreements and offers by the United States
 
combined with reliance by other states created international
 
pressure on the federal government to continue providing some
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level of Landsat services. Transfer of its responsibility
 
to a private entity would eliminate such unprofitable
 
services, probably causing a backlash among other states.
 
Achievement of all of the foreign policy goals and most of
 
the other goals described above is dependent at least in part
 
upon extensive international participation. Consequently, the
 
combination of national and international policy choices by
 
the United States are likely to be designed in such a way as
 
to make it clear to foreign governments that participation
 
in the proposed international system would substantially advance
 
their respective national interests. A policy essentially
 
transferring responsibility for earth resources satellite tech­
nology to the private sector would complicate the prospects
 
for international participation.
 
In addition to its own interests, the State Department
 
is likely to consider the interests of other federal agencies,
 
most significantly NASA and the Department of Interior.
 
In furtherance of NASA's statutory mandate to promote the
 
widest feasible application of space technology on both
 
the national and international levels, NASA and its Office
 
of International Affairs are actively supporting continuation
 
and expansion of the network of memoranda of understanding
 
between NASA and foreign governments. Expansion of the
 
network could generate increased international opposition
 
to discontinuation of the international aspects of the Landsat
 
programs. Further, proliferation of ground stations could
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overcome some of the impediments to the establishment of an inter­
governmental consortium, which could seriously limit the inter­
national market for commercial earth resources services. A
 
policy of intergovernmental implementation on the international
 
level would also strengthen the arguments for provision of
 
earth resources services by a federal agency oi federally
 
chartered entity.
 
The Department of Interior and the U.S. Geological Survey
 
are promoting a policy consistent with their proposals to improve
 
and expand the Sioux Falls installation to facilitate transfer
 
of data to both domestic and international customers. Increased
 
federal involvement at that point in the Landsat system is likely
 
to diminish the probability that private entities will be per­
mitted access at an earlier point in the system.
 
Other elements, particularly from the academic community,
 
are pressing for a U.S. policy in the United Nations which would
 
make available throughout the world both earth resources data
 
and the knowledge and hardware needed to apply the data. Those
 
initiatives generally evidence a distrust of the commercial
 
approach, particularly with respect to socially useful, but
 
generally unprofitable applications.
 
The foregoing analysis of current trends in the CPUOS
 
debates relating to principles to govern the use of earth
 
resources satellites is relevant to general considerations
 
in two main ways. First, under the definition of space indus­
trialization set forth in Part I above, satellite remote
 
sensing constitutes one of the four main categories. Second,
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a comparison of trends in the direct broadcast and earth
 
resources satellite debates indicates that common trends can
 
be identified. Consequently, those trends and the underlying
 
complex of national interests provides the basis for projection
 
of related trends applicable to other types of space industrial
 
activities. As described more fully in Part V below, tendencies
 
apparent from the debate surrounding the draft principles
 
discussed in Subsection B above, suggest that the majority of
 
CPUOS delegations favors a relatively restrictive approach to
 
the development of outer space. This trend, combined with
 
parallel responses in the domestic policy making process, could
 
lead to establishment of international principles which limit
 
the range of available institutional options and hence the
 
character of potential participants in space industrialization.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE CPUOS
 
DEBATES ON THE DRAFT MOON TREATY
 
The first initiative to establish international principles
 
to govern the use and exploration of the moon occurred in 1970
 
when Argentina submitted a proposal to the United Nations calling
 
for promulgation of appropriate rules.1 However, significant
 
activity in the United Nations in that area did not occur until
 
the Soviet Union introduced a draft moon treaty in June 1971.2
 
In response, the General Assembly directed the Committee on the
 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (CPUOS) to consider and elaborate
 
upon the Soviet draft treaty at its fourteenth session, held in
 
New York in September 1971. 3 The Outer Space Committee referred
 
the draft treaty to its Legal Sub-Committee for detailed considera­
tion at its eleventh session in April and May 1972. Despite
 
significant differences of opinion among the delegations, the
 
subcommittee was able to formulate a unified negotiating text
 
consisting of a preamble and twenty-one draft articles. However,
 
certain provisions were stated in alternative forms, indicating
 
disagreement among the delegations as to those provisions.
 
As a result, consideration of the treaty was continued the follow­
4
 ing year.
 
The Legal Sub-Committee again examined the draft moon treaty
 
at its twelfth session in March and April 1973, and several
 
working papers were submitted by various delegations. Six
 
provisions were adopted by the Legal Sub-committee which modified
 
the 1972 draft somewhat and focused the remaining disagreements
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around three main issues:
 
1. 	scope of the treaty;
 
2. 	disposition of lunar resources; and
 
3. 	character and scope of information about the objectives
 
of lunar missions to be made public prior to their
 
commencement.
 
Since 1973 the same issues have remained unresolved and have
 
prevented final approval of a moon treaty.
 
A. 	Current Status of the Moon Treaty Debate
 
Since 1973 three main issues have remained unresolved and
 
prevented establishment of a final consensus on a draft moon
 
treaty to be submitted to the General Assembly. The questions
 
relating to the disposition of lunar resources are considered
 
the most difficult, and its solution is expected to permit
 
resolution of the remaining issues.
5
 
1. 	Natural Resources
 
The main positions among CPUOS delegations on issues
 
relating to the exploration and use of the moon are most clearly
 
crystallized on the question of the disposition of lunar
 
resources and its four major subissues:
 
1. 	the impact of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty;
 
2. 	the impact of the evolving concept of the common
 
heritage of mankind;
 
3. 	the desirability of deferring regulation of lunar
 
exploration and use until those activities have
 
become imminent;
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4. 	the desirability of declaring a moratorium on the
 
exploitation of lunar resources pending establishment
 
of an international consensus on the disposition of
 
lunar resources.
 
For purposes of clarity, this discussion will consider the
 
question of lunar resources from the perspective of these
 
subissues.
 
a. 	Article II and National Appropriation of Lunar Resources
 
Since 1973 two main positions on the question of national
 
appropriation of lunar resources have emerged. The United
 
States takes the position that the Article II prohibition
 
against appropriation of the moon and other celestial bodies
 
does not prohibit acquisition of propriety rights in the
 
6
 
natural resources of the moon. They interpret Article II as
 
prohibiting a state from exercising sovereignty over parts
 
of the moon, but not prohibiting a state from gaining proprie­
torship over goods, including natural resources, which they take
 
or "capture" from the moon. 7 This conceptual distinction
 
between prohibited sovereignty and permitted proprietorship of
 
natural resources is based on the provisions in Articles I and
 
III of the Outer Space Treaty, which expressly permit states
 
8
 
to "use" the moon. As a result, those delegations argue that
 
prohibition of ownership of the natural resources of the moon
 
would require alteration of existing law as embodied in the
 
Outer Space Treaty.
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The Soviet position reaches the same. conclusion by somewhat
 
different reasoning. The Soviets advocate strengthening the
 
Article II prohibition. In particular, they argue that the
 
right of states to explore and use the moon, and the practical
 
establishment of moon stations, does not create an ownership
 
right to the surface or subsurface. 9 However, as made clear
 
in the Soviet Draft Moon Treaty, the Soviets would expand and
 
clarify Article II by expressly enumerating the entities to
 
whom this prohibition allegedly applies. Under the Soviet
 
approach, the prohibition would cover international organiza­
tions, private organizations, and individuals, as well as
 
states. 10 However, the Soviet delegation argues that the
 
Article II prohibition does not apply to natural resources,
 
and that the rights to these resources for exploitation for
 
either local moon requirements or for transportation to Earth
 
are not defined in the Outer Space Treaty. Both delegations
 
agree that the status of the moon's natural resources should
 
be determined in the moon treaty without any restrictions due
 
to the ban on national appropriation in Article II of the 1967
 
Outer Space Treaty; instead, beneficial ownership of such
 
resources would be given to those states that are actually
 
making use of them.
 
The point of view espoused by the United States, the Soviet
 
Union and other potential space powers is opposed by a bloc
 
of developing countries, led by the delegation of Argentina.
 
The Argentine position recognizes two classes of ownership.
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The first, direct or eminent domain, is considered prohibited
 
by Article II. The second, beneficial ownership (domain util)
 
is the enjoyment, receipt of the fruits and profit
 
derived from property which is either unowned or commonly
 
owned. 12 Because of their support of the principle of the
 
common heritage of mankind, the developing countries maintain
 
that lunar resources are owned in common by all members of the
 
international community and is protected against national
 
13
 
appropriation by the provisions of Article 1I.
 
b. 	The Impact of the Concept of the "Common Heritage
 
of Mankind"
 
Closely related to the issues surrounding application of
 
Article II to lunar resources is the question of the applica­
bility of the evolving concept of the "common heritage of
 
mankind." Professor Aldo Armando Cocca, who heads the Argentine
 
delegation, is the concept's leading advocate. In essence,
 
the common heritage principle would secure beneficial ownership
 
(domain util) of lunar resources for all members of the inter­
national community. Consequently, if adopted, that concept
 
would prevent individual states from appropriating lunar
 
resources for individual use; instead, some form of sharing
 
arrangement would be mandated. Such arrangements could require
 
equitable allocation either of the resources extracted from
 
the moon or of profits derived from the sale of these resources.
 
Professor Cocca admits that both negative and positive
 
consequences are to be anticipated from granting beneficial
 
ownership of the moon to all of the states. The projected
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negative aspects -- including inhibition of commercial initia­
tives -- would affect only those countries which now have the
 
capacity to reach outer space. However, Professor Cocca
 
maintains that all states, including the space powers, will
 
benefit from lunar development on that basis. In particular,
 
Professor Cocca has identified the following specific benefits:
 
-- a realization on the part of all States and peoples 
that they are entitled to the benefits derived from 
the principles and norms established for outer 
space and celestial bodies; 
-- the need to link to the exploration and use of 
space and celestial bodies the exploitation 
thereof; 
-- the search for profit, with an attempt to ensure 
its results; 
-- equitable sharing of profits derived, 
-- consideration of the needs and interests of 
developing countries, 
-- supervision of this activity with a view to 
equitable distribution; 
-- the institution of an international regime; 
-- the establishment of appropriate procedures for 
such regime, and 
-- the existence of international machinery or an 
international authority to give effect to all the 
expectations that have been voiced.14 
The Soviet delegation has opposed the inclusion of the
 
"common heritage" concept in the draft moon treaty because
 
it provides in effect for common ownership of lunar resources,
 
which conflicts with the Soviet position, first, that no
 
property interest should be created prior to the time the
 
minerals are extracted from the moon's surface or subsurface,
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and second, that upon extraction, beneficial ownership should
 
vest in the entity undertaking the mining operation. The
 
underlying rationale is that since the Outer Space Treaty
 
forbids national appropriation, the term "heritage," which
 
is essentially a property concept, should not be used in the
 
moon treaty because it goes far beyond the "common province
 
of all mankind" language sanctioned in the Outer Space Treaty.
15
 
Soviet commentators add that the movement to incorporate the
 
concept into the law of the sea is a serious hindrance to
 
the completion of moon treaty negotiations adoption because
 
of the variances between national interests with respect to
 
on the moon.16
 
ocean resources and corresponding interests 

Although the United States is opposed to incorporation
 
of the concept into the moon treaty, it has not taken a strong
 
stand against the "common heritage" concept.1 7 The United
 
States has taken the position that it will accept inclusion
 
of the phrase only if it is defined as not carrying any expressed
 
or implied prohibition of exploitation of the moon's natural
 
18
 
The United States will support an equitable
resources. 

sharing of the benefits of such exploitation, but only if such
 
sharing is defined as allowing expenses of the space program
 
to be deducted before the benefits are shared. The United
 
States bases this position in equity by reasoning that if it
 
were otherwise, a nation would carry the financial burden of
 
space exploration without offsetting this burden with the
 
benefits. 19
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Other delegations including Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
 
have taken a compromise position which would specifically
 
provide that the main goal is to obtain the benefits of outer
 
space for the benefit of all, but this will not be accomplished
 
unless those countries carrying the expensive burden of space
 
20
 
exploration are reimbursed with a certain degree of profit.
 
At present the status of the concept under international
 
law is subject to extensive debate. 21 Continued lack of opposi­
tion in the CPUOS. negotiations is likely to combine with
 
parallel developments in other areas, most notably the law
 
of the sea, to permit evolution of the concept into a binding
 
principle of international law. If the "common heritage"
 
principle were applied generally to space industrial activities,
 
private initiatives may never become economically viable.
 
C. DesirabtZity of Deferring Disposztion of Lunar Resources
 
As part of the position of potential space powers that
 
restrictive principles should not be applied to lunar resources,
 
it is argued that at present the technology and operational
 
institutional arrangements are not sufficiently developed to
 
permit effective policy planning, and that premature restriction
 
of lunar development activities would defer or prevent reali­
zation of the benefits likely to be available from exploitation
 
of lunar resources. This approach is paralleled by arguments
 
primarily made by the United States in the context of the earth
 
resources and direct broadcast satellite debates. Virtually
 
all of the delegations concede that the establishment of legal
 
princ'iples governing the moon's natural resources may be pre­
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mature because technology is not sufficiently advanced to provide
 
a sound, practical basis for such principles. 22 Nonetheless,
 
representatives from the developing countries have urged
 
resolution of the lunar resources issue before it is complicated
 
are 	created. 28
by investment and reliance interests 

d. 	Desirability of Imposing a Moratorium cn Lunar
 
Development Pending Resolution of the Natural
 
Resources Issue
 
As an element of the "common heritage" position, the
 
developing nations want to impose a moratorium in regard to
 
any development and exploitation of resources on the moon
 
until an international arrangement is made, under which all
 
countries will directly participate in or benefit from such
 
development and exploitation. 24  In response to the prematurity
 
arguments discussed above, the developing nations point to the
 
paradox that at present it is too early to elaborate upon the
 
space legal principle governing the moon and its exploitation
 
because technology is not sufficiently advanced, and in the
 
future it will be too late to do such elaboration because a
 
25
 
de facto situation will already exist. The solution to the
 
dilemma, it is argued is a moratorium on development until
 
appropriate policy guidelines are formulated.
 
The space powers and other industrialized nations maintain
 
that such a moratorium would discourage any country from carrying
 
on any program designed to investigate even the possibility
 
of commercial use of lunar resources, and would eliminate any
 
incentive for the development of the technology required
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for exploration and development. The practical effect would
 
not be to encourage the next logical stage in lunar exploration
 
or, if the scope of the treaty is broadened, in the exploration
 
of other celestial bodies. 26 For that reason, the United States
 
in particular is strongly opposed to any sort of moratorium.
 
One U.S. commentator has argued that the moon treaty should be
 
27
 
structured to promote rather than delay exploitation. This
 
comment is particularly incisive because it highlights a
 
fundamental policy question referred to previously in the
 
discussions of international direct broadcast and earth
 
resources satellite policy, the choice between rapid operational
 
implementation and full-scale international participation.
 
The resolution of this question for each new technology or
 
space activity will influence the viability of commercial
 
entry.
 
2. Scope of the Moon Treaty
 
The second major unresolved issue centers upon the scope
 
of the proposed treaty. On one hand, the original initiatives
 
in this area were focused specifically on the moon. However,
 
others have argued that the treaty should cover "the Moon and
 
other celestial bodies" in accordance with the language of the
 
1967 Outer Space Treaty. 28 The former position is taken
 
primarily by space powers who wish to avoid establishment of
 
any restrictions on exploration of other celestial bodies,
 
and the latter is taken by Argentina and the developing countries,
 
which are attempting to establish the "common heritage" approach
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in as many new areas as possible. However, despite the
 
divergent interests of the two blocs, resolution of the
 
natural resources issue is likely to incorporate a solution
 
for this issue as well. The most likely compromise will limit
 
the express scope of the treaty to the moon, but permit arguments
 
by analogy regarding the management of other celestial bodies
 
until more specific international instruments are approved.
 
3. Prior Information
 
The final unresolved issue relating to the draft moon
 
treaty concerns the nature and scope of information each state
 
will be required to furnish prior to the commencement of
 
lunar missions. The positions on this issue do not follow the
 
divisions identified on the other two issues.
 
The Soviet delegation argues that states should not be
 
required to provide prior information concerning their missions
 
because the 1967 Outer Space Treaty already establishes
 
appropriate criteria for the exchange of information, and
 
anymore stringent requirement would require alteration of
 
existing law and would amount to an attempt to interfere
 
in the domestic affairs of each launching state. The latter
 
contention is based on the notion that mandatory advance
 
notification implicitly contains the right of other states to
 
express protest. 29
 
In contrast, the United States supports advance notifica­
tion on the grounds that it would avoid duplication and
 
stimulate scientific efforts.
3 0
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The developing nations support very thorough and wide
 
ranging prior dissemination of information. India has even
 
proposed in one of its working papers to the Legal Sub-

Committees that all nations be obligated to share discoveries
 
of natural resources (which is not currently required in the
 
draft treaty).31 The delegation from Bulgaria, which is one
 
of the leading advocates of compromise on all three unresolved
 
issues of the Draft Moon Treaty, suggests that the point in
 
time to require all states to give information concerning moon
 
missions is "as soon as possible after launching." Compromise
 
on that basis appears possible which will develop on this
 
32
 
issue.
 
B. Prospects for Resolution of the Moon Treaty
 
In contrast to the CPUOS debates on direct broadcast and
 
earth resource satellites, the United States and the Soviet
 
Union have taken similar positions on the issues raised by the
 
draft moon treaty, in particular on the key question of the
 
disposition of lunar resources. Both of the major space
 
powers, as well as a number of the states which are presently
 
developing space capabilities have perceived their interests
 
to be best served by postponing the resolution of the issue
 
of the legal status of the natural resources of the moon, if
 
agreement can only be based on a "common heritage" approach
 
which deprive the space powers of a very valuable advantage
 
with respect to the exploitation of those resources.
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The developing nations have perceived delay to be contrary
 
to their interests. They also are aware that their demand to
 
include the "common heritage" language is one of the main
 
impediments to establishment of an international consensus on
 
principles to govern the exploration and exploitation of the
 
moon's resources. As a result, some significant pressure to
 
soften demands for incorporation of "common heritage" language
 
is being exerted. However, since the less developed countries
 
are seeking to establish "common heritage" regimes in a number
 
of areas, including the deep seabed, they are unlikely to
 
soften these demands to any significant degree. Consequently,
 
rapid resolution of the CPUOS negotiations on the draft moon
 
treaty is unlikely. In the absence of a major policy initiative
 
proposing mutually agreeable resolution of a number of diverse
 
issues, protracted negotiations may be anticipated. The United
 
Nations conference on science and technology proposed for 1979
 
may provide a framework for such an initiative.
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PART IV: CONCLUSIONS
 
The foregoing analysis raises a fundamental question
 
relatingto the extent to which and the conditions under which
 
the private sector will be permitted to participate in the
 
development of outer space. On one hand, in some cases in the
 
United States the responsibility for operational implementation
 
has been left to the private sector. The most significant
 
example is the case of communications satellite technology.
 
On the other hand, current trends are leading away from signi­
ficant private sector participation. Consequently, the private
 
sector should be concerned that its option to participate
 
may be eroded.
 
Assumption by the private sector of responsibility for
 
operational activities suggests a wide range of potential
 
benefits for national interests. First, commercial enterprises
 
are likely to promote institution and provision of full-scale,
 
high quality operational services on a more timely and efficient
 
basis than any of the other institutional alternatives. Second,
 
commercial implementation would permit the federal government
 
to focus its efforts on appropriate research and development
 
activities. That approach gives rise to three advantages.
 
First, the combination of government research and private
 
sector implementation has proven highly effective in maximizing
 
the realization of the potential benefits of technological
 
development. Second, concentration of federal efforts on
 
research and development will result in minimization of federal
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expenditures consistent with optimum technological development.
 
Third, private sector implementation would make the system
 
operation and service offerings responsive to marketplace
 
demand rather than the congressional budgetary cycle, with
 
concomitant positive implications for the quality and consis­
tency of service.
 
Another advantage from private sector operation of mature
 
systems is based on the positive effects for national economic
 
development. Although any other institutional approach may
 
promote economic development, commercial implementation is
 
more likely to maximize the multiplier effects throughout the
 
national economy.
 
These and other considerations suggest that private sector
 
participation in space operations is desirable. Nonetheless,
 
a number of trends suggest that national and international
 
policy may be moving away from promotion of full-scale commercial
 
involvement. On the national level, that tendency is evidenced,
 
for example, by the legislative trends. In August 1976,
 
Senator Moss introduced a bill to establish an operational
 
earth resources satellite system based on private sector
 
initiatives. In January of this year, Senator Ford introduced
 
a related bill which removed the private sector mandate,
 
allocating operational responsibility to NASA and to the
 
Department of the Interior.
 
A number of parallel trends are apparent in the interna­
tional arena. Even the cornerstone of international space
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law, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, creates the foundation for
 
limitation of private sector involvement. Article I(1) is
 
said to require space activities to be carried out "for the
 
benefit and in the interests of all countries." If any
 
operative effect is given to that phrase, it could diminish
 
the viability of commercial ventures. Similarly, Articles VI
 
and VII of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as the Convention
 
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
 
contain provisions which potentially require relatively
 
restrictive governmental supervision of national -- including
 
commercial -- space operations. Supervision is likely to entail
 
regulation and resultant limitation of operational flexibility.
 
Of course, the treaty's provisions as interpreted by the
 
United States are not completely negative. For example,
 
Article II arguably does not inhibit appropriation of outer
 
space or portions of celestial bodies by private enterprises.
 
However, this construction is not universal. As noted in
 
Section III of Part III above, the Soviets interpret Article II
 
to prohibit appropriation by any entity, including commercial
 
entities. In addition, a number of current trends suggest
 
that private sector involvement in the implementation of new
 
space technologies will not be encouraged. First, negotiations
 
presently underway generally do not take private sectors
 
interests sufficiently into account. In addition to actions
 
relating to the adoption of the potentially restrictive
 
principles discussed above in Sections I-III of Part III,
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specific efforts have been made to preclude private sector
 
participation in both direct broadcasting and satellite remote
 
sensing. The reasons for these tendencies appear to be three­
fold. First, the negotiations are conducted between governments,
 
and most delegations do not have national private sector
 
interests in space development to protect, and as a result,
 
advocate policies which protect national interests rather
 
than promote commercial development. Second, negative attitudes
 
toward international commercial ventures motivates even space
 
powers to place concern regarding international repercussions
 
above national commercial interests. Finally, private sector
 
interest in participating in operational space activities has
 
been somewhat understated, possibly because of the low level
 
of market development.
 
The lack of emphasis on private sector interests in
 
international negotiations is complicated by the demands of
 
less developed countries to treat space and other resources
 
as the "common heritage of mankind." The trend toward mandatory
 
licensing of activities relating to the exploitation of seabed
 
resources may be extended to the moon and other celestial
 
bodies. The allocation of geostationary orbital slots by the
 
ITU according to an a priori plan rather than actual use is
 
another indication of the trend in this direction.
 
Paralleling the evolution of the "common heritage" concept
 
is a tendency toward international policies mandating inter­
national participation and sharing. At present, the trend is
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evident in proposals relating to direct broadcast and earth
 
resources satellite activities. The "common heritage" approach
 
to disposition of lunar resources is conceptually similar.
 
This trend could lead eventually to sharing of facilities,
 
space vehicles, products, and perhaps even profits of space
 
ventures. Private sector participation could be jeopardized
 
by any of those results.
 
Although there is ample evidence to support the existence
 
of these tendencies, their strength should not be overestimated.
 
First, the current series of CPUOS negotiations has been in
 
progress for a number of years, and final resolution of out­
standing issues is not expected for some time. Until those
 
negotiations are completed, direct impact on space activities
 
is likely to be somewhat limited. Second, as institution of
 
operational services becomes imminent, some shifts away from
 
restrictive political positions toward more practical, results­
oriented approaches may occur. Consequently, the trends
 
described above are likely to be reversible under appropriate
 
conditions. From the perspective of the private sector, a
 
thorough evaluation of this possibility appears desirable, in
 
light of the possibility that advances in space technology may
 
create attractive business opportunities.
 
To maximize effectiveness, the suggested approach should
 
focus on the development of an ability to respond to legal,
 
institutional and policy developments which will either affect
 
particular space industrial activities directly or create
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precedents which will influence future policy decisions. Since
 
space services are likely to affect both national and inter­
national interests, the scope of this approach should encompass
 
both sets of considerations. In addition to the international
 
deliberations described in the present memoradnum which are
 
likely to influence the nature and scope of international
 
activity, national policymaking activities are currently
 
underway, especially in the earth resources and direct broad­
cast areas, which are likely to affect private sector interests
 
in a number of space industrial activities. The most signifi­
cant example is the legislation introduced in the Senate to
 
establish an operational earth resources satellite system.
 
In order to preserve its option to participate in the develop­
ment of outer space, the private sector should develop the
 
ability to respond to significant initiatives or trends.
 
This response cabability should be based on adequate
 
information. Consequently, effective monitoring activities
 
are 	considered desirable. The objectives of those activities
 
should be to identify:
 
1. 	significant interests affected by each category of
 
space industrial activity;
 
2. 	main actors, both institutions and individuals;
 
3. 	main policy considerations; and
 
4. key decision points.
 
To achieve the necessary level of effectiveness, monitoring
 
should be conducted on a systematic, on-going basis.
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However, a systematic approach is difficult because of the
 
broad array of material considerations. Consequently, a means
 
of selecting monitoring activities to provide both manageability
 
and accuracy must be developed. There are management tools
 
which permit a comprehensive view of the process of developing
 
a technology from initial experimentation through operational
 
implementation. Such a framework could facilitate identification
 
of key activities and trends and could provide the basis for
 
anticipating and responding to developments relevant to future
 
space industrial efforts.
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